☢ test - Í

interview the newly discovered witness is a permissible alternative to a continuance. In this case, it is clear that the State discovered the witness’s name at the same time Grier did, and Grier did not argue to the trial court and has not shown on appeal that the interviews led to any other witnesses or evidence of which he was otherwise unaware.” Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (March 19, 2003). “[W]here a party has had several months in which to employ counsel and neglects to do so, no continuance will be granted for such reason.” Emphasis here is on “neglect” – trial court must inquire into defendant’s diligence and ability to employ. Garland v. State 256 Ga.App. 313, 568 S.E.2d 540 (July 2, 2002). Defendant denied continuance to allow him to obtain computer-aided dispatch logs that were unavailable in court but had been introduced into evidence at a previous hearing. Defendant argued he needed the evidence to proceed. Held, “[e]ven if Garland was surprised that the dispatch logs were unavailable on the morning of trial, he has not demonstrated how those logs would have benefited his defense. And where such a benefit is not shown to exist, we will not conclude that a continuance was necessary.” Guild v. State, 255 Ga.App. 285, 564 S.E.2d 862 (May 7, 2002). Where defendant fired his attorney and hired a new one two weeks before trial, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny request for continuance in armed robbery trial. See also Roland v. State , 266 Ga. 545, 546(3), 468 S.E.2d 378 (1996), Cunningham v. State , 244 Ga.App. 231, 232(1), 535 S.E.2d 262 (2000). Accord, Thornton v. State , 305 Ga.App. 692, 700 S.E.2d 669 (August 26, 2010) (“we have affirmed a trial court's denial of a last-minute request for a continuance to retain new counsel if it appears that the defendant negligently failed to employ new counsel promptly or if it appears he is using the tactic for delay,” as here, where existing counsel was apparently ready for trial). Berry v. State, 246 Ga.App. 9, 539 S.E.2d 516 (September 14, 2000). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying motion for continuance, made the morning of trial. “Berry asked for the continuance so he could hire his own expert, and he certainly would have been entitled to have an independent expert examine the substance if he had filed a timely motion for such an examination. [Cits.] Berry had several months before trial when he could have moved for an independent expert examination of the substance seized from him; he did not have to wait until he received the state’s report to move for such an examination. But Berry failed to make such a pre-trial motion and instead waited until the day of trial to orally ask for his own expert examination. Given such an untimely oral request, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Berry a continuance on that basis.” Sanders v. State, 245 Ga.App. 701, 538 S.E.2d 772 (August 28, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying continuance based on defendant’s desire to fire appointed counsel on the eve of trial and seek (unspecified) retained counsel. “The case had been pending for over a year,” and defendant “had had many months before the trial to exercise” his right to counsel. “The trial court was justified in preventing Sanders from using a last- minute discharge of counsel as a dilatory tactic. Brannon v. State, 220 Ga.App. 572, 574(2), 469 S.E.2d 716 (1996); Wills v. State, 216 Ga.App. 157, 158(1), 453 S.E.2d 762 (1995). And although Sanders's attorney supported his continuance request, the trial court was not required to release defense counsel because of friction with his client's family.” Cunningham v. State , 244 Ga.App. 231, 535 S.E.2d 262 (May 26, 2000). Rape, kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance based on defendant’s retention of new counsel two weeks before trial, and her failure to obtain transcripts of co-defendants’ prior trial. “Even though the new attorney may have only two weeks to prepare, denying a continuance is not an abuse of discretion, Judge v. State, 240 Ga.App. 541, 543(2), 524 S.E.2d 4 (1999); see also Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231(1), 91 S.E.2d 764 (1956), particularly where the short time period arises from defendant's voluntary decision to substitute new counsel. See Bearden v. State, 241 Ga.App. 842, 844-845(3), 528 S.E.2d 275 (2000); Judge, supra, 240 Ga.App. at 543(2), 524 S.E.2d 4. … Nor do we find the denial of a continuance to be an abuse of discretion where the basis for the continuance is the lack of a transcript, Moreland v. State, 213 Ga.App. 75, 76(2), 443 S.E.2d 701 (1994); cf. Kier v. State, 240 Ga.App. 152, 153, 525 S.E.2d 102 (1999), unless defendant has shown due diligence in obtaining the transcript. See Bearden, supra, 241 Ga.App. at 844(3), 528 S.E.2d 275 (‘[t]he party requesting the continuance must show that he exercised due diligence.’) (footnote omitted); compare Coaxum v. State, 146 Ga.App. 370, 371(4), 246 S.E.2d 403 (1978) (counsel made repeated requests over a one- year period for transcripts). Here, there was no showing that the first counsel had sought the transcript, and the new counsel made only a single request for the transcript with no follow-up in the two weeks before trial.” Walton v. State, 242 Ga.App. 639, 530 S.E.2d 531 (March 8, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denial of continuance. “After the call of the trial calendar, defense counsel made a motion for