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dismiss criminal charges without prejudice for want of prosecution. State v. Grimes, 194 Ga.App. 736, 736-737 (392 S.E.2d 727) (1990) (trial court was authorized to dismiss misdemeanor criminal trespass charge without prejudice after the State received a continuance but was not ready on the rescheduled trial date). In Aldridge, supra, we held that the trial court had authority to dismiss an accusation without prejudice when the prosecutor had agreed to leave the decision as to the final disposition of the charges against the defendant to the trial court and the defendant. 259 Ga.App. at 673-674(1). A trial court, however, abuses its discretion when it interferes with the State's right to prosecute by dismissing an accusation without a legal basis to do so. State v. Perry, 261 Ga.App. 886, 887-888 (583 S.E.2d 909) (2003) (trial court abused discretion in dismissing, sua sponte, charges against defendant arising out of fight on school grounds; school system's request that charges be dropped did not provide legal basis for dismissal).” Accord, Ozment (July 13, 2015), above. State v. Carr, 287 Ga.App. 691, 652 S.E.2d 597 (October 1, 2007). Defendant pled no contest to underage alcohol possession. Prior to sentencing, the trial court ordered defendant to complete an alcohol education program. Upon completion of the program, the trial court “ sua sponte dismissed the accusation without providing notice to the State or conducting a sentencing hearing.” Held, “ the trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing the accusation. ‘A criminal charge is generally dismissed only when there is a defect on the face of the indictment or accusation. [Cit.]’ State v. Henderson, 283 Ga.App. 111, 112(2) (640 S.E.2d 686) (2006). While a trial court is thus authorized to dismiss an accusation, it may not do so in a manner ‘impermissibly interfer[ing] with the State’s right to prosecute....’ State v. Aldridge, 259 Ga.App. 673, 674(1) (577 S.E.2d 863) (2003).” As “[t]here … is no claim of a defect on the face of the accusation …. the trial court was not authorized to sua sponte dismiss the accusation.” State v. Henderson, 283 Ga.App. 111, 640 S.E.2d 686 (December 19, 2006). 1. State was authorized to appeal from trial court’s (erroneous) ruling dismissing accusation for possession of firearm by a convicted felon. Trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds that he thought his right to possess a firearm had been restored when he was granted a hunting license; but dismissal was entered without a trial or evidentiary hearing. “‘ Under OCGA § 5-7-1(a), the State may appeal from orders or judgments ... setting aside or dismissing accusations or indictments .’ (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Barker, 277 Ga.App. 84, 85 (625 S.E.2d 500) (2005). When a criminal defendant obtains a ruling terminating the case against him by means of the dismissal of an accusation or indictment, before there has been a determination of guilt or innocence, the State may directly appeal such ruling. See id.” As “the trial court heard no evidence at the hearing, only argument by counsel. … the trial court’s order was nothing more than the dismissal of the accusation without an adjudication of guilt, which the State may appeal. See Barker , supra.” 2. Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, not based on a defect on the face of the charging instrument, without trial. “ A criminal charge is generally dismissed only when there is a defect on the face of the indictment or accusation ,” citing State v. Givens, 211 Ga.App. 71, 72 (438 S.E.2d 387) (1993). “Henderson, however, sought to have the charge at issue dismissed based on the existence of an affirmative defense, which required the consideration of facts extrinsic to the accusation. See Murphy v. State, 280 Ga. 158, 159(2) (625 S.E.2d 764) (2006) (mistake of fact is an affirmative defense). There is no basis in Georgia criminal practice for ‘“what, in civil practice, would be termed a motion for summary judgment .”’ Thus, the trial court had no authority to dismiss the charge against Henderson prior to trial. See Givens, supra.” Followed in Carr (October 1, 2007), above. Accord, Rader v. State , 300 Ga.App. 411, 685 S.E.2d 405 (October 8, 2009). State v. Perry, 261 Ga.App. 886, 583 S.E.2d 909 (June 24, 2003). Trial court exceeded its authority in dismissing charges over prosecutor’s objection where court felt the prosecution had “gone far enough.” Decision about which cases to prosecute belongs to State, not court or victim. “[T]he power to control the proceeding of the court is subject to the proviso that in so doing a judge does not take away or abridge any right of a party under the law…. By dismissing the case over the State’s objection, the trial court deprived the state of its right to present the case against Perry, and thus abused its discretion.” Accord, Brooks (December 1, 2009), above. State v. Aldridge, 259 Ga.App. 673, 577 S.E.2d 863 (February 14, 2003). In prosecution for driving on suspended license, no error in state court’s dismissal “so that Aldridge could ‘straighten[ ] out’ the matter.” “[T]rial courts are authorized to dismiss accusations. Because a trial court may not impermissibly interfere with the State's right to prosecute, generally, such dismissals do not amount to ‘dismissals with prejudice’ or acquittals. So long as the dismissal in this case did not amount to a dismissal with prejudice, or an acquittal, there was no error.” See also Brooks (December 1, 2009), above. State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga.App. 135, 537 S.E.2d 457 (July 14, 2000). Trial court properly dismissed Blackwell’s