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whom he had good relationships and his evidence regarding his depression, suicidal thoughts, poor impulse control, severe drug dependency, and severe intake of drugs and alcohol on the night of the murders).” Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009). 1. In defendant’s capital murder prosecution, defendant wasn’t entitled to “an ex parte hearing on his motion for funds to retain a jury composition expert. The use of a jury composition expert ‘cannot be considered a secretive trial strategy.’ Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 309(6) (486 S.E.2d 861) (1997). Thus, Arrington was not improperly placed ‘in a position where, in order to make the showing required for public funds with which to employ an expert, he had to reveal his theory of the case to the State.’ Id. at 310(6).” 2. No abuse of discretion in denial of funds to retain “to retain a mitigation specialist and a prison consultant. … After an ex parte hearing on Arrington's initial request for a mitigation specialist made two weeks before his case was initially set for trial, the trial court found, among other things, that defense counsel had done considerable trial preparation, including obtaining evidence that could be used in mitigation. The trial court then granted Arrington's motion to continue the case and granted Arrington funds to assist in the preparation of any additional mitigation evidence that he wished to present. Moreover, no limit was placed on the hours for which counsel would be paid for investigating and preparing the case. We find no abuse of discretion here, as our review of the record shows that Arrington did not establish that the services of a mitigation specialist or a prison consultant were critical to his defense or that without such assistance his trial would be rendered unfair. See Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 41(3)(d) and n.3 (365 S.E.2d 115) (1988).” Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 394, 677 S.E.2d 71 (April 28, 2009). No abuse of discretion in denying funds for “independent forensic toxicologist. In order to obtain funds to hire a scientific expert, an indigent defendant must disclose to the trial court, with a reasonable degree of precision, why certain evidence is critical, what type of scientific testimony is needed, what that expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for services. Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39(3)(d), 365 S.E.2d 115 (1988). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for the appointment of an expert rests within the trial court's sound discretion, and the trial court's decision will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Crawford v. State, 267 Ga. 881(2), 485 S.E.2d 461 (1997). After reviewing [defendants’] motions for funds and conducting an ex parte hearing, the trial court granted their requests for funds to hire a forensic pathologist but reserved ruling on their requests for funds to hire an independent toxicologist because they had not demonstrated why their pathologist could not rely on the State's toxicology report in reaching his conclusion as to the cause of death. At no subsequent time did [defendants] present additional evidence to the court in support of their previously filed motions and they at no time renewed their motion for funds. In this circumstance, even assuming the alleged error has been preserved for appellate review, we find [defendants] failed to provide sufficient information necessary for the trial court to fully consider their requests. See Finn v. State, 274 Ga. 675(2), 558 S.E.2d 717 (2002).” Washington v. State, 295 Ga.App. 586, 672 S.E.2d 665 (January 16, 2009). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault (with a motor vehicle), no abuse of discretion in denial of funds to hire expert witness (accident reconstructionist). “‘A motion on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant for funds with which to obtain the services of a scientific expert should disclose to the trial court, with a reasonable degree of precision, why certain evidence is critical, what type of scientific testimony is needed, what that expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for services. The decision whether to grant or deny an indigent criminal defendant's motion for the appointment of an expert rests within the trial court's sound discretion, and the trial court's decision will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 14(2) (560 S.E.2d 663) (2002).” “At trial, Washington unsuccessfully renewed his request for funds for an expert witness and proffered his theory that an expert accident reconstruction witness would provide evidence that the automobile collision between Washington and Coley was not the result of an intentional act on the part of Washington. However, even assuming this renewed request was timely, we note that Washington was able to cross examine and challenge the State's two eyewitnesses who stated that Washington intentionally caused the collision, and the State's evidence of Washington's guilt did not involve any expert accident reconstruction testimony or scientific evidence concerning the collision site. Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of the trial court's discretion in failing to provide mid-trial funding for an accident reconstruction expert as to the aggravated assault by vehicle charge. See Kelly v. State, 255 Ga.App. 813, 814(2) (567 S.E.2d 36) (2002) (no abuse of discretion where conviction not dependent solely on State's expert testimony, and routine subject matter did not necessarily require the input of an expert); Davis v. State, 244 Ga.App. 345, 349(6) (535 S.E.2d 528) (2000) (no expert funds required where conviction not based on expert opinion testimony and no explanation of exculpatory evidence was needed); Brooks v. State, 232 Ga.App. 115, 116(6) (501 S.E.2d 286) (1998) (no abuse of discretion where scientific evidence was not the only basis for finding of guilt; and noting the Supreme Court's limits on the scope of an indigent defendant's right to state funded expert witnesses: ‘the ruling of this case cannot serve as a basis for wide-ranging demands on behalf of indigent defendants for scientific investigative funds’) (punctuation omitted).