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receives such license from the court.... ’ OCGA § 40-5-62(a)(1). Defendant here was convicted of vehicular homicide and other offenses, and surrendered his license to the Department of Corrections upon incarceration, but was given no notice of suspension or revocation until over two years later, as his incarceration was ending. “In this case, however, Eason does not argue and the record does not reflect that the court of conviction notified Eason of his habitual violator status. Accordingly, even if Eason could have been declared a habitual violator as early as October 7, 2004, he was not declared a habitual violator until September 11, 2007. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, Eason's license could not have been revoked based on his status as a habitual violator until the later date. See OCGA § 40-5-58(a), (b); see also Lokey, [June 6, 2008, below]; Hardison [ v. Orndorff, 173 Ga.App. 630, 632 (327 S.E.2d 497) (1985)] (physical precedent only). Moreover, while Eason's license may have been held by the Department of Corrections while he was incarcerated, his five-year revocation period may not be reduced by that time because Eason had not been declared a habitual violator by DDS. Compare with Lokey, 291 Ga.App. at 859-860(2) (because Lokey was declared a habitual offender, the time between the court of convictions's declaration and DDS's record update was reduced from his five-year revocation period).” Robinson v. State, 293 Ga.App. 477, 667 S.E.2d 647 (September 2, 2008). Defendant couldn’t use appeal of his DUI conviction to challenge constitutionality of suspension of his commercial driver’s license. “Appeal of a license revocation is governed by OCGA § 40-5-66, which, with certain exceptions, requires an appeal to the superior court. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 (658 S.E.2d 592) (2008).” Lokey v. Georgia Department of Driver Services, 291 Ga.App. 856, 663 S.E.2d 283 (June 6, 2008). 1. Defendant’s driver’s license was properly suspended though superior court clerk sent notice of suspensions to DDS more than ten days after conviction as called for by OCGA § 40-5-53(b). Based on Hardison v. Orndorff , 173 Ga.App. 630, 327 S.E.2d 497 (1985) (license was properly suspended though superior court failed to transmit notice to DDS until three years after conviction). “[W]hile ‘[t]he statute directing the courts to send a ten-day notice is facilitative of supplying records to the [DDS], ... the [DDS’] duty to act is not based upon when the court acts, but upon when its records disclose facts sufficient to revoke a license.’ Id.” 2. DDS improperly based date of habitual violator revocation on date it received notice from trial court, instead of date defendant was given notice of revocation. “In essence, the DDS takes the position that there can be no valid revocation of a habitual violator's license unless and until the DDS receives ‘official’ notice of the conviction triggering that revocation from the convicting court. This argument, however, ignores both the language found in the latter part of OCGA § 40-5-58(b), as well as that found in OCGA § 40-5-60, which explicitly provides that ‘[a]ll revocations ... provided for in this chapter shall be effective on the day the driver receives actual knowledge or legal notice thereof, whichever occurs first.’” DDS issuance of a temporary permit to defendant in the interim does not change this result. (DDS was aware of defendant’s second DUI conviction, but not the third; but defendant was given notice of habitual violator status by the trial court before DDS issued the temporary permit based on the second conviction. DDS received a copy of the habitual violator notice, but not the underlying conviction, prior to issuing the temporary permit.) “Given that Lokey was not entitled to the limited driving permit even if his license had been merely suspended, we view the issuance of such a permit as evidence of an administrative mistake on the part of the DDS, rather than as evidence that Lokey’s license had previously been suspended, instead of revoked.” Z. EX PARTE COMMUNICATION See also subheading RECUSAL OF JUDGE, below Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed. “[T]he fact that the trial court adopted the State's proposed order [denying motion for new trial] verbatim” is not “evidence that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under OCGA §§ 5–5–20 and 5–5–21.” Nor is it a violation of due process unless process was fundamentally unfair, citing “ Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 806 (621 S.E.2d 419) (2005). In Brockman's case, after both parties had been given the opportunity to fully brief the issues, they were simultaneously informed that, after review, the trial court had decided to deny the motion for new trial and was requesting that the State prepare a proposed order. Defense counsel were provided an opportunity to respond to the proposed findings and conclusions. Brockman has presented no evidence that the trial court did not fully review the evidence and consider Brockman's claims or that the process by which the trial court arrived at its findings was fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, we reject Brockman's contentions regarding the trial court's adoption of the State's proposed order.” Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 715 S.E.2d 113 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no due process violation “when the trial court adopted the State's proposed order denying the motion for new trial verbatim. ‘[W]hen the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.’ Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 572(II) (105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518)