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said ‘it's showtime,’ began acting belligerently, and voluntarily stopped taking his medication.” Major v. State, 306 Ga.App. 342, 702 S.E.2d 684 (October 5, 2010). DUI conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court continued trial to allow defense to prepare for witnesses left off State’s witness list. Trial had already commenced, and jury had been selected; after thirty-day continuance, same jury returned, heard the evidence, and convicted defendant. Held, defendant didn’t have right to demand that case go forward immediately, excluding the witnesses. “The court agreed to a continuance of 30 days to allow Major to speak to the witnesses; the jury that had been seated would return to hear the matter. Major subsequently continued to protest and stated that ‘it's our position that we should go forward today with the witnesses being excluded.’” “Major's contention is controlled adversely to him by Ruff v. State, 266 Ga.App. 694 (598 S.E.2d 362) (2004), cited with approval in Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 239(3) (626 S.E.2d 491) (2006). The Court in Ruff makes clear that the trial court has the discretion to grant a continuance under these circumstances and that a defendant is obligated to request one to cure any possible prejudice from the State's failure to comply with OCGA § 17-16-21. Ruff, 266 Ga.App. at 695.” Lewis v. State, 304 Ga.App. 831, 698 S.E.2d 365 (July 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter and child cruelty affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to continuance. Indictment contained obvious error, alleging involuntary manslaughter occurred on June 7, 2005, but child cruelty as to same victim occurred on July 7. Defendant filed notice of alibi as to July 7 date, but prosecutor announced intention to prove that the child cruelty occurred on June 7. Held, “[t]he trial court was authorized to conclude that there was no basis for Lewis's claim of surprise in this case. The other counts of the indictment charging Lewis with murder and felony murder alleged that I.L. had died on or about June 8, 2007. The prosecutor advised the trial court that during the exchange of discovery, Lewis was given all of the state's evidence, including I.L.'s death certificate, which established that the charged offense took place on June 7, 2005 and that I.L. had died on the following day, June 8, 2005. Lewis did not disclaim having knowledge that I.L. had been deceased for nearly one month prior to the July date alleged in the indictment, and he acknowledged that it was impossible for the crime to have been committed on the date alleged in the indictment. Under these circumstances, the error in the date alleged in the indictment was obvious and Lewis's claim of surprise was unwarranted. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis's motion for a continuance. See Turner [ v. State, 202 Ga.App. 799, 800-801(1), 415 S.E.2d 524 (1992)] . Compare Raposa v. State, 207 Ga.App. 106, 106-107, 427 S.E.2d 79 (1993) (concluding that the defendant was entitled to a continuance based upon his alibi defense since the state failed to provide defendant with notice of the conflicting date, even though the defendant had filed a pretrial discovery motion seeking records reflecting the date of the offense).” Stott v. State, 304 Ga.App. 560, 697 S.E.2d 257 (June 22, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation and incest affirmed; defendant was not entitled to a continuance of trial although he “arrived from jail unshaven, with ‘a couple of days of stubble’ or growth” on the day of jury selection. McIntyre v. State, 302 Ga.App. 778, 691 S.E.2d 663 (March 10, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for child molestation affirmed; no abuse of discretion where case proceeded to trial with public defender to whom the case was assigned four days prior to trial. “Prior to the trial's commencement, McIntyre's trial counsel announced that he had been trying to prepare for the trial, but could not say that he was ‘ready to go.’ Trial counsel, however, did not present a motion for a continuance. Rather, trial counsel confirmed that he had reviewed all of the discovery and statements in his file and further announced, ‘if Your Honor orders me to go[,] I will go to trial[.]’ The trial court stated that the trial would proceed.” Court of Appeals notes that no motion to continue was filed or denied, but “even if trial counsel's announcement could be construed as a motion for continuance, no basis for reversal has been shown. ‘ There is no fixed rule as to the number of days that should, of right, be allowed counsel for a defendant after his employment or appointment in a criminal case to prepare the case for trial[.]’ Foster v. State, 213 Ga. 601, 603(1) (100 S.E.2d 426) (1957). Motions for continuance seeking additional time to prepare for trial are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Daniels v. State, 296 Ga.App. 795, 797(2) (676 S.E.2d 13) (2009). ‘Mere shortness of time does not by itself show a denial of the rights of the accused, and mere shortness of time will not reflect an abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying a continuance, where the case is not convoluted and is without a large number of intricate defenses.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Here, the state's case was not convoluted, notwithstanding its presentation of expert testimony regarding the victim's forensic interview and the DNA testing. McIntyre's trial counsel was familiar with the case; had reviewed all of the discovery and materials in the defense file; had reviewed the videotape of the victim's interview multiple times; had prepared voir dire questions for jury selection and requests to charge; and, had demonstrated his preparedness through his opening statement and examination of the witnesses at trial.” Accord, White v. State , 304 Ga.App. 158, 695 S.E.2d 425 (May 20, 2010).