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Goodson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 167, 529 S.E.2d 175 (February 1, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; no error in denying motion for directed verdict at bench trial. “‘[T]he trial court could not have directed a verdict of acquittal because there is no verdict in a bench trial. Therefore, even if a motion for a directed verdict was made, such a motion has no meaning when a case is tried without a jury.... [T]he issue is whether the evidence was sufficient at trial to support a conviction under the standards of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).’ (Citation omitted.) Jones v. State, 226 Ga.App. 608, 609, 487 S.E.2d 89 (1997).” Moody v. State, 272 Ga. 55, 525 S.E.2d 360 (January 18, 2000). Trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for directed verdict after conviction was error, but grant of State’s “extraordinary motion for new trial” was improper, as “there is no authority for the State to seek a new trial in a criminal case and the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the State's motion.” After defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, and related offenses, trial court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the firearm charge. State then filed its motion for new trial, pointing out that trial court couldn’t grant directed verdict following conviction. Supreme Court notes in dicta that grant of defendant’s directed verdict motion was improper, but law provides State no power to move for new trial. “There is no provision in Georgia law authorizing a trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of not guilty notwithstanding a verdict of guilty in a criminal case. Wilson v. State, 215 Ga. 775(1), 113 S.E.2d 607 (1960). Since Wilson, the legislature created a statutory right to seek a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case during trial, codified as OCGA § 17-9-1; however, that statute does not apply after the entry of a verdict. Although this issue is not presently before the Court, we observe that a judgment which is ‘void for any other cause, is a mere nullity and may be held so in any court where it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it.’ OCGA § 17-9-4.” Williams v. State, 237 Ga.App. 814, 515 S.E.2d 875 (April 8, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict, regardless of defendant’s claim that indictment didn’t adequately set out manner of defendant’s injury. “‘ A motion for directed verdict of acquittal is not the proper way to contest the sufficiency of an indictment. A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the underlying indictment. (Cit.)’ (Punctuation omitted.) McKay v. State, 234 Ga.App. 556, 559(2), 507 S.E.2d 484 (1998).” V. DISCOVERY See also EVIDENCE – EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE - DISCLOSURE ( BRADY ), above, and WITNESSES – WITNESS LIST, below State v. Brown, 333 Ga.App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (July 30, 2015). In prosecution for cocaine trafficking and related offenses, exclusion of State’s evidence based on alleged discovery violation was error. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, investigator’s field notes were not subject to discovery absent some showing that they were exculpatory (no such showing here). “We find no basis for concluding that the [Criminal Procedure Discovery] Act requires every member of law enforcement to preserve ‘everything associated with [every] case,’ including informal notes created by an investigator only for the purpose of helping the investigator include accurate information in a warrant application.[ fn] The record does not show that the investigator's informal notes, which the State could not produce, were subject to discovery under any of the provisions of the Act. [FN19. To the extent the appellees suggest that the notes may have been exculpatory, they have not articulated how the investigator's description of the activity she observed during her surveillance could have been exculpatory. A finding of a Brady violation , that is, that the State failed to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punishment, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87, cannot be based on mere speculation . Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 789(7), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983); Jones v. State, 276 Ga.App. 728, 730–731, 624 S.E.2d 275 (2005); Pinson v. State, 266 Ga.App. 254, 263–264(8), 596 S.E.2d 734 (2004); Nikitin v. State, 257 Ga.App. 852, 854(1)(a), 572 S.E.2d 377 (2002); Merritt v. State, 248 Ga.App. 709, 713– 714(3), 548 S.E.2d 427 (2001). ] We conclude, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the extreme sanction of evidence exclusion for the State's failure to produce the investigator's notes.” Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015). Child molestation convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance, based on non-disclosure of similar transaction victim’s contact information. State gave notice of the witness “months before trial,” but no contact information “to protect the victim's anonymity pursuant to her request.” “At the beginning of the trial, the court granted the state's motion but directed the state to make the victim available to defense counsel before she testified. The state gave defense counsel a printout showing that the victim had no criminal record. Defense counsel met with the victim prior to her testimony, but she refused to talk to him.” Held, this satisfied the purpose of the discovery statute, which is “‘to prevent a defendant from being surprised at trial by a witness that the defendant has not had an opportunity to interview. The trial court may allow an exception