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defense ha[d] failed to comply with the requirement for written notice of alibi.’” “‘If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that the defendant has failed to comply with the requirements of [OCGA § 17-16-5], the court may order the defendant to permit the ... interview of the witness, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the defendant from ... presenting the witness not disclosed, or may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-16-6. By the plain terms of the statute, however, the sanction of exclusion is reserved for instances in which the trial court finds prejudice to the state and bad faith by the defense. Id.; Brown v. State, 268 Ga.App. 24, 27(2) (601 S.E.2d 405) (2004) (‘[A] showing of bad faith and prejudice to the state is required to warrant exclusion of evidence.’) (footnote omitted). See also Tubbs [ v. State, 276 Ga. 751, 753(2) (583 S.E.2d 853) (2003)]; Massey v. State, 272 Ga. 50, 51-52(4) (525 S.E.2d 694) (2000). In light of the trial court's express declaration that its exclusion of the witness was not based upon a finding of bad faith, the trial court erred. See State v. Jones, 283 Ga.App. 539, 540-541 (642 S.E.2d 183) (2007). See also Massey, 272 Ga. at 51-52(4); Hill v. State, 232 Ga.App. 561, 562 (502 S.E.2d 505) (1998).” Herieia v. State, 297 Ga.App. 872, 678 S.E.2d 548 (May 14, 2009). Trial court properly admitted knife found just before trial by State and disclosed to defendant. “‘If prior to or during trial a party discovers additional evidence or material previously requested or ordered which is subject to discovery or inspection under this article, such party shall promptly notify the other party of the existence of the additional evidence or material and make this additional evidence or material available as provided in this article.’ OCGA § 17-16-4(c). It is only where a defendant shows that the state failed to comply with the discovery statute, that the state acted in bad faith, and that the defendant would be prejudiced thereby that the trial court may exclude evidence improperly withheld from the defense. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga.App. 410, 416(6)(a), 582 S.E.2d 556 (2003). Here, Herieia has failed to establish the three requirements above.” “[T]he state showed that due to interpretation difficulties, the state did not know about Herieia holding the knife during the armed robbery and aggravated assault until the Thursday before trial. The state subsequently informed defense counsel about this finding, at the latest, the following Monday. This disclosure complied with the newly discovered evidence statute.” Accord, Mallory v. State , 306 Ga.App. 684, 703 S.E.2d 120 (November 1, 2010); Goggins v. State , 330 Ga.App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (October 8, 2014). Hinds v. State, 296 Ga.App. 80, 673 S.E.2d 598 (February 13, 2009). No error allowing DFCS caseworker to testify to statements of defendant she remembered during trial, not contained in her written report and previously provided to defendant. 1. No discovery violation as “[t]hese recollections did not constitute a ‘statement of a witness’ under OCGA § 17-16-1(2), and the state was not obligated to produce this information prior to trial under OCGA § 17-16-7.” 2. No violation of duty to disclose defendant’s own statements as they were not “within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution” until the witness recalled them, whereupon “the state … promptly informed Hinds of them and offered to make [witness] Sipos available for interview by Hinds's counsel, [fn] and that Hinds had the opportunity at trial to cross-examine Sipos on her failure to include the additional information in her written report. Therefore, even assuming that OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(1) applied to statements made by Hinds to Sipos during the interview,[fn] we find no abuse of discretion in the court's admission of Sipos's testimony under the circumstances.” Not resolved here: “whether a statement made to a DFCS representative in the context of a separate child deprivation hearing, not at the direction of law enforcement, falls within the definition of a statement within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution, as that term is defined under OCGA § 17-16-1(1).” Dodd v. State, 293 Ga.App. 816, 668 S.E.2d 311 (October 3, 2008). Trial court erred in failing to produce to defendant exculpatory materials found in DFCS file, instead merely providing “a verbal summary of certain materials in the Department's files which he identified as potentially valuable or exculpatory. … The trial court's refusal to turn over the exculpatory documents themselves was erroneous. OCGA § 49-5-41(a)(2) (public disclosure permitted when information necessary for resolution of issue before the court); [cits.] We cannot conclude, however, that this error operated to deprive Dodd of his due process rights. The trial court's description of the materials contained in the Department's files does not indicate that the files contained exculpatory information of the type Dodd now claims was withheld. Dodd, moreover, never requested that the records reviewed by the trial court be made part of the record on appeal. Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 379-380(7) (519 S.E.2d 221) (1999) (failure to ensure materials reviewed in camera are sealed and filed constituted waiver).” Holmes v. State, 284 Ga. 330, 667 S.E.2d 71 (September 22, 2008). No abuse of discretion in admitting defendant’s late-disclosed statement: “The State was unaware of [defendant’s co-worker] Gregory's statement until six days before trial; however, it informed defendant about the statement as soon as it was discovered. Two days later, defendant was made aware of the fact that the State subpoenaed Gregory and planned to use him as a witness. Defendant attempted to