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conviction: “Georgia has long recognized that the manner by which an accused is brought before a court has no bearing on the court’s jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331(2), 271 S.E.2d 478 (1980) (illegal arrest, without more, does not bar subsequent prosecution, nor is it defense to valid conviction); Seabolt v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 171, 240 S.E.2d 57 (1977) (defect or irregularity in arrest or imprisonment does not affect court’s jurisdiction); [other cits.].” While other Articles of the IAD expressly provide remedies for violation, Article V (prohibiting continued detention past dismissal of charges “which form the basis of the detainer”) does not. “In the absence of express language to the contrary, we therefore reject [defendant’s] invitation to interpret Article V in such a manner as to convert it into a substantive provision conferring or divesting Georgia courts of subject matter or personal jurisdiction.” “To hold otherwise would have the unjustified and unwarranted effect of granting greater protection to a defendant over whom the State obtains custody pursuant to the IAD than to prisoners brought to Georgia by other methods. It is well settled in Georgia that a trial court has jurisdiction to oversee the criminal prosecution of even those defendants who were forcibly removed from another state and brought into a Georgia court, who were illegally arrested or detained without a showing of probable cause, and who were unlawfully or irregularly extradited by the State. [Cits., including Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347(1), 165 S.E. 945 (1892), affirmed, Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 545, 13 S.Ct. 687, 37 L.Ed. 549 (1893) (unlawful extradition).]” Sears and Benham dissent. State v. Carlton, 276 Ga. 693, 583 S.E.2d 1 (June 30, 2003). An arrest warrant is not a “detainer” which allows a federal inmate to demand speedy trial pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers because it is not a charging instrument or its equivalent. Reverses Carlton v. State , 254 Ga.App. 653, 563 S.E.2d 521 (2002). Accord, Herbert v. State , 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (March 18, 2011); Denson v. State , 317 Ga.App. 456, 731 S.E.2d 130 (August 22, 2012) (based on Carlton , an arrest warrant isn’t an intrastate detainer, either). Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S. Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (June 11, 2001). Affirming Alabama Supreme Court; trial court erred in denying motion to dismiss defendant’s weapons charges based on violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Bozeman was being held in federal prison on Florida when Alabama filed a detainer to obtain him for trial on weapons charges. Alabama picked up Bozeman for arraignment and appointment of counsel, kept him one day, then returned him to federal prison. About a month later, they retrieved him for trial, whereupon his counsel moved for dismissal based on Article IV(e) of the IAD, which “says that trial must be ‘had ... prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment’; otherwise, the charges ‘shall’ be dismissed with prejudice.” Trial court denied the motion and defendant was convicted at trial, but Alabama Supreme Court reversed, saying that dismissal was mandated when Alabama obtained defendant from another “state’s” custody and then returned him prior to trial. U.S. Supreme Court agrees, holding that the word “shall” used in the IAD allows for no de minimis exceptions: “we must assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)'s ‘no return’ requirement.” Also notes, however, that “our decision does not bar a receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e).” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 120 S. Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (January 11, 2000). Reversing New York Court of Appeals; trial court properly determined that defendant’s right, under Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), to trial within 180 days was waived when counsel agreed to later trial date. Hill was serving time in Ohio when produced for trial in New York on murder and related charges. After disposition of defense motions, counsel appeared in court to set a trial date; counsel on both sides agreed to a certain date, but prior to trial the defense moved for dismissal “arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired.” The trial court found that “the 180 day time period had indeed expired,” but “the trial court concluded that ‘[d]efense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180-day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendant's rights under the IAD.’” U.S. Supreme Court agrees with trial court; contrary to defendant’s argument, right to timely trial under the IAD is waivable by counsel. “No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendant's assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, ‘in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions,’ articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995), and we have recognized that ‘[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver,’ Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991).” “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. … For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. ‘Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has – and must have – full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.’