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‘otherwise ... aid the presiding judge in organizing the courts as he may require.’ OCGA § 15-18-6(3). Indeed such aid is contemplated by Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 30.1, which provides that ‘[t]he judge, or the judge’s designee, shall set the time of arraignment unless arraignment is waived either by the defendant or by operation of law.’ (Emphasis supplied.). Given that the functions of the district attorney are not exclusively executive, the Internal Operating Procedure 2000-3 of the Appalachian Judicial Circuit, which appoints the district attorney to act as calendar clerk for criminal matters, merely aids the judges in the Appalachian Judicial Circuit in organizing their courts and is not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers .” King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). “King’s case was ‘docketed’ in the superior court when his true bill of indictment was recorded by that court. Because this docketing occurred before January 1, 1995, and because the State refused to consent to the application of OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. as it could have under OCGA § 17-16- 2(d), the trial court did not err in finding that OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. was inapplicable to King’s case.” Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (September 13, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion challenging the circuit’s method of assigning cases to judges, and calling cases for trial. 1. Case assignment. Circuit’s case assignment method allowing the District Attorney to assign cases, violates USCR 3.1 and due process. “The precise method of assigning and calendaring cases adopted by a multi-judge circuit … must comport with the notion of due process under the State and Federal constitutions, as well as the spirit and purpose of the uniform rules and applicable statutes. [Cit.] The purpose of the assignment system in multi-judge circuits is to ‘prevent any person's choosing the judge to whom an action is to be assigned.’ USCR 3.1. … In the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit, however, it is not the chief or other circuit judge who makes case assignments and sets the calendar but the district attorney. Because the district attorney is clearly within the category of persons directed to refrain from affecting case assignments under USCR 3.1, we find the method of case assignment employed in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit violates the clear mandate of that rule.” 2. Selection of cases for trial. “OCGA § 17-8-1 requires that cases on a criminal docket be ‘called in the order in which they stand on the docket unless the defendant is in jail or, otherwise, in the sound discretion of the court.’ Although OCGA § 17-8-1 is a discretionary rule rather than a mandatory one, this discretion lies with the trial judge and not the district attorney. Rosenbrook v. State, 78 Ga. 111(2) (1886); Williams v. State, 188 Ga.App. 496(3), 373 S.E.2d 281 (1988). While a trial judge may in his discretion call cases out of order, under § 17-8-1, the district attorney is without authority to independently calendar and call cases for trial. The judges of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit must take primary responsibility for the order in which criminal cases are called for trial.” Y. DRIVER’S LICENSES Barrow v. Mikell, 298 Ga. 429, 782 S.E.2d 439 (February 1, 2016). Reversing 331 Ga.App. 547, 771 S.E.2d 211 (March 25, 2015); superior court erred by dismissing defendant’s appeal of Department of Driver Services (DDS) license denial as untimely. Defendant’s license was cancelled in 2010 when DDS determined was in the country illegally. “More than three-and-a-half years later, Barrow applied for a new license, claiming that his immigration status had changed since the cancellation of his earlier license. The Department, however, denied his application.” Contrary to DDS argument, a driver whose license is cancelled can re-apply at any time, and may appeal the denial of a license, as “a cancellation is ‘without prejudice.’” OCGA § 40-5-1(3). “The cancellation and the denial of an application for a new license following cancellation are distinct decisions of the Department. As such, the failure to timely petition for judicial review of the cancellation is no absolute waiver of the right to timely petition for judicial review of the denial of the application for a new license.” Distinguishing Earp v. Angel, 257 Ga. 333, 357 S.E.2d 596 (1987), and Earp v. Lynch, 257 Ga. 633, 362 S.E.2d 55 (1987), where a) both drivers had licenses revoked, not cancelled, and b) both improperly filed habeas petitions rather than appealing. Mikell v. Hortenstine, 334 Ga.App. 621, 780 S.E.2d 53 (November 17, 2015). Reversing superior court; Department of Driver Services (DDS) properly dimissed late appeal of his administrative license suspension. Hortenstine’s license was suspended based on refusal of implied consent testing following his DUI arrest. Hortenstine paid a lawyer to appeal the suspension, but the lawyer didn’t mail the appeal until the 11 th business day following the arrest. OCGA § 40-5-67.1(g)(1) requires such appeals to be postmarked within 10 business days. “OCGA § 40–5–67.1(g)(3) further provides, ‘[i]f no hearing is requested within the ten business days specified above, and the failure to request such hearing is due in whole or in part to the reasonably avoidable fault of the person, the right to a hearing shall have been waived.’” “As Hortenstine’s failure to timely mail the request for an administrative hearing was due to the unexcused acts and omissions of his counsel, the errors of his counsel are imputed to Hortenstine and did not relieve him from the consequences of the failure to submit the hearing request in a timely fashion. Compare Davis v. Brown [274 Ga.App. 48, 51(2), 616 S.E.2d 826 (2005)] (the superior court properly set aside the suspension of the driver’s license where the