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keep Gregory from testifying, pointing out that he was not given timely notice of Gregory's statement. Finding no bad faith on the part of the State in failing to disclose defendant's statements, the trial court ruled that the statements would be admitted and that Gregory would be permitted to testify. In so ruling, the court added that it was willing to make Gregory available to defendant for an interview and to give defendant all the time he needed to question the witness before he took the stand. In light of these facts, it cannot be said that the State acted in bad faith or that defendant was prejudiced by the State's failure to more timely provide defendant with his statements to Gregory and the police. It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's statements and in permitting Gregory to testify. Compare Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 774(14), 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004) with Peeples v. State, 234 Ga.App. 454, 456, 507 S.E.2d 197 (1998).” Murray v. State, 293 Ga.App. 516, 667 S.E.2d 382 (September 11, 2008). No abuse of discretion in admitting photographs of victim, not produced pursuant to discovery. “After Murray objected to the admission of the photographs, the prosecutor stated that she did not send copies of them because the quality was poor and “they do not copy.” Although the state's disclosure certificate filed with the court did not reveal that the photographs were available for inspection or copying, the prosecutor stated that the certificate in her file did indicate that the photographs were available. Because the photographs were mentioned in the police report, which was produced to Murray, the prosecutor assumed that defense counsel was aware of them. It thus appears from the record that the state's failure to make the photographs available was inadvertent and not in bad faith, supporting the trial court's conclusion.” Counsel also had an overnight recess in which to review the photographs, and did not request further continuance. Morris v. State, 284 Ga. 1, 662 S.E.2d 110 (May 19, 2008). No reversal based on Brady violation where defendant failed to carry “the burden of proving that ‘a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.’ (Citation omitted.) Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 583(4) (581 S.E.2d 23) (2003).” Evidence here (lack of blood stains at alleged scene of murder) was disclosed in court. Thompson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (April 18, 2008). Trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting defendant’s statement to officer despite discovery violation. “Thompson correctly asserts that the State failed to timely provide him with the content of an oral statement he made to police before arrest. During argument on the issue, however, the State explained to the trial court that, in light of the refusal of the victim to answer her subpoena, the State had to adjust its evidence at the last minute by calling the responding officer to testify as to Thompson’s statements that Thompson and Pope had been arguing. Further, the State’s counsel explained that he did not discover the substance of the statements until two days prior to trial (a Sunday) and that he informed Thompson’s counsel the next day, stating that he did not intend to present that evidence in his case in chief. The following day, when the victim could not be located, and the State learned that Thompson would be arguing self-defense, the State informed the defense that it would use the officer's testimony regarding Thompson’s statements. Based on these facts, the trial court ruled that Thompson had not shown that the State had acted in bad faith. Under this scenario, and in light of the change in circumstances arising from the victim’s failure to answer her subpoena (despite efforts by the State to locate her), we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Ellis v. State, 289 Ga.App. 452, 657 S.E.2d 562 (January 31, 2008). No Brady violation for failure to disclose DFCS file as part of discovery. “[T]he DFCS files ‘sought by [Ellis] are confidential and access thereto is prohibited except as provided by statute.’ Davidson v. State, 183 Ga.App. 557, 559(4)(b) (359 S.E.2d 372) (1987). See OCGA § 49-5-41. As Ellis even notes in his brief, ‘[t]he proper procedure for obtaining access to such records in cases such as the one at bar is to petition the trial court to subpoena the records and conduct an in camera inspection as to whether the records are necessary for determination of an issue before the court and are otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.’ Davidson, supra, 183 Ga.App. at 559(4)(b). See OCGA § 49-5-41(a)(2). This procedure affords a defendant the ability to obtain exculpatory evidence pursuant to his due process rights while also upholding the State’s interest in protecting the confidentiality of DFCS’s files. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60-61(III)(C) (107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40) (1987) ; Honeycutt v. State, 245 Ga.App. 819, 820(2) (538 S.E.2d 870) (2000). Furthermore, and contrary to Ellis’s contentions, the reciprocal discovery act does not provide an independent statutory basis for the discovery of DFCS files. See Horne v. State, 192 Ga.App. 528, 531(4)(a) (385 S.E.2d 704) (1989). Thus, given the fact that Ellis did not request an in camera inspection of T.F.’s DFCS file until his appellate counsel did so in his second amended motion for new trial, the State was not obligated to produce the file and did not violate his due process rights under Brady or Georgia’s reciprocal discovery act by not providing the file earlier.” Accord, Waters v. State , 303 Ga.App. 187, 692 S.E.2d 802 (March 26, 2010) (in child molestation prosecution, no discovery violation where defendant requested no in camera inspection of child counselor’s records).