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a witness who could die before trial or become too ill to attend trial. However, the case law governing when a trial court may allow or refuse to allow a witness to be recalled as a witness at trial seems instructive, and that case law shows that the decision is within the trial court’s discretion. See Ivey v. State, 277 Ga. 875, 877(4)(a) (596 S.E.2d 612) (2004); Smith v. State, 261 Ga.App. 871, 875(3) (583 S.E.2d 914) (2003). In light of the fact that Rice had already questioned Heaton about the medications she was taking and whether in her subjective judgment her memory was affected by her medications, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to allow additional pretrial cross-examination of her.” Evans v. State, 275 Ga.App. 621, 621 S.E.2d 584 (September 27, 2005). Trial court erred in admitting victim’s sworn statement as a “deposition” under OCGA § 24-10-130. “In the instant case, none of the requirements of OCGA § 24-10- 130 was satisfied. The state never filed a motion to take [victim] Bordwell’s deposition. And since there was no motion to rule on, the trial court never held a hearing, never found that it was satisfied that the grounds for a deposition existed and never ordered that a deposition of Bordwell be taken during a particular time period. Instead, the state simply sent a letter to the defense stating that it was trying to coordinate a deposition of Bordwell. Apparently the state never actually scheduled a formal deposition, and instead simply e-mailed questions to Bordwell, who then responded with his sworn statement.” Austin v. State, 275 Ga.App. 560, 621 S.E.2d 546 (September 22, 2005). 1. Trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing victim’s testimony to be taken via deposition pursuant to OCGA § 24-10-130(b)(4). “The trial court found that OCGA § 24-10-130(b)(4) was satisfied because the victim’s brain tumor, vertigo, and general anxiety disorder physically prevented the victim from attending the trial and could affect her ability to testify in future proceedings. Based on the evidence received, the trial court was authorized to find that the victim was ‘so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds to believe that such witness [would] be unable to attend the trial.’ OCGA § 24-10-130(b)(4). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion to take the victim’s deposition. Davis v. State, 238 Ga.App. 84, 86(2) (517 S.E.2d 808) (1999).” 2. Prior to use of deposition at trial, “it would be a better practice for a trial court, before allowing a deposition pursuant to OCGA § 24-10-135, to make a finding of unavailability explicitly on the record. But in this case such a finding was implicit in the court’s ruling and was authorized by the evidence.” T. DETAINERS State v. McCarter, 314 Ga.App. 542, 724 S.E.2d 843 (March 2, 2012). Trial court erroneously dismissed prosecution for aggravated assault and related offenses; “the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the ‘IAD’) [fn] afforded the state 180 days to try McCarter following his complete satisfaction of the IAD's notification procedures, and … this time period had not expired when the trial court entered its dismissal order.” “‘[T]he right of a prisoner to be tried within 180 days accrues only after the precise operational procedures set forth in the IAD are completely satisfied.’ Clater v. State, 266 Ga. 511, 512(3) (467 S.E.2d 537) (1996) (footnote omitted). In this case, those procedures were satisfied on October 19, 2010, upon receipt by the court and the district attorney of the notification and certificate properly forwarded by McCarter's custodian, and not upon the August 13, 2010 filing of McCarter's demand. See Thompson v. State, 186 Ga.App. 379, 381 (367 S.E.2d 247) (1988) (appellant's actions in mailing the request directly to the prosecutor and the clerk of court did not comply with the IAD).” State v. Thompson, 284 Ga.App. 744, 644 S.E.2d 889 (April 2, 2007). Demand for trial on Interstate Detainer, served on one district attorney, required trial on all pending charges anywhere in Georgia within 180 days of notice, else the charges must be dismissed. Thus, Augusta Judicial Circuit properly dismissed defendant’s charges there, although defendant’s notice was only served on the DA of the Toombs Circuit. “ A prisoner’s request applies to all untried indictments ‘on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.’ (Emphasis added.) There is no county- or circuit-specific language here. See Florida v. Wiggins, 425 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla.App., 1983) (since the state of Florida is ‘a single jurisdiction,’ each county filing a detainer has responsibility to proceed to trial ‘prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment’).” Morrison v. State, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (February 13, 2006). State obtained defendant’s presence from federal custody in Florida pursuant to Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) based on terroristic threats charges. The terroristic threats charges were dismissed, but State kept defendant and prosecuted him on two sets of charges which were not the basis of the interstate detainer. Defendant appeals, contending that violation of the IAD divested trial court of jurisdiction. Supreme Court (like Court of Appeals, see 272 Ga.App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720 (March 8, 2005)), affirms