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conclusions, which were based on his microscopic examination of bullets and shell casings for each weapon tested in the case. Cook is not entitled to the internal documents and work product of the Crime Lab. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 753(3)(b), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983); Self v. State, 232 Ga.App. 735, 737(3), 503 S.E.2d 625 (1998); Andrews v. State, 196 Ga.App. 790, 791, 397 S.E.2d 63 (1990).” Felder v. State, 270 Ga. 641, 514 S.E.2d 416 (March 8, 1999). Felony murder convictions affirmed. Trial court properly allowed State to present evidence not produced in discovery, where it first gave counsel opportunity to inspect the items – ski masks, articles of clothing and plaster casts of shoe prints – “before their introduction into evidence. This is a permissible response to the State's failure to comply with criminal discovery provisions. OCGA § 17-16-6. Moreover, the evidence would be inadmissible only if Coley could show both prejudice and bad faith. OCGA § 17-16-6; Tucker v. State, 222 Ga.App. 517, 518(3), 474 S.E.2d 696 (1996). Because he showed neither, the trial court properly admitted the evidence after allowing his attorney the opportunity to inspect it. See Aleman v. State, 224 Ga.App. 391, 393(2), 480 S.E.2d 393 (1997); Bell v. State, 224 Ga.App. 191, 192, 480 S.E.2d 241 (1997); Sledge v. State, 223 Ga.App. 488, 489(3), 477 S.E.2d 898 (1996).” Accord, Corbin v. State, 240 Ga.App. 788, 525 S.E.2d 365 (November 15, 1999) (trial court properly admitted photographs of aggravated assault victim’s injuries, not previously disclosed, where no bad faith alleged); Reinhard v. State , 331 Ga.App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (March 18, 2015) (exclusion of testimony and mistrial not available remedies absent bad faith in discovery violation). Guild v. State, 236 Ga.App. 444, 512 S.E.2d 343 (February 12, 1999). Convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana affirmed; trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting lab results despite State’s failure to produce in discovery. “‘“If the State fails to comply with OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(3), the trial court may prohibit the State from introducing the evidence it improperly withheld from the defense. This sanction, however, applies only where there has been a showing of prejudice to the defense and bad faith by the State.”’ Aleman v. State, 224 Ga.App. 391, 393(2), 480 S.E.2d 393 (1997). Here, Guild made no such showing. The indictment charged Guild with possession of cocaine and marijuana, the cocaine field-tested positive, the witness who performed the test was timely included on the State’s witness list and the transcript contains no evidence that the admission of the report impaired Guild’s trial strategy in any way. Compare Brady v. State, 233 Ga.App. 287, 289(2), 503 S.E.2d 906 (1998). Guild has not argued that he was surprised by the positive test results, and he declined a continuance. Compare id. In these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the report. McWhorter v. State, 229 Ga.App. 875, 876(2), 495 S.E.2d 139 (1997). This finding, however, is not meant to condone the State’s failure to comply with the discovery statute. The report’s presence in some sort of ‘pending drawer’ rather than in Guild’s file fails to buttress the State’s claim that it did not have the report. See Marshall v. State, 230 Ga.App. 116, 118(2), 495 S.E.2d 585 (1998).” W. DISMISSAL See also subheading SUMMARY JUDGMENT, below State v. Miller, 335 Ga.App. 700, 782 S.E.2d 803 (February 12, 2016). Physical precedent only. The State brought probation revocation petitions against three probationers based on alleged new offenses. “When the State failed to produce victims or witnesses of each of the new crimes, the trial court dismissed all three of the new indictments ‘for want of prosecution.’” Held, trial court erred by dismissing new indictments based on State’s failure to present evidence at probation revocation hearings. “‘“A criminal prosecution and a probation revocation proceeding based on the same occurrence actually have nothing to do with each other.”’ Teague v. State, 169 Ga.App. 285, 286(1) (312 S.E.2d 818) (1983), quoting Aldridge v. State, 155 Ga.App. 916, 917 (273 S.E.2d 656) (1980); see also Brown v. State, 294 Ga.App. 1, 2(1) (668 S.E.2d 490) (2008). At a probation revocation proceeding, ‘the defendant is not in the position of one accused by indictment, even though the probationary condition alleged to have been violated is the commission of a crime against the State.’ Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 (108 S.E.2d 313) (1959) (citations omitted). Such a proceeding ‘is not a trial on a criminal charge, but is a hearing to [judicially determine] whether the conduct of the defendant during the probation period has conformed to the course outlined in the order of probation.’ Id., quoting Sparks v. State, 77 Ga.App. 22, 23 (47 S.E.2d 678) (1948). Even if this trial court would have been justified in denying the State’s petitions for probation revocation on the ground that it had failed to produce any witnesses in support of the petitions, there is no legal basis for the dismissal of the indictments at issue in this appeal.” In re: M.D.H., 334 Ga.App. 394, 779 S.E.2d 433 (November 10, 2015). Juvenile court properly dismissed late-filed delinquency petition without, not with, prejudice pursuant to OCGA § 15–11–521(b). Subsection (a) provides for dismissal without prejudice where no petition filed within 72 hours and juvenile in custody. Subsection (b) provides for dismissal within 30 days in other cases, without specifying whether the dismissal is to be with or without prejudice. “In construing a related statute in Georgia’s former Juvenile Code,[fn] former OCGA § 15–11–26,[fn] our Supreme Court held that former OCGA § 15–11–26(a) did not constitute a speedy trial demand and, thus, violations of its provisions