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The use of the word ‘shall’ indicates clearly that the state is required to file a rebuttal to the defendant’s notification.” “The state contends that it satisfied its obligation under OCGA § 17-16-5 because it had previously supplied a list of witnesses and the rebuttal witnesses were named on that list. The statute, however, is concerned not with witnesses generally, but with witnesses who will testify regarding the alibi defense. Requiring specific disclosure of the witnesses upon whom the state will rely to rebut the alibi furthers the act’s purpose of preventing surprise and promoting fairness. Furthermore, a defendant who knows which witnesses will testify to rebut an alibi can more accurately assess the strength of his case prior to trial and may consider avoiding a trial through a plea bargain.” B. APPEALS See POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, above C. ARRAIGNMENT Coney v. State, 316 Ga.App. 303, 728 S.E.2d 899 (June 20, 2012). Conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; no reversal where defendant was arraigned without counsel of record being present, absent a showing of prejudice. Contrary to defendant’s contention, he didn’t lose ability to pursue motions due to counsel’s absence at arraignment; rather, trial court had a local rule allowing motions to be filed within 10 days of discovery being provided by State, which occurred here 23 days after arraignment. “[A]s our Supreme Court has … held, a reversal for lack of counsel at any ‘critical stage of a criminal proceeding,’ including an arraignment, ‘is by no means automatic.... The harmfulness of counsel's absence must appear.’ Dixon v. Hopper, 237 Ga. 811, 812(1) (229 S.E.2d 656) (1976). ‘[W]here the record does not show whether or not the defendant was prejudiced by the absence of counsel’ at a pretrial appearance, a trial court ‘should determine whether the lack of counsel was harmless error.’ State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58, 60 (222 S.E.2d 333) (1976). ‘A federal constitutional error can be held harmless only if the state shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Id. Thus in Bache v. State, 208 Ga.App. 591 (431 S.E.2d 412) (1993), this Court held that a defendant who lacked counsel at arraignment, but who could not show how any specific motion not made ‘would have enhanced his defense,’ could not show harm arising from the absence of counsel at that stage of the proceedings. Id. at 592(1). Because the record shows that Coney did not lose the right to a hearing on his motion to suppress as a result of a lack of counsel at arraignment, because he has not alleged any other specific harm resulting from that event, and because he was afforded the assistance of counsel at trial, we conclude that the State has carried its burden of showing that any error arising from the absence of counsel at arraignment was harmless. See Dixon, 237 Ga. at 812–813 ( State carried its burden of showing no harm arising from lack of counsel at arraignment when defendant failed to allege any specific harm arising therefrom and when he was represented by counsel at trial); Bache, 208 Ga.App. at 592(1); compare Ledford v. State, 247 Ga.App. 885 (545 S.E.2d 396) (2001) (reversing defendant's conviction because she lost the right to file a motion to suppress when she appeared without counsel at arraignment).” Flores v. State, 308 Ga.App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (March 10, 2011). In prosecution for trafficking in methamphetamine, no basis for reversal of conviction due to inadequacies of arraignment or notice thereof. “Flores contends that he received inadequate notice of his arraignment and was never formally arraigned, in violation of OCGA §§ 17-7-91 and 17-7-93. OCGA § 17-7-91 provides, in relevant part, that in criminal cases the court clerk shall mail notice of arraignment to the defendant and his attorney at least five days prior to arraignment, and the defendant shall be arraigned on the date fixed by the court. OCGA § 17-7-93 sets forth procedures to be followed during the arraignment. Flores's contention presents no basis for reversal. At trial, Flores voiced no objection to the alleged lack of arraignment or notice. Any error in the lack of arraignment was waived by his failure to raise the issue prior to verdict. Spear v. State, 270 Ga. 628, 632(5) (513 S.E.2d 489) (1999). Moreover, even if there had been no waiver, procedural errors occurring at the arraignment stage are subject to a harmless error analysis. See Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 228(9) (610 S.E.2d 521) (2005). In light of Flores's failure to show (or even assert) any harm, reversal is not required. Id. at 228-229(9).” Accord, Moss v. State , 298 Ga. 613, 783 S.E.2d 652 (March 7, 2016). Hall v. State, 282 Ga.App. 562, 639 S.E.2d 341 (November 2, 2006). “Hall … maintains that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive formal arraignment. However, the record included a copy of the indictment with Hall’s signature indicating that he waived being formally arraigned and pled not guilty. While this form, standing alone, fails to establish that Hall knowingly or intelligently waived rights guaranteed him by the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions, Payne v. State, 217 Ga.App. 386, 387 (460 S.E.2d 297) (1995), any error in the lack of arraignment was waived by Hall’s failure to raise the issue before the verdict. ‘The right of formal arraignment and plea will be conclusively considered as waived, where the defendant goes to trial before the jury on the merits, and fails, until after verdict, to bring to the attention of the court that he has not been formally called upon to enter a plea to the indictment.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Frazier v. State, 204 Ga.App. 795 (420 S.E.2d 824) (1992).”