☢ test - Í

Brandon v. State, 236 Ga.App. 203, 511 S.E.2d 573 (February 3, 1999). DUI amd related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance. “To warrant a continuance based upon the absence of a witness, the requesting party must show due diligence in securing the witness’ attendance. Halthon-Howard v. State, 234 Ga.App. 229, 229-230(1), 506 S.E.2d 415 (1998); OCGA §§ 17-8-20; 17-8-25. Absent a showing that the witness was subpoenaed and where other statutory requisites are unsatisfied, the denial of a continuance does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Halthon-Howard, 234 Ga.App. at 230, 506 S.E.2d 415. The record shows that the trial court granted Brandon at least one previous continuance to secure this same witness. Brandon offered no evidence that he was properly subpoenaed. In these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.” Accord, Presley v. State , 307 Ga.App. 528, 705 S.E.2d 870 (January 5, 2011). N. COSTS Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570, 651 S.E.2d 679 (September 24, 2007). Trial court erred in ordering county to pay certain costs of capital murder defense: “the costs of transcribing telephone conversations made by or to [defendant] Nichols at the jail and of presenting demonstrative evidence in the courtroom in a digital format.” These are not “contingent expenses” for which the county is liable pursuant to OCGA § 15-6-24 (“Any contingent expenses incurred in holding any session of the superior court, including lights, fuel, stationery, rent, publication of grand jury presentments when ordered published, and similar items, such as taking down testimony in felony cases, etc., shall be paid out of the county treasury ... upon the certificate of the judge of the superior court and without further order.”). “The costs of transcribing telephone conversations at the jail and of presenting demonstrative evidence digitally are not expressly authorized. They are not the type of expenses that can be expected to be incurred ordinarily in a trial in superior court. It follows that the trial court erred in ordering Fulton County to pay these costs.” Court’s power to order county to pay costs of defense under OCGA § 17-12-44 “was only effective until January 1, 2005, following establishment of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council. See OCGA §§ 17-12-1; 17-12-12.” Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. State, 284 Ga.App. 660, 644 S.E.2d 510 (March 29, 2007). Public Defender Standards Council is not liable for costs of trial transcripts for indigent defendants. “Payment for these transcripts is an obligation of the State, and our law requires that the counties pay for transcripts. See, e.g., OCGA § 15-6- 24 [fn] (taking down testimony in felony cases); OCGA § 48-5-220(5) (one purpose of county taxes is to pay court expenses); and OCGA § 15-6-79 (transcripts for appellate courts under indigency affidavits shall be paid from county funds). These responsibilities existed at the time the Council was created, and the General Assembly is presumed to have enacted the Georgia Indigent Defense Act with knowledge of the existing laws requiring counties to pay for transcripts. Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, [254 Ga. 91, 93 (327 S.E.2d 188) (1985)]. Additionally, we cannot say that the Act repealed these existing laws by implication because repeals by implication are not favored. Only if a prior statute is clearly inconsistent and contrary to the most recently enacted statute or the later statute covers the entire subject matter will we hold that a statute repeals another by implication. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeKalb County, 251 Ga. 309(2) (304 S.E.2d 386) (1983). That cannot be said in this case.” O. CUMULATIVE ERROR Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (February 26, 2007). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no reversal based on “cumulative error” or the totality of circumstances. “Stokes contends that he was denied a fair trial under the totality of the circumstances. He urges that when the trial is viewed as a whole, with all of the errors that occurred before and during trial and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the inescapable conclusion is that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial. However, Stokes has not prevailed in any of his claims of error, including his assertions of ineffectiveness on the part of trial counsel. … Moreover, Georgia does not recognize the cumulative error rule. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 770(6) (604 S.E.2d 804) (2004); Bridges v. State, 268 Ga. 700, 708(9) (492 S.E.2d 877) (1997).” Accord, Woodall v. State , 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014); Rivers v. State , 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015). Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (February 26, 2007). Footnote 1: “The Supreme Court of the United States has held that it is the prejudice arising from ‘counsel’s errors’ that is constitutionally relevant, not that each individual error by counsel should be considered in a vacuum. Strickland [ v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(III) (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984)]. Accordingly, the cases in which the Court of Appeals has held that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors should not be considered are disapproved. See Anderson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 58, 62(3) (637 S.E.2d 790) (2006); Fields v. State, 281 Ga.App. 733, 737(2) (637 S.E.2d 136) (2006); Hutchens v. State, 281 Ga.App. 610, 613(2) (636 S.E.2d 773) (2006); Tyler v. State, 279 Ga.App. 809, 812(3) (632 S.E.2d 716) (2006);