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to the rule where good cause is shown and counsel is afforded an opportunity to interview the witness. Here, ... the defense was not surprised because the identity and involvement of the [victim was] made known in discovery.’ Rose v. State, 275 Ga. 214, 217(3), 563 S.E.2d 865 (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). … Even had the court abused his discretion in finding good cause, Arbegast received the remedy to which he was entitled. ‘[A]bsent a showing of prejudice and bad faith, an interview of the witness is the remedy for failure to comply with the requirement that a witness must be identified prior to trial.’ Carter v. State, 253 Ga.App. 795, 797(1), 560 S.E.2d 697 (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).” Devaughn v. State, 296 Ga. 475, 769 S.E.2d 70 (February 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing State to present witness whom they first located on the first day of trial. “The court complied with § 17–16-8(a) by granting the defense a continuance until noon the following day to interview Branch and review his statement to the investigators; Appellant was also excused from the requirement of obtaining certified copies of Branch's prior convictions for impeachment. Appellant says that he was prejudiced by the brevity of the continuance granted, but ‘[m]ere shortness of time ... does not ipso facto show a denial of the rights of an accused.’ Livingston v. State, 266 Ga. 501, 503, 467 S.E.2d 886 (1996). See also Wilkins v. State, 291 Ga. 483, 487, 731 S.E.2d 346 (2012) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a witness to testify despite his not being on the State's witness list where the court ‘suspended trial overnight to afford appellant to interview the witness ... and review notes related to the content of his interview by police’).” Bryant v. State, 296 Ga. 456, 769 S.E.2d 57 (February 2, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed. No discovery violation where firearms examiner added detail to her opinion on cross-examination not previously disclosed. “Although her lab report stated that the bullet recovered from Williams was fired from either a .357 or .38 caliber revolver, she testified at trial that the bullet was more consistent with a .357 caliber.” But “OCGA § 17–16–4(a)(4) ‘applies only where the state seeks to admit scientific reports it has not timely provided to the defendant. The code sections do not prevent a codefendant from cross-examining a witness with regard to content of a scientific report.’ Shearer v. State, 259 Ga. 51, 54(10)(b), 376 S.E.2d 194 (1989) (emphasis in original). The testimony of which Bryant complains in fact was elicited by his co-defendant during cross-examination and not by the State. So it appears that the State had no obligation to provide Bryant with notice of the firearms examiner's opinion that the bullet recovered from Williams was more consistent with a .357 caliber.” Burton v. State, 330 Ga.App. 503, 767 S.E.2d 510 (December 18, 2014). Convictions for criminal damage to property affirmed; mistrial not required despite State’s failure to disclose written witness statements or oral statement of defendant, where no bad faith or prejudice shown. The witness statements were lost; the statement by defendant wasn’t used against defendant. 1. “The record contains no evidence that the [witness] statements were lost or misplaced due to bad faith on the State's part. Nor did Burton establish prejudice resulting from the State's failure to disclose the statements. Because the statements could not be located, the State could not use them to support its case against Burton. In addition, any argument that the statements might have aided Burton's defense or provided a basis to impeach the State's witnesses is simply speculative, and Burton's counsel was able to use the statements' absence to attempt to undermine Deputy Ouzts' credibility at trial. We do not otherwise perceive how granting a mistrial would be just under the circumstances, especially since there is no evidence in the record that the statements might yet be found and thus potentially alter Burton's strategy in a new trial. As Burton failed to establish bad faith, prejudice, or any ‘other imperative to grant a mistrial,’ Prince v. State, [295 Ga. 788, 794, 764 S.E.2d 362 (2014)], the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial based on the failure to disclose witness statements.” 2. “ Failure to disclose Burton's custodial statement. Under OCGA § 17–16–4(a)(1), the State must disclose within ten days prior to trial ‘the substance of any ... relevant oral statement made by the defendant, before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by any person then known by the defendant to be a law enforcement officer,’ if the State intends to use the statement at trial. As the State did not attempt to impeach Burton with the statement that was first disclosed during the charge conference, Burton cannot establish that he was harmed by the State's belated disclosure of the statement. See Bertholf v. State, 224 Ga.App. 831 (482 S.E.2d 469) (1997) (defendant not harmed by any violation of OCGA § 17–16–4 resulting from State's failure to provide defense with copy of audiotape of defendant's confession because audiotape was not introduced into evidence).” Bayo v. State, 329 Ga.App. 389, 765 S.E.2d 611 (October 29, 2014). Convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping affirmed. No “ineffective assistance by failing to renew his motion to force [victim] Scripture to disrobe and be examined naked.” Defendant contended that he had a sexual relationship with his former employer, Scripture, and could accurately describe the intimate parts of his body; but trial court properly found that defendant had no right to require the victim to