☢ test - Í

testimony, not scientific evidence; trial counsel appointed one month before trial, had benefit of file from counsel who represented defendant for prior nine months); Miller v. State , 303 Ga.App. 422, 693 S.E.2d 637 (April 6, 2010) (aggravated assault case was not complicated, no scientific evidence or expert testimony); White v. State , 304 Ga.App. 158, 695 S.E.2d 425 (May 20, 2010). Parker v. State, 282 Ga. 897, 655 S.E.2d 582 (January 8, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court granted continuance for State based on unavailability of witness although witness wasn’t under subpoena. “Typically, the terms of the continuance statutes are strictly applied ‘in reviewing the denial, rather than the grant, of a motion for continuance in a criminal prosecution.’ Hicks v. State, 221 Ga.App. 735, 736(2) (472 S.E.2d 474) (1996).” French v. State, 288 Ga.App. 775, 655 S.E.2d 224 (November 6, 2007). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance to prepare for testimony of out-of-state witnesses. “The record reflects that French knew of these witnesses and their addresses and telephone numbers for over one year prior to trial. In May 2005, shortly after he was indicted and arraigned, French listed them as defense witnesses in response to the state’s discovery demand. The trial did not take place until June 2006, after the case had appeared on at least two previous calendars. French has not shown any reason for his failure to prepare the witnesses during the lengthy period of time in which the case remained pending. Thus, French has not shown that he exercised the requisite due diligence. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying French’s motions for continuance. Williams v. State, 231 Ga.App. 123, 123-124(1) (497 S.E.2d 660) (1998). See also OCGA § 17-8-22.” Ingram v. State, 286 Ga.App. 662, 650 S.E.2d 743 (July 18, 2007). No harm shown where trial court denied continuance despite fact that confidential informant’s identity not disclosed “until five days before trial instead of the ten days required by OCGA § 17-16-8(a).” Trial court’s stated reason for denying the continuance – need to try the case based on pending speedy trial demand – was erroneous, given that more than five months remained in term of court. Nevertheless, “we have held that ‘absent a showing of prejudice and bad faith, an interview of the witness is the remedy for failure to comply with the requirement that a witness must be identified prior to trial.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Carter v. State, 253 Ga.App. 795, 797(1) (560 S.E.2d 697) (2002). Ingram had an opportunity to interview the witness and used the results of that interview to good effect in cross-examination. He has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance.” Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 866, 648 S.E.2d 183 (June 15, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a continuance merely because defense counsel said he was unprepared although he had been counsel of record for over four months. “Jones’s counsel argues that he did not have sufficient time to prepare, develop strategies, develop trial tactics, or develop an intricate defense because he believed that he had reached an agreement with the state. ‘ A statement by counsel for the defendant that he has not had sufficient time to investigate and prepare the defense is a mere conclusion. Questions of this nature must of necessity be entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Xulu v. State, 256 Ga.App. 272, 274(2) (568 S.E.2d 74) (2002). Counsel does not specify what else he could have done to prepare for trial, other than set up his trial notebook, which the court gave him time to do. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Jones a continuance.” Accord, Miller v. State , 303 Ga.App. 422, 693 S.E.2d 637 (April 6, 2010). Matthews v. State, 285 Ga.App. 859, 648 S.E.2d 160 (June 15, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a second continuance to prepare an alibi defense. “Given that [defendant] had seven months since his incarceration to establish an alibi defense, that the trial court previously granted a continuance for the very same reason, and that Matthews had two months from that continuance to identify an alibi witness, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Matthews’s motion for a continuance.” Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 642 S.E.2d 640 (March 19, 2007). “Collum contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance after receiving amended witness lists and additional documentation from the State shortly before trial. ‘“Whether to grant a motion for continuance is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” [Cit.]’ Davis v. State, 279 Ga. 786, 787(2) (621 S.E.2d 446) (2005). See OCGA § 17-8-22. Here, there was detailed discussion regarding the nature of the discovery at issue prior to the trial court’s ruling and Collum conceded there was no bad faith in the timing of its delivery. As Collum has failed to demonstrate any harm from the denial of his motion for continuance, we find no error.” Accord, Schramm v. State , 286 Ga.App. 156, 648 S.E.2d 392 (May 22, 2007) ( no abuse of discretion in denying continuance to pro se defendant who failed to subpoena witness for trial despite prior instruction from court that he should do so); Green v. State , 291 Ga.