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198, 200(2), 483 S.E.2d 355 (1997). This is true even though the defendant contends he had other civilian clothing available to wear. See, e.g., Carswell v. State, 163 Ga.App. 743, 744(1), 295 S.E.2d 548 (1982); Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga.App. 835(1), 270 S.E.2d 61 (1980).” Johnson v. State , 243 Ga.App. 891, 534 S.E.2d 563 (May 11, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no error in trying defendant while he was wearing prison garb. 1. Defendant waived right to object. “A criminal defendant has a right to appear before a jury in civilian clothes. See Pike v. State, 169 Ga.App. 358, 359, 312 S.E.2d 808 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Pike, 253 Ga. 304, 320 S.E.2d 355 (1984). But it is not error to try a defendant in prison garb which bears no distinctive markings or is not otherwise different from normal civilian attire. See Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga.App. 835(1), 270 S.E.2d 61 (1980); Whittington v. State, 155 Ga.App. 667(1), 272 S.E.2d 532 (1980). Moreover, the right to wear civilian clothing may be waived. See Timmons v. State, 223 Ga. 450(1), 156 S.E.2d 68 (1967).” Defendant here wore prison clothes during jury selection, then asked for and received civilian clothing. “It is likely that the jury would not have seen Johnson's prison garb had he asked for civilian clothes earlier. A defendant is not entitled to a mistrial if he waits until after the jury is impaneled to object to being tried in prison clothing. [ Sharpe v. State, 119 Ga.App. 222, 166 S.E.2d 645 (1969)]; Wilkes v. State, 221 Ga.App. 390, 392-393(2), 471 S.E.2d 332 (1996). Johnson's right to be tried in civilian clothing was waived until he asserted it. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Johnson's motion for mistrial.” 2. No prejudice shown. “Even if Johnson had not waived objection to his exposure to the jury in his prison clothing, he was not denied a fair trial. Because the trial judge could not read the markings on Johnson's uniform, from his elevated physical position, we have no reason to believe that the jury could identify the markings as prison insignia. Also, Johnson was not exposed to the jury in his prison clothing once the presentation of evidence began. In these circumstances, we cannot presume that the jury was unfairly tainted.” I. COMMITMENT HEARING See subheadings FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING, and PRELIMINARY HEARING, both below J. COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL See also PLEAS – COMPETENCY, above Warren v. State, 297 Ga. 810, 778 S.E.2d 749 (October 19, 2015). In capital murder prosecution, trial court erred by ordering involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs for sole purpose of making defendant competent to stand trial. Trial court’s one-page order merely stated conclusorily that the four Sell [June 16, 2003, below] determinations were made without elaboration; remanded for more detailed findings of fact and specific treatment plan. 1. “[T]he State should bear the burden of proof on the factual questions involved under the clear and convincing evidence standard.” 2. Although trial court fails to identify the “important governmental interest” at stake, Supreme Court here supplies some: “‘ [t]he Government’s interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property.’ 539 U.S. at 180. In addition ‘[t]he Government has a substantial interest in timely prosecution’ and ‘a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair one.’ Id. Warren is accused, among other crimes, of shooting five people, killing four of them and paralyzing the fifth. These are crimes against persons of the most serious magnitude. Moreover, nearly six years have already passed since the alleged crimes, and even if the administration of medication ultimately succeeded in making Warren competent to stand trial, his trial would not begin for quite some time, particularly given the extensive pretrial proceedings associated with a death penalty proceeding. Thus, if this exceptionally serious case is to be tried, and tried fairly, the State has compelling interests in doing so with as little further delay as possible.” Defendant’s commitment is not a countervailing “special circumstance” because “civil commitment is not ‘a substitute for a criminal trial,’ particularly where ‘it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of commitment during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost.’ Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.” 3. Trial court’s findings that “‘ involuntary medication will significantly further ’ the governmental interests in bringing the defendant to trial,” that “ involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests,” and that “administration of the drugs is medically appropriate ” is undermined because “the court has not specified what antipsychotic medication or medications may be forcibly administered to Warren, in what dosage or range of dosages, for what period of time, and with what oversight by the court.” Rejects State’s argument that the Court can’t know what medications to order before doctors actually try them on defendant and see which ones work best. “ Sell does not require certainty as to whether medication will make a defendant competent to stand trial or as to the side effects, only factually supported predictions as to what results are ‘substantially likely’ from the treatment regime proposed by the State. And Sell did not condone—nor will this Court allow—trial courts to cede oversight of such a significant constitutional matter to the State, allowing its doctors to force a mentally ill criminal defendant to take whatever medications in whatever dosages and for whatever period of time they consider appropriate. ‘To approve of a treatment plan without knowing the proposed medication and dose range would give prison medical staff carte blanche to experiment with what might even be dangerous drugs or