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not applicable to pre-trial suppression hearings for that reason).” Cauley v. State, 287 Ga.App. 701, 652 S.E.2d 586 (October 1, 2007). Trial court properly denied motion to disclose identity of informant where the evidence before the court demonstrated that the informant was a mere tipster. Defense counsel’s assertion that she had “witnesses that are prepared to testify that there are certain individuals that have made promises to send Mr. Cauley back to prison and that have stated that there was going to be a set-up involving drugs being planted in the vehicle,” was supported by no actual evidence. Compare Johnson (July 11, 2005), below. Cole v. State, 282 Ga.App. 211, 638 S.E.2d 363 (November 1, 2006). “Cole claims he was denied due process of law and a fair trial because the trial court denied his motion seeking disclosure of the name, address, and phone number of the confidential informant. Cole introduced no evidence, did not dispute that the methamphetamine was found in his vehicle, and did not claim that the confidential informant could provide evidence materially favorable to his sole defense that the State violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying the motion. Respress v. State, 267 Ga.App. 654, 655-656 (600 S.E.2d 727) (2004); Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 162-164 (231 S.E.2d 729) (1977).” Little v. State, 280 Ga.App. 60, 633 S.E.2d 403 (June 21, 2006). Trial court properly refused to order disclosure of confidential informant’s identity where the only issue the informant had knowledge of was not material at trial. “The trial court did not err in refusing to compel the State to reveal the identity of the confidential informant because Little failed to show that the informant was the only person whose personal knowledge would confirm or refute a material defense to the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine. See Binns v. State, 237 Ga.App. 719, 721(3) (516 S.E.2d 583) (1999) (informant was not the only person whose personal knowledge would confirm or refute a material defense to the charge of trafficking in cocaine); see also, Ivory v. State, 234 Ga.App. 858, 860(2) (508 S.E.2d 421) (1998) (test for determining whether identity of informant should be revealed). Here, although the informant arranged the sale by telephone, there is no evidence that she actually participated in the transaction in the parking lot. Further, while the informant may have been in a position to witness Little’s encounter with the officer, she was not the only person present who could have testified about what occurred.” The issue the informant could speak to – defendant’s consent to search vehicle – was not material because the officer already had “plain view” of the marijuana and thus authority to arrest and search, anyway. Footnote: “We note that public policy in Georgia favors nondisclosure of an informant’s identity. In fact, OCGA § 24-9-21(4) and § 24-9-27(d) ‘prohibit disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant who was not an eyewitness to the offense being prosecuted, although the informant may have seen the defendant in possession of the contraband at an earlier time, but did not participate in the offense.’ Turner v. State, 247 Ga.App. 775, 777(2) (544 S.E.2d 765) (2001).” Accord, Jones v. State , 289 Ga.App. 767, 658 S.E.2d 386 (February 26, 2008) (informant a mere tipster whose information led to warrant, not a witness to possession of drug on date charged). Johnson v. State, 274 Ga.App. 282, 617 S.E.2d 252 (July 11, 2005). Trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera hearing to determine identity of State’s confidential informant. “In Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 (231 S.E.2d 729) (1977), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that when faced with a Brady motion to reveal the identity of an informant, the trial court must first determine whether that information is favorable to the defendant and whether it is relevant either to guilt or to punishment. Id. at 162-165(2). Where an informant is a mere tipster, disclosure of his identity is not required. But where the informer is a witness or participant, a request for disclosure requires the trial court to balance the benefits of disclosure to the defendant against the resulting harm to the government. ‘Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.’ State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309, 312(2) (275 S.E.2d 646) (1981) (citing Thornton, supra, and Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639) (1957)).” Defense here contended that informant might be Bridges, whom witnesses identified as having placed something in defendant’s vehicle before he was arrested. “If the informant was Bridges and that information had been presented to the jury, it would have been favorable to Johnson’s defense that someone else planted the cocaine in his vehicle and he knew nothing about it. The information also would have been relevant to Johnson’s guilt or innocence. Applying the balancing test set forth in Roviaro v. United States, supra, we conclude that the informant’s identity (if it is Bridges) should have been disclosed, particularly because there is no reasonable substitute for that information. [Cit.]” Compare Cauley (October 1, 2007), above. Accord, Hernandez v. State , 291 Ga.App. 562, 662 S.E.2d 325 (May 19, 2008) (testimony was in conflict, informant was at scene of transaction; remanded for trial court to conduct in-camera hearing on disclosure of identity).