☢ test - Í

with ‘considerable discretion in its conduct of court proceedings.’ Lonergan v. State, 281 Ga. 637, 640(4) (641 S.E.2d 792) (2007). This considerable discretion includes discretion to make reasonable accommodations for the comfort and care of witnesses with special needs. See Williamson v. State, 234 Ga.App. 658, 658-69(2) (507 S.E.2d 765) (1998) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court permitted grandmother to stand near nine-year-old victim of child molestation while he testified). Unless the trial court has abused its wide and considerable discretion, we will not interfere on appeal with the exercise of this discretion. See Lemley v. State, 245 Ga. 350, 353-354(3) (264 S.E.2d 881) (1980). We see no abuse of discretion here.” Here, fire department delivered victim to court in her gurney, but without bringing her wheelchair. “In these circumstances, and given the limited choice to which Ezebuiro put the trial court, we do not think the trial court abused its wide discretion.” L. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, REVEAL IDENTITY Seminal cases: Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1956); Thornton v. State, 238 Barlow v. State, 327 Ga.App. 719, 761 S.E.2d 120 (June 24, 2014). Convictions for “multiple drug-related offenses” affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to reveal informant’s identity and any deals with him. “Here, the confidential informant's sole involvement in the case was providing an initial tip to the police officers and participating in the two controlled buys of cocaine from Barlow at the Sherbrooke Way residence. The officers then relied upon the tip and the controlled buys to obtain a search warrant for the residence. The State did not indict Barlow for the sales of cocaine to the informant. Rather, the State indicated Barlow solely for the drugs found in the residence upon the execution of the search warrant. The informant was not present during the execution of the search warrant and was not a witness to the offenses forming the basis for the present prosecution. Furthermore, … Barlow was without standing to challenge the search warrant obtained for the residence based on the information provided by the informant [based on his denial that he lived there, had a bedroom there, or had “anything to do with that house”]. Under these circumstances, Barlow failed to make a threshold showing that the testimony of the confidential informant would be material or relevant to his defense on the issue of guilt or punishment. The trial court therefore did not err in declining to conduct an in-camera hearing and in refusing to require the State to reveal the identity of the informant. See Reid v. State, 321 Ga.App. 653, 656(2), 742 S.E.2d 166 (2013); Browner v. State, 265 Ga.App. 788, 792(2), 595 S.E.2d 610 (2004); Turner v. State, 247 Ga.App. 775, 777(2), 544 S.E.2d 765 (2001). Furthermore, because the confidential informant did not testify at the suppression hearing or at trial, and because Barlow did not have standing to challenge the search warrant that was obtained based on the information supplied by the informant, the trial court likewise did not err in refusing to require the State to reveal any deal reached with the informant. See Johnson [ v. State, 275 Ga. 630, 632(8), 570 S.E.2d 309 (2002)]; Serrate [ v. State, 268 Ga.App. 276, 280(3), 601 S.E.2d 766 (2004)].” Sorrells v. State, 326 Ga.App. 888, 755 S.E.2d 586 (March 28, 2014). Physical precedent only. Conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed, but remanded to consider ineffective assistance. Counsel’s performance was deficient when he failed to move for disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, Thornton test was met here. “Because the confidential informant participated in the drug transaction, his testimony appears material to Sorrells's defense of misidentification; the testimony presented by the prosecution was in conflict with that presented by Sorrells; and the confidential informant was the only available witness to the transaction who could have amplified or contradicted the testimony of the state's witnesses concerning the seller's identity. See Little v. State, 230 Ga.App. 803, 808–810(3), 498 S.E.2d 284 (1998) (concluding that the threshold requirements for an in camera hearing were met, where the police officer's testimony was in conflict with the defense witness's testimony that the defendant was not at the drug scene and thus could not have participated in the drug transaction, and where the confidential informant was the only available witness to the drug transaction who could have amplified or contradicted their testimony; noting further that the defendant elected not to testify); Hampton v. State, 215 Ga.App. 57–58, 449 S.E.2d 654 (1994) (concluding that an in camera proceeding to determine whether the failure to obtain identity of confidential informant was harmful was required, where testimony of undercover police officer working with confidential informant conflicted with the testimony of defendant).” Counsel said he didn’t seek the informant’s identity because he didn’t want to add another witness against defendant, but “Sorrells's trial lawyer conceded that he had not discerned that the informant's testimony would have been damaging.” Remanded to determine whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Chandler v. State, 317 Ga.App. 406, 731 S.E.2d 88 (August 8, 2012). Conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to disclose identity of confidential informant. Informant here made drug buys observed by officer; Ga. 160, 165(2), 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977). See test at Browner (February 23, 2004), below. Relevant statutes: former OCGA §§ 24–9–21, 24–9–27; new OCGA § 24-5-505(c)