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to health problems. Gould v. State, 273 Ga.App. 155, 614 S.E.2d 252 (May 3, 2005). “Gould obtained appointed counsel on August 22, 2003. His counsel filed a number of documents and invested a great deal of time in preparation for trial. On May 10, 2004, when the case was called for trial, Gould informed the trial court that he wished to terminate his counsel because he believed him to be ineffective. We agree with Gould that he had the right to seek his own counsel at his own expense, but here he had many months before the trial to exercise that right, and he had never claimed that his appointed counsel was ineffective prior to this time. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gould’s motion for continuance, made on the day of trial, in order to hire new counsel or prepare himself for trial. [Cit.] ‘The trial court was justified in preventing [Gould] from using a last-minute discharge of counsel as a dilatory tactic.’ [Cit.]” Accord, Lewis v. State , 330 Ga.App. 650, 768 S.E.2d 821 (February 10, 2015). Currington v. State, 270 Ga.App. 381, 606 S.E.2d 619 (November 9, 2004). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for continuance despite failure to give 10 days notice of trial as required by USCR 32.1. “[N]on-compliance with USCR 32.1 ‘is to be assessed under the circumstances of each case.’ [Cit.]” Heath v. State, 269 Ga.App. 872, 605 S.E.2d 427 (October 4, 2004). “Heath claims the trial court should have granted him a continuance after the State gave notice during argument on a pre-trial motion the day his trial began that it would present evidence that the crime occurred in 1996, not 1995, as alleged in the indictment. The trial court correctly concluded that the dates in the indictment were not a material element of the crimes with which Heath was charged. See Miller v. State, 226 Ga.App. 509, 510(1), 486 S.E.2d 911 (1997) (rape and child molestation case). ‘Where the date alleged in the indictment is not a material element of the offense, the State may prove the offense as of any date within the statute of limitation.’ Id.” Defendant not entitled to a continuance on this basis unless asserting an alibi defense. Singleton v. State, 266 Ga.App. 795, 598 S.E.2d 80 (April 6, 2004). Defendant sought continuance when his girlfriend/witness, who had been present in the morning session, “failed to return to the courthouse after lunch.” Held, trial court did not abuse discretion in not granting the continuance: “Singleton failed to meet the requirement for a continuance as set out in OCGA § 17-8-25. Singleton did document that his witness had been subpoenaed and was absent. However, he did not establish that the witness lived within 100 miles of the court or that he would be able to procure the witness’ testimony by the next term of court. In fact, Singleton’s attorney admitted that the witness had been difficult to locate and that she had only been served with the subpoena that morning. [Cits.]” Joiner v. State, 265 Ga.App. 395, 593 S.E.2d 936 (February 3, 2004). “In all cases wherein a continuance is sought upon the ground of the absence of a witness, the movant must make a showing of the requirements set forth in OCGA § 17-8- 25, i.e., the witness is absent, he has been subpoenaed, he does not reside more than 100 miles from the place of trial, his testimony is material, the absence is not with permission of the applicant, his testimony can be procured by the next term of court, the facts expected to be proved, and that application is not made for the purpose of delay.” No continuance is demanded without a showing of each element. Further, “‘where the missing witness’ testimony is solely impeaching, as in the instant case, and the judgment complained of was authorized by evidence other than the testimony sought to be impeached, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse the continuance.’” Accord, Krirat v. State , 286 Ga.App. 650, 649 S.E.2d 786 (July 6, 2007) (no continuance required where testifmony of missing witness merely cumulative). McConnell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 686, 589 S.E.2d 271 (October 21, 2003). “‘A motion for continuance based on counsel’s claim of insufficient time to prepare for trial is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court.’ The defendant’s conduct ‘is obviously relevant and is a proper consideration for the judge in the exercise of his discretion. The reason for this is to prevent [the defendant] from using discharge and employment of counsel as a dilatory tactic.’ Moreover, ‘[i]t is a rule of criminal procedure ... that ‘in all cases, the party making an application for a continuance must show that he has used due diligence.’ OCGA § 17-8-20.’” Accord, Lewis v. State , 330 Ga.App. 650, 768 S.E.2d 821 (February 10, 2015) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance based on defendant’s firing of his fourth attorney at the beginning of trial. “The sudden withdrawal of retained counsel is not ‘ipso facto a ground for continuance.’ Huckaby v. State, 127 Ga.App. 439, 440(1), 194 S.E.2d 119 (1972) (citation omitted).”). Grier v. State, 262 Ga.App. 777, 586 S.E.2d 448 (August 18, 2003). Trial court did not err in refusing to grant defendant a continuance “when a new State’s witness appeared on the day of trial.” Witness was an eyewitness to the assault. “‘Granting or refusing a continuance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent a clear showing of abuse, this court will not reverse for refusing to grant a continuance.’ Allowing defense counsel an opportunity to