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is material to the other; a predicate offense is material. Accord, Wells v. State , 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (October 16, 2006); Finley v. State , 286 Ga. 47, 685 S.E.2d 258 (October 5, 2009); Poole v. State , 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (November 5, 2012); Leonard v. State , 292 Ga. 214, 735 S.E.2d 767 (November 27, 2012); Brown v. State , 295 Ga. 804, 764 S.E.2d 376 (October 6, 2014); Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (June 1, 2015). Vann v. State, 266 Ga.App. 238, 596 S.E.2d 722 (March 12, 2004). Defendant received ineffective assistance when counsel failed to seek bifurcation of possession of firearm by convicted felon charges from other charges without any “compelling reason.” State’s argument that subject was only raised by certified copy of prior conviction, and mentioned only briefly during closing argument, is unavailing. Evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, thus defendant’s convictions are reversed and remanded for new trial. Seminal case on bifurcation: Head v. State , 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984). Evans v. State, 240 Ga.App. 215, 522 S.E.2d 506 (September 13, 1999). At defendant’s trial for murder and firearm possession by a felon, jury properly considered evidence from first stage of trial during second, bifurcated stage. “[T]he jury was authorized by law to consider evidence from the first phase of the trial during its deliberations on the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, and it apparently did so, even without being so instructed. Franklin v. State, 208 Ga.App. 740, 431 S.E.2d 733 (1993).” G. CLARIFYING ORDERS Barlow v. State, 279 Ga. 870, 621 S.E.2d 438 (October 24, 2005). After defendant was convicted at jury trial on charges of malice murder, felony murder, rape and aggravated sodomy, trial court granted motion for new trial based on error in jury charge (on inferring intent to kill based on use of deadly weapon). State’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Well outside term of court in which new trial was granted, State then moved the court to clarify its order as to whether new trial would be as to all charges or only as to malice murder. Over defendant’s objection, trial court entered order clarifying that the new trial was as to the malice murder count only. Defendant files interlocutory appeal, contending that the court effectively modified its prior order, and that its power to do so expired with the term in which it was entered. Held, the court properly clarified its prior order. “ The test to determine if an order is clarified or modified is if the clarification is reasonable or whether it is so contrary to the apparent intention of the original order as to amount to a modification. [Cit.] The intent is found by looking at the content and context of the order. Harvey v. Lindsey, 251 Ga.App. 387, 390(1) (554 S.E.2d 523) (2001).” Here, content and context both support view that new order was clarification, not modification. As to content, the new order expressly claims to clarify; it does not vary from the prior order; the prior order implies that the retrial is limited to the issue related to the erroneous charge. As to context, the trial court had already held that it was without power to modify its new trial order; a reference in a collateral order, prepared by defense counsel, to “new trial … on all charges” “is not dispositive.” Likewise, comments by court at the hearing on the motion for clarification (comments not specified in the Supreme Court’s opinion) do not prevent finding that new ruling was, in fact, clarifying, not modifying prior order. “[I]t is certain that the superior court has the power to interpret and clarify its own orders. Blair v. Blair, 272 Ga. 94, 96(1) (527 S.E.2d 177) (2000); Millner v. Millner, 260 Ga. 495, 497(2) (397 S.E.2d 289) (1990); Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 268(3) (271 S.E.2d 175) (1980). See also Harper v. State, 270 Ga.App. 376, 377(1) (606 S.E.2d 599) (2004). Such power includes shedding light on the scope of an earlier ruling. King v. Bishop, 198 Ga.App. 622, 624 (402 S.E.2d 307) (1991).” H. CLOTHING Palmer v. State, 294 Ga.App. 85, 668 S.E.2d 523 (October 16, 2008). “‘A criminal defendant has a right to appear before a jury in civilian clothes. But it is not error to try a defendant in prison garb which bears no distinctive markings or is not otherwise different from normal civilian attire.’ Citations and footnotes omitted.) Johnson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 891, 892(1), 534 S.E.2d 563 (2000). The clothing given to Palmer at trial was photographed and appears in the record. Palmer is shown wearing a plain white oxford shirt, navy slacks and white tennis shoes, with no markings or unusual designs to indicate that they were anything other than ‘just plain old clothes,’ as the trial court observed. ‘[O]ur examination of the photograph supports this conclusion.’ Wilburn v. State, 278 Ga.App. 542, 545(2)(a), 629 S.E.2d 267 (2006). Palmer also argues that he had made arrangements for his own clothing, and he adds that the shirt provided by the jail did not fit him well, the navy slacks had an elastic waistband, and the tennis shoes were too bright a shade of white. But the right guaranteed to Palmer is the right to appear in civilian clothes, not the particular civilian clothes of his fashion preference. ‘It is well established in Georgia that a criminal defendant has a right to appear at trial in civilian clothes rather than prison clothing. A defendant does not, however, have the right to dictate to the court which civilian clothing he will wear. See Brown v. State, 201 Ga.App. 510, 511(1), 411 S.E.2d 366 (1991).’ Colley v. State, 225 Ga.App.