☢ test - Í

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-418, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is ‘deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have “notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.”’ Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326, 25 L.Ed. 955 (1880)). Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983), what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965), and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226-227 (C.A.1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last.” “The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: In allowing the court to grant ‘good-cause continuances’ when either ‘prisoner or his counsel ’ is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).” U. DIRECTED VERDICT Watson v. State, A16A0228, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1726222 (May 2, 2016). Robbery and theft by taking convictions affirmed; no error in denying motion for directed verdict. Contrary to defendant’s argument, “[u]nder Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 374–75(1) (219 S.E.2d 743) (1975), a court reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is not limited to considering only the evidence presented in the case-in-chief, but may consider all the evidence in the case.” Fletcher v. State, 326 Ga.App. 389, 756 S.E.2d 625 (March 20, 2014). Convictions for robbery by intimidation and related offenses affirmed; no error in deferring ruling on defense motion for directed verdict. “‘We are unaware of any authority which does not permit the court to reserve ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and rule upon it [before the case goes to the jury].’ Ballentine v. State, 194 Ga.App. 560, 561(4), 390 S.E.2d 887 (1990).” Martinez v. State, 318 Ga.App. 254, 735 S.E.2d 785 (October 29, 2012). Conviction for attempted armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, trial court could grant directed verdict as to charged offense of kidnapping, but still allow jury to deliberate on lesser included offense of false imprisonment. “Where a directed verdict has been granted on one charge, as in the instant case, our appellate courts have upheld a trial court's decision to allow the jury to consider a lesser included offense. In one similarly postured case, our Supreme Court determined that ‘[t]he trial court did not commit error by charging the jury on a lesser included offense of simple battery after it had directed a verdict on the charge of aggravated assault.’ (Citation omitted.) Clarke v. State, 239 Ga. 42, 43(1) (235 S.E.2d 524) (1977). Similarly, when the trial court ‘ruled that the evidence was insufficient to convict [the defendant] of felony obstruction of an officer ... [and] let the case go to the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer,’ of which the defendant was convicted, this Court upheld that conviction. Williams v. State, 196 Ga.App. 154, 155–156(1) (395 S.E.2d 399) (1990).” “Thus, ‘if an offense is a lesser included offense as a matter of law or fact, an accused can be convicted of that offense even if the trial court directs a verdict on the offense expressly charged in the indictment,’ quoting Morris v. State, 310 Ga.App. 126 (712 S.E.2d 130) (2011). State v. Canup, 300 Ga.App. 678, 686 S.E.2d 275 (October 16, 2009). Trial court erred in granting directed verdict after sentencing. “‘Because there is no provision in Georgia law authorizing a trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of not guilty notwithstanding a verdict of guilty in a criminal case, the court's action was procedurally unauthorized.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Banks v. State, 290 Ga.App. 887, n. 1 (660 S.E.2d 873) (2008). See also Rhyne v. State, 209 Ga.App. 548, 550-551(1) (434 S.E.2d 76) (1993) (ruling that Georgia law does not provide for a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict); State v. Bilal, 192 Ga.App. 185 (384 S.E.2d 253) (1989) (same). Although OCGA § 17-9-1 provides for a directed verdict of acquittal during trial, ‘that statute does not apply after the entry of a verdict.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Moody v. State, 272 Ga. 55, 56(1), n2 (252 S.E.2d 360) (2000). After the trial court's entry of judgment on the verdict, the trial has ended. See OCGA § 16-1-3(4); Dorsey v. State, 259 Ga.App. 254, 256 (576 S.E.2d 637) (2003). At that juncture, the defendant's challenge of the conviction must be pursued through post-conviction remedies, such as a motion in arrest of judgment or motion for new trial. See Banks, 290 Ga.App. at 887, n. 1; Bilal, 192 Ga.App. at 186. See e.g., State v. Sumlin, 281 Ga. 183, 184(1) (637 S.E.2d 36) (2006).” Distinguishing v. Seignious, 197 Ga.App. 766 (399 S.E.2d 559) (1990) and Ballentine v. State, 194 Ga.App. 560, 562(4) (390 S.E.2d 887) (1990): “In both Seignious and Ballentine, the trial court's ruling upon the motion for directed verdict was entered after the jury returned a verdict, but before the imposition of sentencing and entry of judgment on the verdict. See Seignious, 197 Ga.App. at 766; Ballentine, 194 Ga.App. at 562(4). In contrast, the trial court's reservation of a ruling upon the motion for directed verdict in the instant case not only extended past the jury's return of a verdict, but significantly, was entered after the trial court imposed sentencing and entered its judgment of conviction.”