☢ test - Í

287, 728 S.E.2d 668 (June 25, 2012) (same as Schramm ). Hartley v. State, 283 Ga.App. 388, 641 S.E.2d 607 (February 1, 2007). No abuse of discretion in denying motion for continuance: “When the case was called to trial, Hartley’s trial counsel moved for a continuance on the grounds that the Clayton County Police Department had provided her with copies of radio transmissions that she wanted to inspect before going forward. Counsel had been in possession of the transmissions for at least three days, but had not listened to them . The trial court, noting that the case had been previously continued, denied trial counsel’s motion. Hartley argues that the trial court should have granted the continuance because his trial counsel was not prepared. ‘All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require.’ OCGA § 17-8-22. Further, ‘[t]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. ’ (Footnote omitted.) Gilbert v. State, 259 Ga.App. 371, 374(3) (577 S.E.2d 35) (2003). Given that Hartley’s trial counsel had several days to review the transmissions before trial but did not do so, and that she characterized the information only as a ‘lead,’ the trial court was not presented with a compelling reason to continue the trial. See Hall v. State, 240 Ga.App. 356, 358(4) (523 S.E.2d 409) (1999) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance so that his trial counsel could have more time to prepare for trial).” Martin v. State, 278 Ga.App. 465, 629 S.E.2d 134 (March 24, 2006). Trial court erred in refusing continuance to which defendant was entitled by right. Defendant was originally charged with “with two counts of family violence battery for choking and biting his wife, and two counts of simple battery for grabbing his wife and putting her in a ‘head lock.’ Two months later, and less than ten minutes before the August 29, 2005 trial, the State amended its accusation to add three counts of family violence battery and five counts of battery, each of which charged Martin with either choking, biting, striking, or causing visible bodily harm to his wife. In addition, the amended accusation added a thirteenth count charging Martin with disorderly conduct ‘by acting in a tumultuous manner toward [his wife,] whereby she was placed in reasonable fear of her safety, in violation of OCGA § 16-11-39(a)(1).’” “OCGA § 17-7-71(f) states as follows: ‘Prior to trial, the prosecuting attorney may amend the accusation, summons, or any citation to allege or to change the allegations regarding any offense arising out of the same conduct of the defendant which gave rise to any offense alleged or attempted to be alleged in the original accusation, summons, or citation. A copy of any such amendment shall be served upon the defendant or his or her counsel and the original filed with the clerk of the court. On motion, the court shall grant the defendant a continuance which is reasonably necessitated by an amendment. If any additional charges against the defendant are made the judge shall advise the defendant that he or she has an automatic right to a continuance . ’ (Emphasis supplied.) Charge of disorderly conduct upon which defendant was convicted was clearly an “additional charge,” as it required no proof of physical contact or harm, unlike the original charges. Not clear whether the added battery charges would have been considered “additional charges,” since defendant was acquitted on all battery charges. Robertson v. State, 278 Ga.App. 376, 629 S.E.2d 79 (March 23, 2006). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting State an overnight continuance to procure attendance of out-of-state witness, even though the witness was not under subpoena. “In the course of managing a trial, a judge has a ‘general power to serve the principles of justice.’ Hicks v. State, 221 Ga.App. 735, 736(2) (472 S.E.2d 474) (1996). Recesses and ‘continuances in criminal cases are not governed by the strict rules of civil cases and ... should be granted whenever the principles of justice appear to demand a postponement.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 737. It is apparent from the trial judge’s words alone that he carefully weighed the recess of less than 24 hours against the effects on the young victim of declaring a mistrial, while also bearing in mind the rights of the accused. The trial court concluded that ‘justice’ in this case required the short recess. The recess was within the trial court’s discretion, and we will not disturb it.” Accord, Dowd v. State , 280 Ga.App. 563, 634 S.E.2d 509 (July 14, 2006). Kuykendoll v. State, 278 Ga.App. 369, 629 S.E.2d 32 (March 9, 2006). “[W]hen applicants request a continuance based upon missing witnesses, ‘[w]here the witness has not been subpoenaed and where other statutory requirements have not been met, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse a postponement of the hearing in order to subpoena these persons.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Halthon-Howard v. State, 234 Ga.App. 229, 230(1) (506 S.E.2d 415) (1998).” Accord, Potts v. State , 296 Ga.App. 242, 674 S.E.2d 109 (February 20, 2009). Alvarez v. State, 276 Ga.App. 105, 622 S.E.2d 453 (October 25, 2005). “‘The announcement of ready constitutes a waiver of [Alvarez’s] right to a continuance.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Walton v. State , 242 Ga.App. 639, 640(1), 530 S.E.2d 531 (2000).” Request here based on inability to interview all of State’s witnesses and defense witness missing due