☢ test - Í

for continuance is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court). The record reveals that none of the many reasons Johnson listed in support of his motions, including a local flood, alleged late discovery provided by the State, defense counsel's fatigue due to another recent death penalty trial, and alleged newly-discovered exculpatory evidence, [fn] have merit sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See O'Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1(2), 325 S.E.2d 759 (1985).” Hunter v. State, 237 Ga.App. 803, 517 S.E.2d 534 (April 28, 1999). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance based on missing witness. “ Under OCGA § 17-8-25, a party applying for a continuance based on failure of a witness to appear must show the court the following: the witness is absent, has been subpoenaed, does not reside more than 100 miles from the place of trial, is not absent by permission of the applicant, has material testimony and will appear at the next term of the court. The applicant must also show that the application is not made for the purpose of delay and must state the facts expected to be proved by the absent witness. We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance. Pickens v. State, 225 Ga.App. 792, 798(3)(b), 484 S.E.2d 731 (1997). Hunter failed to prove each of the requirements in OCGA § 17-8-25. ‘Even assuming that the other statutory terms for the granting of a continuance were met, it affirmatively appears that the requirement, “that the applicant expects he will be able to procure the testimony of the witness at the next term of the court,” was not fulfilled.’ Thompkins v. State, 257 Ga. 113, 356 S.E.2d 207 (1987). All Hunter said about the location of his absent witness was that she had attended trial every day previously, but had gone to Florida and did not intend to be there that day. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunter’s motion for continuance.” Accord, Bacon v. State , 239 Ga.App. 874, 521 S.E.2d 695 (August 18, 1999) (Defendant “failed to show … that the witness lived within 100 miles from the place of trial, that he expected that he would procure the witness's testimony at the next term of court, or that the application was not made for the purpose of delay.”); Lafavor v. State , 334 Ga.App. 125, 778 S.E.2d 787 (October 8, 2015) (no showing that witness lived within 100 miles and could be procured in next term of court). Dally v. State, 237 Ga.App. 577, 516 S.E.2d 87 (April 9, 1999). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s request for continuance: “To attempt to establish why he needed more time to prepare for trial, Dally submitted two offers of proof under seal to the court which disclosed a defense strategy of claiming that his ex-wife concocted a scheme to frame him. [fn] But where, as here, a case is not convoluted and does not involve a large number of witnesses or intricate defenses, denial of a continuance merely because of shortness of time for preparation for trial does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Fulghum v. State, 180 Ga.App. 748(1), 350 S.E.2d 268 (1986).” Accord, Eason v. State , 331 Ga.App. 59, 769 S.E.2d 772 (March 10, 2015). Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). Denial of defendant’s motion for continuance was not abuse of discretion where based on untimely request for funds to hire expert to assist with jury selection, and “Pruitt failed to show why such a study was critical to his defense.” Patterson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 80, 514 S.E.2d 873 (March 17, 1999). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance in defendant’s child molestation trial where experienced defense counsel “had less than two and one-half months to prepare for trial and, because they had other cases pending, had insufficient opportunity to investigate the case and prove A.P. previously made false allegations. “‘We point out that[t]here is no fixed rule as to the number of days that should, of right, be allowed counsel in a criminal case to prepare the case for trial, but the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion to grant or refuse a continuance, has to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine what the ends of justice require.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Watkins v. State, 191 Ga.App. 87, 88-89(1), 381 S.E.2d 45 (1989). We note that the Supreme Court has held a two-week preparation period for a malice murder and armed robbery trial is not inadequate as a matter of law. Roland v. State, 266 Ga. 545, 546(3), 468 S.E.2d 378 (1996). Nor is ten days to prepare for an armed robbery case, or one month for a kidnapping with bodily harm charge inadequate as a matter of law, as this Court has previously held. Harris v. State, 202 Ga.App. 618(1), 414 S.E.2d 919 (1992); Green v. State, 193 Ga.App. 894, 896-897(3), 389 S.E.2d 358 (1989).” Letson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 340, 512 S.E.2d 55 (February 9, 1999). Convictions for methamphetamine trafficking and related offenses affirmed; trial court’s denial of continuance based on missing witness was not an abuse of discretion. “OCGA § 17-8-25 provides, among other things, that applications for continuance based on the absence of a witness must be accompanied by a showing that the absent witness’s testimony is material. … [D]efendant failed to call the absent witness … at a hearing that was conducted on his motion for new trial. Defendant, thus, failed to substantiate … that [witness’s] testimony was material to defendant’s defense.”