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Therefore, as Washington has not identified any reversible error, we affirm.” Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211 (July 11, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s request to have State’s interrogation videotape examined by an expert (here, the FBI, which “had agreed to examine the videotape”). “The videotape of the interrogation of Reaves at the police station has an obvious gap between a pause in the interrogation and additional questioning by an officer speaking in mid-sentence.” Defendant contended that the recording had shown the officer threatening him, and had then been rewound and taped over. Officer denied threatening defendant or rewinding the tape. Defense sought expert examination to determine whether the tape had been rewound, but failed to show that such examination was possible. “[E]ven though the use of public funds is not in issue, a criminal defendant is still not entitled to have an expert examine evidence such as a tape recording unless it constitutes ‘“critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion.” [Cit.]’ Carpenter v. State, 252 Ga. 79, 80(1), 310 S.E.2d 912 (1984). See also Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16(6), 282 S.E.2d 61 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 325(5), 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994). The defendant must show both that the evidence is ‘subject to varying interpretations’ and, ‘“when developed by skilled counsel and experts, could induce a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction.” [Cit.]’ Carpenter v. State, supra. See also Reinhardt v. State, 197 Ga.App. 825, 826(1), 399 S.E.2d 729 (1990). After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court failed to find whether Reaves had made this required showing. Therefore, we remand the case for the trial court to make those findings of fact which are necessary for it to determine whether to permit further expert examination of the videotape.” Allen v. State, 283 Ga. 304, 658 S.E.2d 580 (March 10, 2008). Trial court properly denied defense request for “funds to employ an expert to testify about the emotional state of a juvenile who might be interrogated by the police. ... A juvenile’s state of mind is not beyond the ken of the average layman. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 S.E.2d 678) (1981). Unlike the battered wife syndrome, a juvenile’s state of mind and the voluntariness of his confession is not ‘a unique and almost mysterious area of human response and behavior.’ Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 387 (283 S.E.2d 479) (1981).” Nelson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (January 25, 2008). “In reliance on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53) (1985). Nelson contends that the trial court erred in denying his request as an indigent defendant for funds to engage a psychologist to assist in his defense. As a condition to the grant of such funds, however, Ake requires the defendant to make a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense would likely be a significant factor at trial. LaCount v. State, 265 Ga.App. 352, 354(2) (593 S.E.2d 885) (2004). Because Nelson made no such showing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request. See id. at 354-355.” Palmer v. State, 286 Ga.App. 751, 650 S.E.2d 255 (June 4, 2007). “Palmer contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for funds to hire a DNA expert to test evidence recovered from the crime scene using more advanced techniques than that employed by the State crime laboratory. We disagree. ‘The grant or denial of a post-conviction motion for the assistance of an expert witness lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and some special need for the witness must be demonstrated to the trial court.’ Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 77(3) (586 S.E.2d 313) (2003). See also Totten v. State, 276 Ga. 199, 200(2) (577 S.E.2d 272) (2003) (post trial request for investigation services lies within trial court’s discretion).” In any event, defendant’s request for post-conviction DNA testing of rape samples can now be handled pursuant to “OCGA § 5-5-41(c), which provides an avenue for a person convicted of a serious violent felony, including rape, armed robbery, and aggravated sodomy, to obtain additional DNA testing of evidence where, as contended by Palmer, the requested DNA test was not available at the time of trial and the hypothesized test results raise a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have been acquitted if the test was previously available. See OCGA § 5-5- 41(c)(3)(B), (D); Crawford v. State, 278 Ga. 95, 97(2)(a) (597 S.E.2d 403) (2004). … Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palmer’s motion for funds to hire a DNA expert of his choosing to test the evidence.” Daly v. State, 285 Ga.App. 808, 648 S.E.2d 90 (May 30, 2007). Dicta: retained counsel “could have petitioned the court for funds to hire an expert even though she was retained. See Hall v. State, 272 Ga.App. 204, 205-206(1) (612 S.E.2d 44) (2005).” Note, this proposition is mentioned anecdotally in Hall . No ineffective assistance found here, absent showing that outcome of trial would have been affected by hiring expert. Dingler v. State, 281 Ga.App. 721, 637 S.E.2d 120 (October 3, 2006). Burglary conviction reversed; trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for funds to hire an expert to examine handling of State’s DNA evidence. “‘A motion for funds to obtain an expert witness requires a reasonable showing to the court, by the defendant, why the expert’s services are required, what services are to be performed by such expert, the identity of the expert, and the