☢ test - Í

Massey v. State, 272 Ga. 50, 525 S.E.2d 694 (January 18, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in ruling out testimony of defense witness not revealed prior to trial, absent showing of prejudice and bad faith. “On the third day of trial, Massey sought to introduce testimony of an emergency medical technician for the purpose of rebutting prosecution testimony about blood drops found near Massey's vehicle. The trial court refused to allow the EMT's testimony because the EMT's name had not been provided to the State before trial in violation of OCGA § 17-16-8(a). We have noted that an interview of the witness is the remedy for failure to comply with the requirement that a witness must be identified prior to trial; this remedy avoids the harsh sanction provided in OCGA § 17-16-6 of excluding evidence not properly disclosed. Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194(8), 515 S.E.2d 610 (1999); Berry v. State, 268 Ga. 437, 440, 490 S.E.2d 389 (1997). Absent a showing of prejudice to the State and bad faith by Massey, the EMT should have been allowed to testify after the State was afforded the opportunity to interview her. However, reversal is not required because the decision to exclude this witness was not harmful and the evidence of Massey's guilt was especially overwhelming. Laney v. State, supra; see also Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61, 230 S.E.2d 869 (1976).” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court denied continuance based on disclosure of crime lab hair comparison evidence three days before beginning of jury selection. Evidence was provided upon receipt by DA; jury selection lasted one month. “The trial court also stated that it would provide funds for Pace to hire his own hair comparison expert, require the Crime Lab's microanalyst to meet with the defense ex parte, and conduct a separate hearing during the trial to allow the defense to question the Crime Lab's microanalyst about the reliability of hair comparison evidence before it was admitted. … Because of the time remaining before the presentation of the State's case and the measures taken to permit the defense to prepare for the State's anticipated hair comparison evidence, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. See OCGA § 17-8-22; Johnson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 395(1), 433 S.E.2d 638 (1993).” Dickerson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 593, 526 S.E.2d 443 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s rape conviction affirmed; trial court erred by allowing State to use witness for whom it didn’t provide birth date, as required by OCGA § 17-16- 8(a), but error waived by lack of request for continuance. Lack of birth date prevented defense from timely obtaining witness’s criminal history, which later showed conviction involving moral turpitude. Trial court accepted State’s response that “the State could not be compelled to produce information not within its possession and denied Dickerson's motion to compel. Because Dickerson did not request a continuance at that point, he has waived his right to argue that the trial court erred in allowing the State's witness to testify. See Day v. State, 188 Ga.App. 648, 650-651(8), 374 S.E.2d 87 (1988). But for that waiver, we would reverse this conviction, as discussed by the special concurrence, based on the State's failure to meet its mandatory discovery obligations with the resulting harm to the defendant.” Blackburn concurs specially: “The State asserted that it did not have to go looking for the information. I disagree. Although the State complains that getting the information is burdensome, this information is routinely obtained by the State, and the discovery statute places the same burden on the defense. That burden is the cost to the parties of receiving the benefits of the discovery process. The legislature intended for both sides to comply with the law, and the statute contemplates a reasonable effort by both sides to meet their statutory obligations. The information is reasonably available to the State by communicating with its witnesses, the police department, the investigators in the district attorney's office, or checking available records, including computer searches. The State should not be allowed to avoid compliance with the law by producing only the information which it elects to include in its file. See OCGA §§ 17-16-1(1); 17-16-4; Marshall v. State, 230 Ga.App. 116, 118(2), 495 S.E.2d 585 (1998) (the prosecutor's ignorance of discoverable information does not justify noncompliance with the discovery statute); Baker [ v. State, 238 Ga.App. 285, 518 S.E.2d 455 (1999)]. To hold otherwise, would result in an expedient means for the State to avoid compliance-merely not including the information in their file, not asking their witness, the police, or investigators for such information, or not checking the computer or criminal files. This is impermissible and circumvents the very purpose of the statute. Nowhere does the State contend that the statutorily required information was not available through one of the methods outlined above or indeed that they had even attempted to so obtain the information. Thus, to establish good cause for failing to comply with OCGA § 17-16-8(a), the State has the burden of showing what reasonable efforts it has made and why such efforts failed to be fruitful as to those statutorily required items: name, location, date of birth and phone number of the witness.” Distinguishing Morrill v. State, 216 Ga.App. 468, 472(7), 454 S.E.2d 796 (1995): “Unlike the information requested in Morrill, here the statute requires that specific information be provided.” Crawley v. State, 240 Ga.App. 891, 525 S.E.2d 739 (November 18, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for burglary, armed robbery and aggravated assault affirmed; no discovery violation where trial court admitted into evidence money found in