☢ test - Í

Respress v. State, 267 Ga.App. 654, 600 S.E.2d 727 (June 2, 2004). “Here, although the confidential informant was an informer-witness and/or an informer-participant, the State’s evidence and Respress’s evidence did not conflict, as Respress introduced no evidence. See Jones v. State, 240 Ga.App. 745, 747(2) (525 S.E.2d 121) (1999). Moreover, the informant’s testimony would not have been material to the defense, as the evidence indisputably showed that cocaine was found in Respress’s vehicle. See Harvey v. State, 232 Ga.App. 21, 23 (500 S.E.2d 916) (1998). Therefore, ‘[t]he threshold requirements of the first step of the inquiry were not met, and there was no error in the trial court’s refusal to require the State to reveal the identity of the [confidential informant].’ [Cit.]” Browner v. State, 265 Ga.App. 788, 595 S.E.2d 610 (February 23, 2004). “‘In determining if the confidential informant’s identity should be revealed by the State, the trial court must conduct a two-step hearing. Initially, the trial court should hear evidence to determine: (a) that the confidential informant is an alleged informer-witness or informer-participant whose testimony appears to be material to the defense on the issue of guilt or punishment; (b) that the testimony for the prosecution and the defense is or will be in conflict; and (c) that the confidential informant was the only available witness who could amplify or contradict the testimony of these witnesses. The movant must establish the relevance, materiality, and necessity of the identity of the informant as a predicate for disclosure. Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the CI’s testimony under the mandates set forth in Thornton [ v. State, 238 Ga. 160 (231 S.E.2d 729) (1977) ], and Moore [ v. State , 187 Ga.App. 387, 370 S.E.2d 511 (1988)].’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Harvey v. State, 232 Ga.App. 21, 23 (500 S.E.2d 916) (1998). If the trial court determines that the informant is a tipster who neither participated in or witnessed the offense, no further inquiry is necessary and the informant’s confidentiality should remain privileged. Moore v. State, 187 Ga.App. at 389-390(2).” Where informant participated in controlled buy upon which warrant was based, but had no knowledge of the drugs found in defendant’s car upon which the prosecution is based, trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to reveal informant’s identity. “In this case, there was no reason for the trial court to hold an in camera hearing because Browner, as movant, never satisfied the threshold requirement of showing that the identity of the informant was material, relevant, and necessary to his defense.” Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga.App. 198, 582 S.E.2d 173 (May 9, 2003). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses remanded on other grounds; trial court properly denied motion to reveal informant’s identity. Identity of confidential informant who “was not an eyewitness to the offense that forms the basis for the prosecution” is privileged under OCGA §§ 24-9-21(4) and 24-9-27(d), even where he participated in a controlled buy days earlier that led to issuance of a search warrant. State did not indict defendant on controlled buy, but on possession of items found on execution of search warrant. Accord, Mallard v. State , 321 Ga.App. 650, 742 S.E.2d 164 (April 26, 2013). Rapier v. State, 245 Ga.App. 211, 535 S.E.2d 860 (June 30, 2000). Convictions for selling cocaine affirmed; no error in denying motion to disclose identity of confidential informant, as “the undercover agent testified that the CI was not involved in the two transactions for which Rapier was tried. Moreover, Rapier admitted that he had no contact with the CI after December 30, 1997. It follows that the CI's testimony would not be material to the February 24, 1998 sale.” Jones v. State, 240 Ga.App. 745, 525 S.E.2d 121 (November 9, 1999). Defendant’s VGCSA conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court, after in camera hearing, denied request to disclose identity of confidential informant. “As required by Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 165(2), 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977), the trial court conducted a hearing concerning Jones's motion to reveal the informant's identity. During a hearing on such a motion, a trial court must determine, among other things, whether the testimony of the informant is the only testimony that will amplify or contradict that of the government's witnesses. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 232 Ga.App. 21, 23, 500 S.E.2d 916 (1998). Also, the court must decide whether the movant has satisfied the burden of showing that the informant's testimony is material and whether the testimony for the State and that of the defendant will be in conflict. Id. Here, the State's evidence and that of Jones did not conflict, for Jones introduced no evidence. Also, the informant was not the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the State's witness, Ballard. The informant's testimony during the in- camera hearing shows instead that Jones knew everyone standing nearby and could have called these people as witnesses on his own behalf. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Jones's motion to disclose the identity of the informant. See Ivory v. State, 234 Ga.App. 858, 860(2), 508 S.E.2d 421 (1998). … [T]he informant's testimony at trial would not have exculpated Jones, and Jones has therefore demonstrated no harm in the trial court's refusal to disclose the informant's identity. See Boatright v. State, 195 Ga.App. 440-441(1), 393 S.E.2d 707 (1990).” Binns v. State, 237 Ga.App. 719, 516 S.E.2d 583 (April 22, 1999). “The trial court’s refusal to compel the State to reveal the identity of the confidential informant was not error because Binns failed to show the informant was the only person whose personal knowledge would confirm or refute a material defense to the charge of trafficking in cocaine. See Moore