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continuance wherein she claimed to be unprepared to try the case. The motion was denied. The case was called two days later. Defense counsel announced ready and a jury was struck. No further motion for continuance was made. The next day, prior to the introduction of evidence, defense counsel again announced ready, and the case proceeded to trial. No further motion for continuance was made. ‘The announcement of ready constitutes a waiver of [Walton's] right to a continuance.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mercier v. State, 203 Ga.App. 494, 495(3), 417 S.E.2d 430 (1992). See also Vining v. State, 195 Ga.App. 816, 817(2), 395 S.E.2d 17 (1990); Wise v. State, 146 Ga.App. 194(1), 246 S.E.2d 6 (1978).” Brown v. State, 242 Ga.App. 106, 528 S.E.2d 868 (January 28, 2000). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance “to allow the State Crime Lab to complete analysis of body fluids taken from Brown and [victim] Turner or to allow Brown to obtain an independent analysis of the fluids. … First, Brown had no right to seek, and the trial court had no authority to order, that the State Crime Lab analyze the samples for his benefit. Kendrix v. State, 206 Ga.App. 627, 628, 426 S.E.2d 251 (1992). It follows that Brown was not entitled to a continuance for this purpose. Second, even though an indigent defendant, upon timely motion, has a right to funds to hire an expert to examine critical evidence which is subject to varying expert opinion, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion for an expert in this case. Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 17, 282 S.E.2d 61 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994); Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 365 S.E.2d 115 (1988). An indigent criminal defendant's motion for funds to obtain an independent expert should inform the trial court with reasonable precision why the evidence sought to be examined is critical, what type of testimony is needed, what the expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for the expert services. Id. at 40-41, 365 S.E.2d 115; Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 310, 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997). Because Brown's motion failed to set forth these elements, denial of the motion was not error. It follows that the trial court did not err in denying Brown a continuance for this purpose.” In any event, evidence of victim’s drug and alcohol use was presented to the jury. Smalls v. State, 242 Ga.App. 39, 528 S.E.2d 560 (January 21, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court denied continuance based on alleged medical need of defendant. “Smalls presented no evidence regarding the automobile accident or his resulting medical treatment at the time he made his motion for continuance. See Kervin v. State, 178 Ga.App. 601, 604(2), 344 S.E.2d 441 (1986) (affirming the denial of a motion for continuance even though the defendant was unable to be present for trial due to his hospitalization); Sewell v. State, 162 Ga.App. 483-484(2), 291 S.E.2d 783 (1982); cf. Frain v. State, 40 Ga. 529, 531 (1869) (reversing a conviction for failure to grant a continuance after the defendant produced documentation and witnesses evidencing his severe medical condition). Further, the trial court observed Smalls' demeanor in court for two days before ruling on the continuance; it also observed Smalls during the trial and sentencing. See Stovall v. State, 106 Ga. 443, 445(1), 32 S.E. 586 (1899); Gunter v. State, 63 Ga.App. 65, 69(2), 10 S.E.2d 264 (1940). In deciding the motion for new trial, it is also very likely that the trial court considered Smalls' tacit admission that he obtained the pain pills prescription the day before seeking the motion for continuance. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Bearden v. State, 241 Ga.App. 842, 528 S.E.2d 275 (January 18, 2000). Defendants’ convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance to hire counsel on eve of trial. “ [Co-defendant] Jablonowski contends the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance so that he could obtain hired counsel to represent him at trial. We disagree because the record shows that Jablonowski did not exercise due diligence to retain counsel. Motions for continuance based on insufficient time to hire or substitute counsel are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge's ruling will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See Bennett v. State, 186 Ga.App. 832(2), 368 S.E.2d 789 (1988); Beard v. State, 178 Ga.App. 265(1), 342 S.E.2d 751 (1986). In addition, the trial judge may consider the conduct of a party in order to prevent a party from using the discharge and employment of counsel as a dilatory tactic. See Marion v. State, 224 Ga.App. 413, 414(1), 480 S.E.2d 869 (1997). The party requesting the continuance must show that he exercised due diligence. Id. As Jablonowski's appellate brief indicates: ‘Trial counsel had been appointed substantially prior to the trial in question and no previous attempts had been made to hire counsel or substitute counsel prior to trial. According to the statements of [Jablonowski's mother], she had only made an attempt to try and obtain counsel beginning on the Saturday prior to the Monday trial date....’ Nonetheless, Jablonowski contends his request for a continuance should have been granted merely because his mother indicated that she was not attempting to delay the impending trial. The trial court is not bound to accept such a conclusory statement. Moreover, Jablonowski has not suggested any evidence or any matter whatsoever which he could have presented in his defense if he had had more time to prepare . See Warren v. State, 232 Ga.App. 488, 490(3)(a), 502 S.E.2d 336 (1998). We cannot say that the trial court erred in denying a continuance when Jablonowski made no attempt to hire counsel until the weekend before his scheduled trial .”