☢ test - Í

Reddick v. State, 264 Ga.App. 487, 591 S.E.2d 392 (November 18, 2003). Trial court did not err in limiting alibi witness’s testimony to the scope of her knowledge as proffered and stipulated by counsel. Defendant invoked reciprocal discovery procedures of OCGA § 17-16-6, but failed to timely identify witness; trial court thus had discretion to exclude witness’s testimony. Overruled on other grounds, State v. Springer , 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (June 29, 2015). King v. State, 262 Ga.App. 37, 584 S.E.2d 652 (June 27, 2003). Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the state, or prejudice to defendant’s case, trial court properly allowed state’s witness to testify regarding the results of chemical tests where neither side had the information until the night before the testimony, and defendant was given the opportunity to review the results and recall the expert. “[T]he witness’ testimony ... was not critical to the prosecution.” Stone v. State, 257 Ga.App. 492, 571 S.E.2d 488 (September 19, 2002). “[T]here is no basis for making a governmental unit’s compliance with the [defendant’s request pursuant to the] Open Records Act a prerequisite to the success of the State’s prosecution.” King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). 1. “King’s case was ‘docketed’ in the superior court when his true bill of indictment was recorded by that court. Because this docketing occurred before January 1, 1995, and because the State refused to consent to the application of OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. as it could have under OCGA § 17-16- 2(d), the trial court did not err in finding that OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. was inapplicable to King’s case.” 2. “ The trial court did not err by denying King’s blanket motion for the disclosure of any psychiatric histories of the State’s witnesses that might exist. King failed to show that the hypothetical records were ‘critical to his defense and that substantially similar evidence [was] otherwise unavailable to him’ so as to penetrate the psychiatrist-patient privilege. Bobo v. State, 256 Ga. 357, 360(4), 349 S.E.2d 690 (1986); OCGA § 24-9-21(5). There is also no evidence in the record that any exculpatory psychiatric evidence was withheld that was not privileged. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).” 3. Defendant was not entitled to “discovery of ‘informal notes of law enforcement officers,’ of search and seizure procedures, of evidence ‘arguably subject to suppression,’ and of ‘any and all documents which substantiate any public statements made by the prosecutor or police official regarding [King’s] case and any and all press releases made by the District Attorney during his campaign for office in the past.’ The trial court properly directed the State to disclose any evidence subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, id., and performed an in camera review of the district attorney’s file in King’s case. King has failed to show that he was legally entitled to discovery of any other materials or to show that the State failed to follow the trial court’s directive.” Accord, Brannon v. State , S15A1724, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 867555 (March 7, 2016) (“By its plain language, OCGA § 17–16–4 … does not include the informal notes of law enforcement officials among the types of evidence the State is statutorily required to produce.”). 4. “ The trial court did not err by denying King’s motion to compel the State to disclose information it might have about prospective jurors . Wansley v. State, 256 Ga. 624, 625-626(2), 352 S.E.2d 368(1987) (holding such information is not subject to compelled discovery unless it is exculpatory and, thus, subject to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) (1963).” Note this case governed by law applicable to cases docketed prior to January 1, 1995. 5. Trial court did not err in requiring defendant “to disclose to the State the materials relied upon by one of his experts in preparing a report that was, in turn, relied upon by another of his experts in rendering a professional opinion about his alleged mental retardation .” Under pre-1995 discovery rules governing this case, “the State is entitled to discovery of expert reports only to the extent that the State’s discovery would be reciprocal to the discovery to which defendants are entitled under OCGA § 17-7-211. Rower [v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 324-325(5), 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994)]. Because this Court has held that a defendant is entitled to discover expert reports and other forms of data relied upon by the State’s experts in forming the opinions they will testify about, the State’s reciprocal right of discovery would also include such materials. See Eason v. State, 260 Ga. 445, 396 S.E.2d 492 (1990); [ State v. Lucious, [271 Ga. 361, 365(4)(b), 518 S.E.2d 677 (1999)] (holding that Eason’ s requirements were ‘derived from former OCGA § 17-7-211’).” Stevens v. State, 245 Ga.App. 237, 537 S.E.2d 688 (July 19, 2000). Cocaine trafficking convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in “failing to object to the introduction of Hill's incriminating statement on the ground that the state failed to provide it to the defense prior to trial, as required by OCGA § 17–16–4(a)(1). However, the statute applies to custodial statements, and Hill's incriminating statement was a spontaneous, unsolicited utterance, involving no police interrogation. Kerrethers v. State, 169 Ga.App. 832, 834(1), 315 S.E.2d 46 (1984); Holbrook v. State, 162 Ga.App. 400, 401–402(1), 291 S.E.2d 729 (1982). Thus, trial counsel's performance was not deficient in this regard.” Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 562, 532 S.E.2d 669 (July 5, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no discovery violation;