☢ test - Í

Mathis v. State, 299 Ga.App. 831, 684 S.E.2d 6 (July 31, 2009). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance for lack of mental evaluation, where trial court directed defense “to ensure that the evaluation was completed, and he failed to do so. Further, Mathis fails to point to any evidence in the record demonstrating that he was incompetent, and we have found none.” Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 680 S.E.2d 850 (June 29, 2009). No abuse of discretion in denial of continuance “to allow additional time to obtain and review a transcript of a co-defendant's trial. The continuance was requested because defense counsel believed portions of the transcript he did not receive until the day of trial ‘might be important for impeachment purposes.’ In denying the motion, the trial court noted there had been no showing that any witness would testify differently from the way they testified at the co-defendant's trial, appellant had received all discovery materials from the State, including transcripts and audio recordings of the witnesses' statements to police, and appellant had been in jail for almost two years awaiting trial. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court's denial of the motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion. OCGA § 17-8-22. See Marshall v. State, 239 Ga. 101(1) (236 S.E.2d 58) (1977) (refusal to grant continuance will not be disturbed by appellate courts absent clear abuse of discretion); Hammonds v. State, 157 Ga.App. 393(2) (277 S.E.2d 762) (1981) (no error in denying motion for continuance where defendant failed to show need for transcript and diligence in obtaining it).” Johnson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 823, 678 S.E.2d 531 (May 13, 2009). No abuse of discretion in denying motion for continuance to hire new counsel mid-trial: “Here, Johnson retained the attorney of his choosing, the two appeared together at the call of the case for a speedy trial, counsel announced ready to proceed, and Johnson later became dissatisfied with him for no apparent good reason other than that they had begun to bicker. Compare Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 751 (653 S.E.2d 713) (2007) (Hunstein, P. J., dissenting). Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's request for a continuance on the ground that it was being made only because of Johnson's eleventh- hour skittishness in going to trial. Cf. Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 226(6) (610 S.E.2d 521) (2005), citing Blair v. State, 166 Ga.App. 434(1) (304 S.E.2d 535) (1983).” Gipson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 413, 677 S.E.2d 431 (April 9, 2009). “A trial court is authorized to conclude that a continuance is sought for delay where, as here, the defendant seeks a continuance for the purpose of obtaining unavailable witnesses.” Witnesses here were in Texas and unwilling to come to Georgia to testify for defendant. Burrowes v. State, 296 Ga.App. 629, 675 S.E.2d 518 (March 13, 2009). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance: 1. where defendant had counsel of record since arraignment, three months before trial, but new co-counsel appeared at trial. “We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the motion made minutes before jury selection, particularly given that attorney Whatley was assisted at trial by attorney Turner who had been involved in the case for several months.” 2. after jury selection, when “defense counsel advised the court that the state had not produced copies of Burrowes' or [victim] Hysten's written statements to police, which had been discovered by defense counsel shortly before voir dire. The state explained that it did not have the statements in its own file and therefore could not produce them to Burrowes. The trial court agreed to help counsel obtain the statements from the police, but denied the motion for continuance on this ground, noting that counsel may not wait until the last minute to look for evidence, particularly the victim's statement, which counsel should know is routinely taken by police. The court recessed the trial until the following morning, at which time defense counsel renewed his motion for a continuance.” Bradford v. State, 285 Ga. 1, 673 S.E.2d 201 (February 9, 2009). At defendant’s trial for drug trafficking, trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for continuance: “Approximately one week before trial, Bradford filed a notice of alibi with the State and planned to present evidence at trial that she was in Tennessee on the date in question. At the beginning of trial, however, the State announced that it actually intended to prove that the trafficking in amphetamine occurred within two weeks of the date in the indictment, not necessarily on that date exactly. Bradford immediately moved for a continuance, stating that she had relied on the date in the indictment for her trial preparation. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance. ‘While it is true that where the date alleged in the indictment is not a material element of the offense, the State may prove the offense as of any date within the statute of limitation, [Bradford's] reliance on an alibi defense for the time alleged in the indictment entitled [her] to a continuance once [she] learned at trial that the State did not intend to prove the date alleged in the indictment.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Raposa v. State, 207 Ga.App. 106, 107, 427 S.E.2d 79 (1993). Therefore, Bradford's motion for a continuance should have been granted.”