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v. State, 187 Ga.App. 387, 388(2), 370 S.E.2d 511 (1988). See also Wells v. State, 212 Ga.App. 60, 63-64, 441 S.E.2d 460 (1994). Although Binns states in his brief that the informant was the only one who could amplify or contradict the officer’s testimony that Binns sold him drugs, the undisputed evidence at trial was that the confidential informant called Binns to arrange a time and place for the drug buy, but was not at the drug buy. It follows that the informant was a ‘pure tipster,’ who neither participated in nor witnessed the offense and, therefore, would have no knowledge of whether or not Binns actually sold drugs to the undercover officer. Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 165, 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977).” M. CONTINUANCE See also ATTORNEYS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL – CONTINUANCE TO HIRE COUNSEL, above; subheading DISCOVERY, below; and subheading JUVENILES – CONTINUANCES, below Ingram v. State, 297 Ga. 854, 778 S.E.2d 781 (October 19, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no continuance demanded when defendant’s trial proceeded on September 12, 2001, after jury selection on September 10. “[A]ppellant moved for a continuance, contending that, because this case involved deaths that occurred by fire and smoke, along with rescuers crawling through thick smoke in an attempt to rescue the children, and because the jurors selected had spent the day of September 11 watching events on television, the trial court should continue the case.” Trial court denied the motion after asking the jurors whether any of them were affected by the events of September 11 such that “you would no longer be capable of being a fair and impartial juror on this case?” No juror responded. Lewis v. State, 330 Ga.App. 650, 768 S.E.2d 821 (February 10, 2015). False imprisonment and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying continuance and requiring defendant to proceed pro se where he fired his fourth attorney on the morning of trial. “Lewis argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for continuance so that he could obtain witnesses. He concedes, however, that he did not make the required proffer of what those witnesses would testify about or who they were. See Knox v. State, 227 Ga.App. 447, 448, 489 S.E.2d 582 (1997). The fact that he proceeded pro se does not excuse his failure to make the required showing. A party ‘is not held to a different or more lenient standard ... merely because he elected to proceed pro se. One who knowingly elects to represent himself assumes full responsibility for complying with the substantive and procedural requirements of the law.’ Salazar v. State, 256 Ga.App. 50, 53(4), 567 S.E.2d 706 (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Jones v. State, 329 Ga.App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (October 30, 2014). Convictions for aggravated battery and related offenses affirmed; no error in denying continuance request where “the facts of the present case were neither complex nor convoluted, Jones did not offer any intricate defenses, and the evidence for all of the charges consisted of eyewitness accounts rather than forensic or other scientific evidence. Moreover, defense counsel herself stated that she was prepared for trial, particularly after reviewing the full transcript of the prior trial involving the same witnesses that had ultimately ended in a mistrial.” Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga.App. 683, 761 S.E.2d 91 (June 23, 2014). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denial of continuance, based on late disclosure of evidence by State. Evidence of GBI test of seminal fluid only became available on the day the trial began, prompting defense request for continuance. “The trial court asked defense counsel how a continuance would benefit her client given Calhoun's incriminating admissions to police. Defense counsel responded that had she known of the seminal fluid report earlier, she could have investigated other possible perpetrators by interviewing people in the community. The trial court directed the State's counsel not to mention the test results in opening statements that day. The trial court also decided that, because the test results would not be introduced until the following day, the three investigators in defense counsel's office would have a day and an evening to interview witnesses from the crime lab and the community and to gather evidence.” Trial court didn’t abuse its discretion, based on Elmore v. State, 269 Ga. 528, 528–529(2), 501 S.E.2d 215 (1998) (fingerprint evidence discovered and disclosed during trial, admitted the day after disclosure). “‘[T]o warrant a reversal on appeal, the appellant must also show that harm resulted from the denial of the continuance. To show harm, [Calhoun] was required to specifically identify what evidence or witnesses he would have put forth in his defense if his counsel had been given more time to prepare; speculation and conjecture are not enough.’ (Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) Wynn v. State, 322 Ga.App. 66, 69(3), 744 S.E.2d 64 (2013). At the motion for new trial hearing, Calhoun presented no evidence or testimony implicating a different perpetrator. His trial counsel testified, ‘I don't know if—how the expert [on the semen test] would actually have been helpful in this case, but it could have been.’ Calhoun's new counsel at the hearing stated that he had no expert to rebut the State's evidence.” Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (November 15, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed. No abuse of discretion in denial of motion for continuance while source code appeal proceeded in Kentucky. “Here, the trial