☢ test - Í

cost to provide the needed services. The defendant must also demonstrate that without the assistance of the expert, the defendant’s trial would be rendered fundamentally unfair. The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for funds for an expert witness.’ (Citations omitted.) Coalson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 761, 766(3) (555 S.E.2d 128) (2001).” Failure to name the expert or his cost in the motion did not require denial of the request, inasmuch as the information was already known to the trial court. “Dingler’s motion otherwise indicated that the State’s only evidence against him consisted of the match between his DNA profile and the blood found at the crime scene and that he required the assistance of a DNA expert to challenge the accuracy of the State’s findings. In Thornton v. State, 255 Ga. 434 (339 S.E.2d 240) (1986), the Georgia Supreme Court held that the defendant had been wrongly denied funds for an expert witness. In Thornton, as here, the scientific evidence in issue was critical in that it was the sole link between the defendant and the crime at issue , and, because of its novelty, that evidence was subject to varying scientific opinions. Id.; Jones v. State, 277 Ga. 36, 38(3) (586 S.E.2d 224) (2003); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 286(1)(b) (393 S.E.2d 436) (1990); McKinney v. State, 218 Ga.App. 633, 635(3) (436 S.E.2d 136) (1995) ( ‘[F]orensic analysis of DNA, in light of its novelty, is likely to be the subject of varying expert opinions .’) (citation and punctuation omitted.) Further, the record shows that Dingler timely sought an expert to assist him in challenging the admissibility of the State’s DNA identification evidence. Without such an expert, he was left with no witness on his behalf. In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s failure to appoint an expert rendered Dingler’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Distinguished, Williams v. State , 284 Ga. 849, 672 S.E.2d 619 (January 26, 2009) (“this case is not one where the scientific evidence is ‘critical in that it [i]s the sole link between the defendant and the crime at issue.’”). Robinson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 76, 635 S.E.2d 380 (August 11, 2006). “‘A motion on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant for funds with which to obtain the services of a scientific expert should disclose to the trial court, with a reasonable degree of precision, why certain evidence is critical, what type of scientific testimony is needed, what that expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for services. Lacking this information, a trial court will find it difficult to assess the need for assistance.’ Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 41(3)(d) (365 S.E.2d 115) (1988).” Accord, Washington (January 16, 2009), above. Mobley v. State, 277 Ga.App. 267, 626 S.E.2d 248 (January 19, 2006). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying funds for an expert on eyewitness identification post-trial. “In a motion for funds to hire an expert, the defendant must make a reasonable showing as to why the expert’s services are required, what services are to be performed by such expert, the identity of the expert, and the cost to provide the needed services. Coalson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 761, 766(3) (555 S.E.2d 128) (2001). ‘The defendant must also demonstrate that without the assistance of the expert, the defendant's trial would be rendered fundamentally unfair.’ Id.” “At the hearing on the motion for funds, Mobley’s counsel admitted that she had found no law entitling Mobley to the assistance of an expert on a motion for new trial. The trial court found that the expert’s services were not needed because this was not an identification case since Mobley admitted that he was at the scene and that to allow such an expert would be tantamount to allowing one in every case to question a witness’s recount of events. Mobley’s argument that he needed the expert to prove his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness also fails. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Mobley’s appellate counsel asked trial counsel numerous questions regarding scientific theories on eyewitness identification and trial counsel admitted that he had not reviewed all of the literature.” Accord, Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015) (no abuse of discretion in denying funds to hire expert in absence of Coalson showing). McKinney v. State, 269 Ga.App. 12, 602 S.E.2d 904 (August 6, 2004). Defendant sought funds to hire expert to rebut state’s medical witness on child’s alleged sexual abuse. Trial court denied request, however, as state’s witness’s findings were admittedly inconclusive and not central to the case. “‘A motion for funds to obtain an expert witness requires a reasonable showing to the court, by the defendant, why the expert’s services are required, what services are to be performed by such expert, the identity of the expert, and the cost to provide the needed services.’ Coalson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 761, 766(3) (555 S.E.2d 128) (2001). See also Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 41(3)(d) (365 S.E.2d 115) (1988). McKinney also must show that without the assistance of the expert, his trial ‘would be rendered fundamentally unfair.’ Coalson, supra. Although McKinney’s motion was in the proper format, he failed to show that without [the expert’s] assistance, his trial would be rendered fundamentally unfair.” Distinguished from Thornton v. State , 255 Ga. 434, 339 S.E.2d 240 (1986). Accord, Edwards v. State , 282 Ga. 259, 646 S.E.2d 663 (June 4, 2007). Wright v. State, 265 Ga.App. 855, 595 S.E.2d 664 (February 25, 2004) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). Counsel was not required to seek funding for an expert witness “on the reliability of eyewitness identifications” in this case, both because it was a tactical decision – such testimony could hurt as well as help – and because it was unlikely to change the outcome of the case. “Although, as the trial court noted, a key