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legally entitled to any of the other information he sought. See Ruffin v. State, 283 Ga. 87, 88(5) (656 S.E.2d 140) (2008) (‘Grand jury proceedings are confidential and thus appellant was not entitled to a transcript of those proceedings’); U.A.P. I(A) (noting that the Unified Appeal Procedure governs proceedings only “during and after trial”). Accordingly, we find no error.” 2. “ The trial court did not err by denying Stinski's motion to make the jurors' handwritten notes part of the record. McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598, 613(35) (458 S.E.2d 833) (1995).” 3. Criminal Procedure Discovery Act doesn’t interfere with defendant’s right to effective representation of counsel. Contrary to defendant’s contention, “statements of witnesses discovered by mitigation specialists and reported on in writing to trial counsel” are not “discoverable by the State under OCGA § 17-16-4(b)(3)(C). … OCGA § 17-16-1(2)(C) provides that statements of witnesses referred to in the criminal discovery procedure do ‘not include notes or summaries made by counsel.’ We have held that work ‘done by [an investigator] under the attorney's instruction and supervision was as much a part of the attorney's work as if he had done it himself.’ Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 551, 556(2)(a) (156 S.E.2d 916) (1967). Similarly, we hold that ‘notes and summaries’ made by a mitigation specialist who is working at the direction of trial counsel in a death penalty case should be regarded as ‘notes or summaries made by counsel’ within the meaning of the criminal discovery procedure. Accordingly, there is no merit to Stinski's argument that a death penalty defendant's ability to employ a mitigation specialist to assist in investigation is unduly hampered by the criminal discovery procedure.” 4. “During her testimony, it became apparent that a psychologist who testified on Stinski's behalf in the sentencing phase was basing her expert testimony in part on additional interviews that she had conducted since Stinski had served the State with discovery. See OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. See also Stinski, 281 Ga. at 786(4)(a) (holding that Stinski's election to participate in the criminal discovery procedure was binding on him, despite the General Assembly's subsequent amendment of that procedure). The trial court did not err by ordering Stinski's psychologist to provide the State with a copy of the interview notes upon which she was relying as ‘the basis for [her] expert opinions’ when it became apparent that Stinski had not otherwise provided an updated ‘summary’ of the basis for those opinions. OCGA § 17-16-4(b)(3)(B).” Manaois v. State, 300 Ga.App. 176, 684 S.E.2d 315 (September 22, 2009). 1. No Brady violation where defendant failed to show that the undisclosed information (here, the existence of a potential witness) was favorable to the defense. “In order to demonstrate a Brady violation, ‘[defendant] must prove that ... the state possessed evidence favorable to the defense, i.e., true Brady material.’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Bailey v. State, 229 Ga.App. 869, 874(3) (494 S.E.2d 672) (1997). Here, Manaois made no showing that the existence of the potential witness was exculpatory rather than inculpatory; therefore, the information that the investigator possessed was not true Brady material.” 2. No discovery violation for failure to disclose location of person who potentially had relevant knowledge, but whose whereabouts were unknown to the State and whom the State did not intend to call as a witness. Henley v. State, 285 Ga. 500, 678 S.E.2d 884 (June 8, 2009). No Batson violation or discovery violation where witness testified at trial that he had made a prior verbal statement to officers incriminating defendant, inconsistent with his prior written statement exonerating defendant. No discovery violation because “OCGA § 17-16-7 … does not apply to oral witness statements not recorded or memorialized in any way because they are not, in the words of the statute, ‘in the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution.’ OCGA § 17-16-7. See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 (576 S.E.2d 863) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 (486 S.E.2d 876) (1997).” No Brady violation because the information was not material, “i.e., ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). … The witness admitted on the stand that he initially lied to the police about what happened. It is hard to see how even the most skilled criminal defense attorney could use the fact that the witness changed his story on the way to a bond hearing instead of on the witness stand at the defendant's trial to make a significantly stronger attack on the witness's credibility during cross-examination than was already available.” Ware v. State, 298 Ga.App. 232, 679 S.E.2d 797 (June 5, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for armed robbery reversed; trial court erred in excluding defendant’s alibi witness for lack of statutory notice, without “a finding of bad faith and prejudice.” “During the weekend prior to the trial, Ware's counsel faxed a notification to the state of his intention to call Ware's mother as an alibi witness. The state objected and moved to exclude the witness on the ground that the notice was untimely. Ware's counsel maintained that Ware's mother did not have a constant address or a telephone and that he simply could not reach her prior to trial. He contended that he had recently learned that she could corroborate Ware's testimony that Ware was with her on the day and time of the robbery. He further stated that she was in court and available to be interviewed by the state. The trial court granted the state's request and excluded Ware's mother from testifying. Significantly, the trial court stated that its ruling was ‘based on the [c]ourt's finding, not of bad faith, but that the