☢ test - Í

OCGA § 17-6-7 requires parties to produce witness statements, but doesn’t require copying. “Contrary to appellant's contention, nothing in Lawson [ v. State, 224 Ga.App. 645(3)(b), 481 S.E.2d 856 (1997)] stands for the proposition that OCGA § 17–16–7 requires the custodian of a witness statement to allow the statement to be photocopied. That case addressed whether the State was obligated to serve the defendant with copies of discoverable items, including witness statements. The Court of Appeals properly distinguished between statutory language requiring the State to ‘make available’ documents for copying and language requiring the State to ‘furnish’ the defendant with those documents, i.e., serve copies on the defendant. Lawson, supra at (3)(a). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the production requirement in OCGA § 17–16–7 required the furnishing of copies, noting only that the language in § 17–16–7 was ‘closer to’ the ‘make available’ requirement.” “We recognize that in the context of witness statements in a criminal proceeding, counsel, as a professional courtesy, should allow opposing counsel to copy the statements at a time agreed to by the parties. However, OCGA § 17–16–7 does not require the custodian of a document to allow copying and the refusal to allow a party to photocopy a witness statement thus does not constitute reversible error. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's motion in limine. However, we note that opposing counsel must be allowed use of a witness's statement at trial during cross-examination of that witness in order to facilitate the proper questioning of the witness. See, e.g., OCGA § 24–9–69 (refreshing the memory of a witness); OCGA § 24–9– 83 (impeaching a witness with a contradictory statement).” Christian v. State, 244 Ga.App. 713, 536 S.E.2d 600 (June 29, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance based on discovery issue. “On March 5, 1999, Christian served a discovery request pursuant to OCGA § 17–16–20 et seq. The State responded on March 8, 1999, and identified a videotape which was available for counsel's review. The State also provided a copy of the arresting officers' report which stated that ‘Mr. Christian failed some of all of the field evaluations.’ However, the State did not provide the actual field sobriety evaluation sheet. Christian's counsel first saw the video and the field sobriety evaluation sheet on June 3, 1999, the day of trial. The trial court determined that the video had been made available; that there was no exculpatory information in the omitted field sobriety evaluation; and that there was nothing contained on the evaluation sheet that defense counsel would not have anticipated. The trial court further stated that if new information did come to light, Christian would be given time to consider his position. Christian has not shown that he was harmed by the trial court's failure to grant a continuance, and we find no abuse of discretion under these circumstances. See Downs v. State, 240 Ga.App. 740, 741(2), 524 S.E.2d 786 (1999); Byron v. State, 229 Ga.App. 795, 796(3), 495 S.E.2d 123 (1997).” Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 468, 532 S.E.2d 377 (June 12, 2000). In murder prosecution, trial court erred by holding that OCGA § 17-16-5(a) requires defendant to reveal, as part of pre-trial discovery, the substance of his own testimony where he raises an alibi defense. “The term ‘witness,’ as it is used in OCGA § 17–16–5(a), is defined by OCGA § 17– 16–1(3). That subsection states that the term ‘“[w]itness” does not include the defendant.’ Thus, it is clear that the legislature intended that a defendant should not be treated as a witness under Code Chapter 17–16–1 et seq. For that reason, the trial court's ruling that OCGA § 17–16–5(a) requires Johnson to give notice to the State of any alibi testimony he might give at trial on his own behalf was erroneous and must be reversed. To the extent that Todd v. State, 230 Ga.App. 849, 498 S.E.2d 142 (1998), held that ‘when it is the defendant who will establish the alibi defense, he is a witness within the ambit of [OCGA § 17–16–5(a) ],’ it is hereby overruled.” Likewise, “a defendant is not required by OCGA § 17–16–5(a) to give notice to the State of the anticipated testimony of a witness who would testify merely that the defendant was not present at the crime scene at the relevant time, when such testimony will not also assert that the defendant was at a specified location other than the crime scene at the time of the crime.” McGuire v. State , 243 Ga.App. 899, 534 S.E.2d 549 (May 11, 2000). Voluntary manslaughter and firearms convictions affirmed; defendant can’t complain about State’s failure to produce “certain pictures and a video” in discovery where “[d]efendant did not elect to engage in reciprocal discovery. [fn: ‘[A] notice to produce cannot be used as a discovery tool to circumvent discovery reciprocity under the discovery act.’ Farmer v. State, 222 Ga.App. 506, 509(2), 474 S.E.2d 711 (1996). ] Defense counsel instead filed a Brady v. Maryland [cit.] motion and served the State's attorney with a notice to produce under OCGA § 24–10–26.” In any event, State opened its file to defense counsel, “revealing the existence of the discovery sought before trial, though defense counsel did not ask to view it. Further, at trial the superior court required that the video be shown for the benefit of defense counsel out of the presence of the jury. Defense counsel did not request a continuance. ‘Absent proof of prejudice to the defense and bad faith by the State, the trial court is not required to exclude the evidence and may offer the defendant lesser relief, including a continuance, to review the unproduced discovery. [Cits.]’ Valentine v. State, 229 Ga.App. 791, 792(3), 495 S.E.2d 116 (1997). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the defendant has shown neither prejudice nor bad faith by the State in the case sub judice.”