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at trial, officer testified. “Here, to the extent Chandler wished to call the CI merely to impeach the CI or the investigating officer's testimony, disclosure of the CI's identity was not required. See Black v. State, 154 Ga.App. 441, 442(2), 268 S.E.2d 724 (1980). While Chandler also asserts that the CI was the only witness who could amplify or refute any conflicting testimony regarding his participation in the offense, his claim is without merit. The State's evidence showed that the investigating officer engaged in visual surveillance throughout the controlled buy operations and clearly observed Chandler when he sold drugs to the CI. Chandler admitted that he was known as ‘Smiley,’ and that he lived in the apartment complexes where the second drug transaction took place and which was near the location of the first drug transaction. Although Chandler suggested that the investigating officer could have confused Chandler with several individuals in his neighborhood resembling him, the audiotape recording of the transaction enabled the jury to compare the voices heard in the recording to Chandler's voice when he testified at trial. Consequently, the audiotape recording was a key factor in diminishing the need for the CI to amplify or refute any conflicting testimony. Cf. McClarity v. State, 234 Ga.App. 348, 352–353(3)(d), 506 S.E.2d 392 (1998) (holding that videotape recording of drug transaction was the key factor weighing against the need to reveal the CI's identity, since the objective evidence diminished the need for the CI to testify). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to require the State to reveal the identity of the CI.” Strozier v. State, 314 Ga.App. 432, 724 S.E.2d 446 (February 29, 2012). Rape conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to disclose identity of informant. “The trial court conducted an untranscribed, in camera interview with the informant and then stated on the record that nothing indicated that the informant was an eyewitness to the attack, and that the informant had only seen the victim when she was on the street with the men and was of the opinion that the victim was intoxicated and seeking drugs at that time. Thus, the trial court determined that it was not necessary to identify the informant and denied Strozier's motion accordingly. Under the foregoing circumstances, the trial court correctly denied the motion to reveal the informant's identity when the informant was a mere tipster. [fn: See Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga.App. 198, 201(4) (582 S.E.2d 173) (2003) (trial court properly denied motion when the informant ‘was not present during the execution of the search warrant and was not a witness to the trafficking and obstruction offenses that form[ed] the basis of the ... prosecution’ although informant had earlier purchased drugs from defendant); see also Dyer v. State, 162 Ga.App. 773, 774(2) (293 S.E.2d 42) (1982) (‘[Because] the informant was not a participant or a witness in the overt acts elemental to the conspiracy, the informant was not a decoy, but merely a tipster. Therefore, the trial court correctly refused to compel disclosure of the informant's identity.’ (citation omitted)). ] And while the confidential informant saw the victim and Strozier interact prior to entering the wooded area, the informant did not witness the actual rape—the offense forming the basis of Strozier's prosecution—and the informant was not a participant in the attack. [fn: Compare Simmons v. State, 198 Ga.App. 121, 122 (400 S.E.2d 679) (1990) (physical precedent only) (trial court erred in denying motion when informant was present and witnessed the offense that formed basis of prosecution); Moore [ v. State, 187 Ga.App. 387, 391(2) (370 S.E.2d 511) (1988)] (trial court erred in denying motion when informant was ‘the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the appellant and the police officer’ when informant was a witness to the offense that formed the basis of prosecution (punctuation omitted)). See generally Roviaro [ v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (II), 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1956)] (holding that government committed prejudicial error when the informant was ‘the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged’ and, thus, ‘the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the government witnesses’). ] ” Hernandez v. State, 308 Ga.App. 136, 706 S.E.2d 627 (March 2, 2011). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; trial court’s denial of motion to reveal identity of confidential informant was harmless error because “disclosing the informant's identity would not have given Hernandez access to any exculpatory evidence; to the contrary, the informant's testimony was inculpatory.” At in camera hearing, post trial, “the informant's testimony sharply contradicted Hernandez's testimony that he never talked to the undercover officer about a methamphetamine transaction, and substantially corroborated the officer's testimony that Hernandez participated in negotiating the deal.” Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (July 14, 2008). Confidential informants’ identities did not have to be revealed at motion to suppress hearing where officer “testified from his personal knowledge that neither confidential informant was present at the time the search warrant was executed[;] the State has established that they were neither witnesses nor participants in the crimes charged and, thus, their identities did not need to be disclosed at the motion to suppress hearing. OCGA §§ 24-9-21(4), 24-9-27(d); Leonard v. State, 228 Ga.App. 792, 794(2), 492 S.E.2d 747 (1997). Moreover, ‘guilt or innocence is not at issue on a motion to suppress and does not involve the issue of right of confrontation. [Cits.]’ Leonard, supra at 794, 492 S.E.2d 747. See also Gresham v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881, 882-884(2), 644 S.E.2d 122 (2007) (holding that the right to confront witnesses at trial under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), does not apply to preliminary hearings, because the right of confrontation is a trial right, and citing with approval several decisions from other states holding that Crawford is