☢ test - Í

Frazier v. State, 278 Ga.App. 685, 690(3) (629 S.E.2d 568) (2006); Davenport v. State, 278 Ga.App. 16, 19(2) (628 S.E.2d 120) (2006); Zepp v. State, 276 Ga.App. 466, 475(5) (623 S.E.2d 569) (2005); Fitz v. State, 275 Ga.App. 817, 824- 825(4) (622 S.E.2d 46) (2005); Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga.App. 806, 808(2) (616 S.E.2d 148) (2005); Brooks v. State, 273 Ga.App. 691, 695(4) (615 S.E.2d 829) (2005); Howren v. State, 271 Ga.App. 55, 58(5) (608 S.E.2d 653) (2004); Hodges v. State, 260 Ga.App. 483, 486-487(5) (580 S.E.2d 614) (2003); Baker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 433, 435(3) (577 S.E.2d 282) (2003); Whited v. State, 258 Ga.App. 195, 200(8) (573 S.E.2d 449) (2002); Holland v. State, 250 Ga.App. 24, 28(4) (550 S.E.2d 433) (2001); Osborne v. State, 239 Ga.App. 308, 309(1) (521 S.E.2d 226) (1999); Johnson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 61, 66(3)(e) (510 S.E.2d 918) (1999); Carl v. State, 234 Ga.App. 61, 65(2)(g) (506 S.E.2d 207) (1998). Although the combined effects of trial counsel’s errors should be considered together as one issue, it remains the case that ‘[t]his State does not recognize the cumulative error rule.’ Bridges v. State, 268 Ga. 700, 708(9) (492 S.E.2d 877) (1997).” Accord, Rogers v. State , 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007). Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No reversal based on “cumulative error” in argument. “Georgia does not follow a cumulative error rule of prejudice. Morrison v. State , 276 Ga. 829, 583 S.E.2d 873 (2003).” Compare to Collier (March 18, 2004), below. Accord, Dixon v. State , 268 Ga.App. 215, 601 S.E.2d 748 (June 30, 2004). P. DEAD DOCKET Phillips v. State, 279 Ga. 704, 620 S.E.2d 367 (October 3, 2005). Trial court did not err in trying defendant on murder charge after case was dead docketed. “Although the case was placed on the dead docket after the original trial ended in a mistrial as to the murder charges, that ‘“certainly constitute[d] neither a dismissal nor a termination of the prosecution in the accused’s favor. A case is still pending which can be called for trial at the judge’s pleasure, or upon which the accused can make a demand for trial.” (Cits.)’ [Cits.] Beam v. State, 265 Ga. 853, 855(3), fn. 3 (463 S.E.2d 347) (1995). Nothing in the record supports a finding that, under the circumstances, Phillips failed to receive such notice of his retrial as would satisfy due process.” Chung v. State, 240 Ga.App. 394, 523 S.E.2d 615 (October 18, 1999). Defendant could be prosecuted for deposit account fraud charge after case was dead-docketed. “Placing a case on the dead docket does not constitute either a dismissal or termination of the prosecution in the accused's favor. McCord v. Jones, 168 Ga.App. 891, 892, 311 S.E.2d 209 (1983). The case is still pending and can be called for trial at the judge's discretion. Id.” Q. DEATH PENALTY See subheading UNIFIED APPEAL PROCEDURE, below R. DEMURRER See ACCUSATION/INDICTMENT, above S. DEPOSITIONS New case! Everhart v. State, A16A0652, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3064872 (May 25, 2016). Child cruelty convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed State to present doctor’s testimony via deposition, regardless of technical errors in notice of deposition. “Everhart … argues that the State failed to follow the requirements for using a deposition at trial set forth in OCGA § 24-10-130, which includes a provision for notice. But regardless of any technical defect in the State’s failure to adhere to OCGA § 24-10-130’s requirements, Everhart’s counsel had actual notice of the deposition, was present, and cross-examined the witness. See, e.g. , Burrell v. State , 258 Ga. 841, 844 (6) (376 S.E.2d 184) (1989) (technical violation of statute’s notice provision harmless where, among other things, defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine).” Rice v. State, 281 Ga. 149, 635 S.E.2d 707 (October 2, 2006). 1. On State’s motion, testimony of murder victim’s husband was taken by deposition, due to his medical condition. On conclusion of State’s direct examination, trial court granted defendant a continuance to allow additional time to prepare for cross. Witness died before the date set to resume the deposition. Trial court denied defense motion to exclude the testimony on grounds that defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Held, trial court properly denied the motion. “We agree with the trial court that Rice waived his opportunity to cross-examine Mincher on the day of his deposition. Rice was on notice from the statute governing pretrial depositions that the trial court could order that the deposition occur at any time within 30 days of the hearing. See OCGA § 24-10-130(f). Although Rice’s opportunity for cross-examination was perhaps not ideal given the fact that he had only six days’ notice of the hearing, we find that Rice was afforded a sufficient opportunity for cross-examination and that the lack of cross-examination in this case is the result of his waiving that opportunity.” 2. Trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defense motion for second deposition of a different witness. “There appears to be no case law regarding when, if ever, a trial court is required to permit a second pretrial deposition of