☢ test - Í

Billingsley v. State, 294 Ga.App. 661, 669 S.E.2d 699 (November 18, 2008). No error in trial court’s denial of motion for continuance to hire new counsel. “‘Denial of continuance may be proper where defendant negligently failed to employ counsel promptly or where it appears he is using the tactic for delay.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 225 Ga.App. 319, 321(2) (483 S.E.2d 874) (1997). The record reflects that Billingsley, through appointed counsel, filed a demand for a speedy trial one week before his trial began. At trial, he offered only the desire to get a second opinion from a private attorney in support of his motion. In refusing to continue the trial, the trial court found that Billingsley's appointed counsel was ‘ready to try [his] case.’ We find no indication to the contrary of record. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Billingsley's motion for a continuance.” Mora v. State, 292 Ga.App. 860, 666 S.E.2d 412 (July 9, 2008). “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a continuance in order to allow the state to procure the attendance of a material witness. [Cits.] The fact that the continuance was granted ex parte does not change this result. See Campbell v. State, 181 Ga.App. 790, 791 (354 S.E.2d 10) (1987). Cf. Simmerson v. Blanks, 183 Ga.App. 863, 864 (360 S.E.2d 422) (1987).” Accord, Hoke v. State , 326 Ga.App. 71, 755 S.E.2d 876 (March 10, 2014). Robbins v. State, 290 Ga.App. 323, 659 S.E.2d 628 (February 20, 2008). No abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s motion for continuance. “All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require. Further, trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hartley v. State, 283 Ga.App. 388, 389(1) (641 S.E.2d 607) (2007). The record shows that defense counsel had more than a week before trial to review the state’s discovery, had reviewed the material with his client, and had also had time before trial to hire an expert. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that Robbins’s grounds for continuance was compelling. … Robbins hired his defense counsel in May, several months before the August trial date. Further, it appears that the delay in counsel’s receipt of the discovery material was attributable to defense counsel’s failure to ensure the state had his correct mailing address. ‘In all cases, the party making an application for a continuance must show that he has used due diligence.’ OCGA § 17-8-20. See also Davis v. State, 204 Ga.App. 657, 658(4) (420 S.E.2d 349) (1992) (‘[n]othing in our law either requires or permits defendants to rely solely on information provided by the State for their pretrial investigation, and before they are entitled to continuance, they must show the exercise of due diligence’) (citation omitted).” Gassett v. State, 289 Ga.App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (January 31, 2008). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance where State called co-defendant as a witness without putting her on witness list. “‘The witness list rule is designed to prevent a defendant from being surprised at trial by a witness that the defendant has not had an opportunity to interview.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Wilbanks v. State, 251 Ga.App. 248, 255(5)(a) (554 S.E.2d 248) (2001). But, ‘[w]hen a witness’ name is contained in the indictment, a defendant cannot validly contend that he had been surprised or unable to interview the witness in question through lack of knowledge of such witness.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Byrd v. State, 216 Ga.App. 510, 512(4) (455 S.E.2d 318) (1995). Because Oliver was named in the indictment as a co-defendant, Gassett had noticed that she might be called as a state’s witness. Id.” Accord, Green v. State , 298 Ga.App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (May 18, 2009). In re: C.L., 289 Ga.App. 377, 657 S.E.2d 301 (January 29, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court denied continuance to newly-appointed counsel for juvenile charged with delinquency in connection with two attempted carjackings. “Here, the state’s case and C.L.’s defense were straightforward and uncomplicated. The central issue was whether C.L. was merely present at the scenes of the crimes or was a party to the crimes – an issue that turned on the eyewitness testimony as to what occurred and the inferences that could be drawn from that testimony. Nor did either side rely on scientific evidence or expert testimony in support of its position . In addition to the straightforward nature of the case, C.L. has failed to show that he was harmed by the denial of the continuance. Although C.L. claims that a continuance should have been granted so that a transcript of the detention hearing could have been obtained and reviewed by his counsel, C.L. has failed ‘to demonstrate specifically how the transcript would have helped his examinations at trial or otherwise assist in his defense.’ Cunningham v. State, 244 Ga.App. 231, 233(1) (535 S.E.2d 262) (2000). Moreover, C.L. has failed to show how additional time to subpoena ‘one of the co-defendants’ (presumably Crittendon) would have benefited him in any way at the adjudicatory hearing. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Crittendon would have testified rather than have pled the Fifth Amendment, much less have testified favorably to C.L.” Accord, Sullivan v. State , 295 Ga.App. 145, 671 S.E.2d 180 (November 12, 2008) (child molestation charges based on children’s