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Loggins v. State, 225 Ga.App. 713, 484 S.E.2d 758 (March 25, 1997). Theft and related convictions affirmed; no error where counsel was allowed to waive defendant’s appearance at arraignment and plead not guilty in his behalf. “Contrary to Loggins' assertions, a defendant's attorney is authorized to waive arraignment and enter a not guilty plea in his client's absence. See Davis v. State, 135 Ga.App. 203, 205-206, 217 S.E.2d 343 (1975). The defendant's right to be present at the arraignment is waived if counsel does not object to proceeding in the defendant's absence. Id.” D. BENCH TRIALS Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 614, 734 S.E.2d 450 (November 16, 2012). Conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine affirmed; at bench trial, improper admission of defendant’s testimony from suppression hearing was harmless error; not only was it cumulative of other, properly-admitted evidence, but “the trial judge was already familiar with that evidence since he had also presided over the suppression hearing, and ‘since the judge was acting as both judge and jury [at the bench trial], it must be presumed that he has sifted the wheat from the chaff and selected the legal testimony from that which is illegal and incompetent, unless from the judgment itself it appears that consideration was given to testimony that should have been excluded.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Schenck v. State, 128 Ga.App. 270, 271–272(2), 196 S.E.2d 362 (1973). Because the judgment itself does not reveal otherwise, we must presume that it is based on the competent evidence in the record.” Jennings v. State, 296 Ga.App. 767, 675 S.E.2d 623 (March 20, 2009). At bench trial, “‘there is a presumption, in the absence of a strong showing to the contrary, that the trial judge sifts the wheat from the chaff, ignoring illegal evidence and considering only legal evidence.’ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Fraser v. State, 283 Ga.App. 477, 481(3)(b) (642 S.E.2d 129) (2007).” Accord, Cash v. State , 299 Ga.App. 303, 682 S.E.2d 607 (July 2, 2009) ( citing Watson v. State, 274 Ga. 689, 691(3) (558 S.E.2d 704) (2002)); Mays v. State , 306 Ga.App. 507, 703 S.E.2d 21 (October 19, 2010); In re: R.W. , 315 Ga.App. 227, 726 S.E.2d 708 (March 27, 2012); Jones (November 16, 2012), above. E. BENCH WARRANTS Dennis v. Paxton, 284 Ga. 430, 668 S.E.2d 258 (October 6, 2008). Pre-trial habeas petition properly denied; defendant was arrested on bench warrant after failing to appear at calendar call on identity fraud and other charges. Rejects defendant’s contention that “the bench warrant was of no force and effect once he appeared in the trial court” after being arrested. “Dennis' appearance on the bench warrant did not render it of no force and effect, see Wells v. Newton, 101 Ga. 141, 145 (28 S.E. 640) (1897).” F. BIFURCATION Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “ The trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to bifurcate the proceedings simply because he was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and his prior felony conviction for possession of cocaine was admitted in evidence. The prior felony cocaine possession conviction was independently admissible as a similar transaction. … Thus, the prior felony conviction was legally material to the other charges in this case and bifurcation was unnecessary. See Cordy v. State, 257 Ga.App. 726, 727 (572 S.E.2d 73) (2002). Further, the trial judge instructed the jury on the proper use and purpose of the prior conviction evidence.” Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (October 2, 2006). 1. Trial court properly bifurcated proceedings to try charge of possession of firearm by convicted felon separately, but before the same jury as defendant’s murder charge. “[W]e have never held and we see no reason now to hold that a defendant is entitled to a separate trial before a new jury on that charge. See Cauley v. State, 260 Ga. 324, 324-325(1) (393 S.E.2d 246) (1990) (where indictment alleged that defendant murdered victim by shooting him with handgun, it was not error for trial court to deny defendant’s motion to sever possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge and try before a new jury).” 2. “[T]he trial court properly instructed the jury that it was authorized to consider the evidence presented in the first guilt/innocence phase of the trial, as well as the evidence presented in the second guilt/innocence phase, in reaching its verdict regarding the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Evans v. State, 240 Ga.App. 215, 217(3) (522 S.E.2d 506) (1999) (jury authorized by law to consider evidence from the first phase of trial during its deliberations on the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon).” Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Bifurcation not required where defendant charged with possession of firearm by convicted felon and felony murder predicated upon possession of firearm by convicted felon. Bifurcated trial not required where one charge