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should not result in dismissal of the case with prejudice,” citing In re: R.D.F. , 266 Ga. 294, 296(3), 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) ( superceded by statute in In re: A.H., 332 Ga.App. 590, 593(2), 774 S.E.2d 163, n. 6 (2015)). Cert. granted on this issue, case no. S16G0428, March 7, 2016. State v. Santiago, 333 Ga.App. 742, 776 S.E.2d 824 (August 24, 2015). Trial court erred by dismissing indictment against defendant for false imprisonment and family violence battery committed against his wife. Defendant offered to plead guilty to the charges, but trial court dismissed after learning that the parties had reconciled and were having sex. “[I]t was the prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute the case in light of evidence that Santiago and his wife had reconciled. While the trial court may have disagreed with that decision, the record reveals no legal basis for the trial court to take away the State’s right to prosecute Santiago.” State v. Ozment, 332 Ga.App. 82, 775 S.E.2d 564 (July 13, 2015). Following defendant’s non-negotiated guilty plea to DUI-less safe, trial court erred by dismissing related charges over State’s objection, citing Brooks (December 1, 2009), Bachan (May 3, 2013), and Fiorenzo (February 6, 2014), all below. State v. Bachan, 321 Ga.App. 712, 742 S.E.2d 526 (May 3, 2013). Trial court erred by dismissing defendant’s theft by taking charge (“for unlawfully taking the statue of Bre'r Rabbit from the Uncle Remus Museum in Eatonton, Georgia”) over State’s objection. Trial court entered dismissal “following a bench conference at which the requested plea in absentia was apparently discussed. We find that a delay in Bachan being able to appear in court ‘for years’ due to his immigration status does not provide any legal basis for dismissing the indictment and deprives the State of its right to present its case against Bachan.” Dismissal here was entered in return for forfeiture of defendant’s cash bond, not based on any defect in the indictment, over State’s objection and without calling the case for trial. “‘“In the district attorney's role as administrator of justice, he or she has broad discretion in making decisions prior to trial about [whom] to prosecute, what charges to bring, and which sentence to seek.”’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Perry, 261 Ga.App. 886, 887 (583 S.E.2d 909) (2003).” Accord, State v. Rambert , 322 Ga.App. 379, 745 S.E.2d 649 (June 21, 2013); State v. Fiorenzo , 325 Ga.App. 666, 754 S.E.2d 634 (February 6, 2014) (Trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s indictment “with jeopardy” based on State’s failure to produce a witness at pre-trial hearing.); Ozment (July 13, 2015), above. State v. Benton, 305 Ga.App. 332, 699 S.E.2d 767 (July 21, 2010). Trial court properly rejected defendant’s guilty plea to theft by conversion, as State failed to establish factual basis for offense of theft by conversion; but trial court erred by thereupon dismissing the accusation. “The accusation, which tracked the statutory definition of theft by conversion, however, was not technically deficient.[fn] Although the State failed to satisfy the trial court that there was a factual basis for a guilty plea, and the trial court may have doubted that the State would ultimately be able to carry its burden of proving Benton's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court abridged the State's right to prosecute in dismissing the accusation when the State had never been put to its proof. See State v. Brooks, 301 Ga.App. 355, 360, 687 S.E.2d 631 (2009) (The trial court abridged the State's right to prosecute an accused when it dismissed an indictment on a basis not authorized by law.); Tucker v. State, 283 Ga.App. 428, 641 S.E.2d 653 (2007) (‘A motion for directed verdict of acquittal is not the proper way to contest the sufficiency of an indictment. A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the underlying indictment.’) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. Young, 260 Ga.App. 44, 47(2), 579 S.E.2d 16 (2003) (‘A plea in abatement on the ground that an indictment was found on insufficient evidence, or illegal evidence, or no evidence, will not be sustained, because it comes under the rule that no inquiry into the sufficiency or legality of the evidence is indulged.’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court's order is vacated to the extent it dismissed the accusation.” State v. Brooks, 301 Ga.App. 355, 687 S.E.2d 631 (December 1, 2009). Trial court erred by dismissing defendant’s prosecution for disorderly conduct and simple battery based on defendant’s compliance with a pre-trial “judicial hold order,” over State’s objection. “The trial court's dismissal order states that the charges against Brooks were dismissed based on her compliance with the judicial hold order and did not mention an alleged due process violation.” Citing “ State v. Aldridge, 259 Ga.App. 673, 674 & n. 2 (577 S.E.2d 863) (2003) (trial court generally lacks authority to dismiss accusations with prejudice but exception applies when prosecution would violate defendant's constitutional rights).” “To the extent the trial court was attempting to dismiss the accusation without prejudice, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. ‘While we recognize the duty of the trial judge to control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of its officers and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it, this power clearly may be abused. Thus, the power to control the proceeding of the court is subject to the proviso that in so doing a judge does not take away or abridge any right of a party under the law.’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Colquitt, 147 Ga.App. 627, 628-629 (249 S.E.2d 280) (1978). We have held that the trial court's power to control proceedings entails the discretion to