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co-defendant’s pants. Money was discovered by prosecutor and defense counsel together, the day before trial. “Before that time, although both the prosecutor and the defense counsel had access to the bloody clothes, neither had examined them. OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(3) requires the prosecuting attorney to make available to defense counsel for inspection, at least ten days before trial, all tangible objects in the State's possession and intended for use as evidence. If before or during trial a party discovers evidence which is subject to discovery under the provisions of the article, that party shall promptly notify the other party and make the evidence available to him,” as occurred here. Downs v. State, 240 Ga.App. 740, 524 S.E.2d 786 (November 8, 1999). Defendant’s battery conviction affirmed; late disclosure of witnesses did not necessitate continuance. “Allowing counsel to interview the newly identified witnesses is an acceptable alternative to a continuance. Lakes v. State, 244 Ga. 217, 259 S.E.2d 469 (1979). Downs did not argue to the trial court and has not shown on appeal that the interviews led to any other witnesses or evidence of which he was otherwise unaware. He has not argued any harm as a result of the denial of the continuance. We do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court under these circumstances.” Prindle v. State, 240 Ga.App. 461, 523 S.E.2d 44 (September 28, 1999). Breath test results were properly admitted in defendant’s DUI prosecution. “[Intoximeter] [c]ertificates of inspection are not discoverable as scientific reports under OCGA § 17-16-23. Renschen v. State, 225 Ga.App. 678, 679(3), 484 S.E.2d 753 (1997).” Davis v. State, 240 Ga.App. 301, 522 S.E.2d 729 (September 24, 1999). The state did not have to resubmit discovery evidence following defendant’s re-indictment on the same charges. Thompson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 26, 521 S.E.2d 876 (August 30, 1999). 1. No discovery violation where witness statement was not written or recorded, but was only “‘referenced’ in the Lawrenceville Police Department Arrest Report Supplemental, a copy of which he served on trial counsel. ‘There can be no “possession, custody, or control” of a witness' statement which has neither been recorded nor committed to writing. OCGA § 17-16-1(1). Accordingly, if, but only if, the eyewitness' statement had been recorded or committed to writing other than in “notes or summaries made by counsel,” it would be discoverable. OCGA § 17-16-1(2)(C).’ Forehand v. State, 267 Ga. 254, 255(3), 477 S.E.2d 560 (1996).” 2. Criticizes police department policy of not developing photographs until day before trial, apparently to avoid producing them in discovery; but no error in admitting photograph where defendant turned down trial court’s offer of continuance to further examine the photograph. “The rights of the accused to reasonable pretrial access to evidence are not subject to the vagaries of a police department ‘policy’ not to develop evidentiary photographs until the day before trial. See Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 711(10), n. 5, 482 S.E.2d 314 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds, Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 9(5), 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999); Bentley v. State, 210 Ga.App. 862, 863(2)(a), 438 S.E.2d 110 (1993). Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that, after the offer of a continuance was declined, no prejudice to the defense was established under these circumstances.” Redding v. State, 239 Ga.App. 718, 521 S.E.2d 840 (August 27, 1999). Mistrial was not required where officer made reference in cross-examination to incriminating custodial statement by defendant, not previously revealed; no showing of bad faith or prejudice. “Indeed, the State did not even offer defendant Redding's custodial admission into evidence at trial. Defendant Redding's incriminating custodial statement was elicited by [co-]defendant Gay's attorney during Officer Dorsey's cross-examination.” State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (June 14, 1999). A 4-3 majority upholds constitutionality of the 1994 Georgia Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. 1. Due process . Due process does not prohibit the reciprocal discovery practices set out in the Act. “In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476-477, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973), the Supreme Court held that under the due process clause a defendant cannot be compelled to disclose to the State evidence or witnesses to be offered in support of an alibi defense absent reciprocal discovery of the State's rebuttal witnesses.” “The Court in Wardius thus articulated a due process requirement of reciprocity in criminal discovery statutes in the absence of a strong state interest to the contrary. This same requirement has been held to apply under the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution. See Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323(5), 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994) (to satisfy due process, discovery practices in criminal cases must provide a balance of forces between the defendant and the State). Applying this due process standard to the Act, we find that the Act furthers legitimate State interests by establishing a closely symmetrical scheme of discovery in criminal cases that maximizes the presentation of reliable evidence, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete or misleading evidence, and fosters fairness and efficiency in criminal proceedings. Because the Act provides for reciprocal discovery in criminal felony cases with any imbalance favoring the defendant, the Act does not violate the due process clause of the United States or