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evidence showed that an officer at the jail confiscated the driver’s copy of the suspension notice, which authorized the court to find that events out of the driver’s control prevented him from making a timely request and, therefore, the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in applying the 10–day notice requirement).” Wolfe v. Georgia Department of Driver Services, 330 Ga.App. 552, 768 S.E.2d 528 (January 26, 2015). Trial court properly affirmed decision of DDS canceling Wolfe’s driver’s license, following action of State of Illinois. Defendant was never a resident or licensee in Illinois, but committed DUIs there in 1987 and 1989. “In 1999, Wolfe moved to the State of Georgia and obtained a driver's license in this state. In 2001, he was convicted of a DUI in Georgia. Several years later, Illinois received notice of this conviction and imposed a lifetime ban on Wolfe's privilege to drive in that state based on an Illinois statute enacted in 1999.[fn] Following the Illinois ban, the [Georgia] Department cancelled Wolfe's Georgia driver's license pursuant to OCGA § 40–5–50, claiming that the withdrawal of Wolfe's driving privileges in Illinois renders him ineligible for the issuance of a driver's license in Georgia.” Held, superior court properly “affirmed the final agency decision, reasoning that the cancellation of Wolfe's license was authorized by OCGA § 40–5–22(c)(7) because the term ‘license issued by any other jurisdiction’ includes the privilege to drive whether or not such person held a valid, physical license from that jurisdiction.” “OCGA § 40–5–22(c)(7) provides that the Department ‘shall not issue any driver's license to nor renew the driver's license of any person ... [w]hose license issued by any other jurisdiction is suspended or revoked by such other jurisdiction during the period such license is suspended or revoked by such other jurisdiction.’” And “[u]nder Title 40 of the Georgia Code, a license is defined as ‘any driver's license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under, or granted by, the laws of this state, including ... [t]he privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license. ’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 40–1–1(24)(B).” “Wolfe contends that under Roberts [ v. Burgess, 279 Ga. 486, 614 S.E.2d 25 (2005)] , OCGA § 40–5–22(c)(7) can only be constitutionally applied to those who subjected themselves to the licensing laws and regulations of the other state by applying for a driver's license. We reject that premise. Whenever a driver avails himself of the roadways of a particular state, he is obligated to abide by the applicable rules and regulations of that state. … Although Wolfe never formally applied for a physical Illinois driver's license, he voluntarily took advantage of Illinois's grant of the privilege to drive within its borders and, on at least two occasions, violated Illinois's laws and regulations regarding the operation of a motor vehicle. Thus, Wolfe subjected himself to the laws and regulations of Illinois. See Roberts, 279 Ga. at 488(1), 614 S.E.2d 25 (‘Florida validly suspended appellant's license according to its statutes and regulations. Neither Georgia nor Florida is precluded from taking into account offenses that occurred in another state in deciding whether to issue or revoke an already issued operator's license.’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in affirming the Department's revocation of Wolfe's Georgia driver's license.” Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; “‘suspension of a defendant's driver's license after his conviction of a traffic-related offense is a reasonable condition of probation.’ Brock v. State, 165 Ga.App. 150, 151 (299 S.E.2d 71) (1983).” Sledge v. State, 312 Ga.App. 97, 717 S.E.2d 682 (October 18, 2011). Convictions for DUI and suspended license affirmed; evidence, though equivocal, supported finding that defendant received appropriate notice of his suspension for implied consent refusal. “The law applicable to service of a notice of revocation of one's driver's license for refusing a blood alcohol test is contained in OCGA § 40–5–67.1(f)(1) …: ‘The law enforcement officer, acting on behalf of the department, shall personally serve the notice of intention to suspend or disqualify the license of the arrested person or other person refusing such test on such person at the time of the person's refusal to submit to a test or at the time at which such a test indicates that suspension or disqualification is required under this Code section.’ … The officer who was to have served the notice on Sledge … ultimately testified that she served Sledge with the notice, but that she could not recall when and how service was made. Because some evidence exists, even though contradictory, that Sledge was served with the notice of suspension, it cannot be said that the evidence demanded a verdict of acquittal.” Eason v. Dozier, 298 Ga.App. 65, 679 S.E.2d 89 (May 20, 2009). Department of Driver Services (DDS) properly counted defendant’s habitual violator revocation from date DDS declared the license revoked, rather than from the date defendant was convicted of the underlying offenses, where the court gave no notice of suspension. “An individual whose license has been revoked is not eligible for a new license until ‘[f]ive years from the date on which the revoked license was surrendered to and received by the department pursuant to a person's having been declared a habitual violator under Code Section 40-5-58 or from the date on which [DDS] processed the citation or conviction, reduced by a period of time equal to that period of time which elapses between the date the person surrenders his driver's license to the court after conviction for the offense for which the person is declared a habitual violator and the date the department