☢ test - Í

element of the State’s case against Wright was the identification testimony, this is not a case where only one witness testified as to the identity of the perpetrator, where the only eyewitness identifications were cross-racial, or where the identification testimony was the only evidence presented by the State. Here, three witnesses, two of whom were trained and experienced law enforcement officers with extensive experience in surveillance and undercover work, identified Wright at trial. Both Agent Dillard and Wright are African American, and Agent Dillard testified he knew Wright by his street name. Lastly, in addition to the eyewitness testimony, an audiotape of the drug buy was played for the jury at trial. Thus, while the expert testimony may have been beneficial, Wright has failed to show that the outcome would have been different had trial counsel sought funds to obtain an expert on identification testimony. [Cit.] We would note further that the case of Brodes v. State, 250 Ga.App. 323, 325 (551 S.E.2d 757) (2001), in which we held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification, does not require a different result. First, Brodes concerned the admissibility of available evidence, not whether funds should have been sought to obtain such evidence. Moreover, Brodes is distinguishable on its facts, because in that case the identification was cross-racial, no other evidence tied the defendant to the crime, and no evidence corroborated the testimony of the victims.” Davis v. State, 264 Ga.App. 221, 590 S.E.2d 192 (November 18, 2003). “[T]he general rule applies that the grant or denial of a motion for assistance of expert witnesses and other investigative services lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that some special need must be demonstrated to the trial court to grant funds to hire an investigator. Brooks v. State [259 Ga. 562, 385 S.E.2d 81 (1989)] held that ‘in making the requisite showing defendant could be placed in a position of revealing his theory of the case. He therefore has a legitimate interest in making the showing ex parte . ’” But the right to an ex parte hearing was waived where counsel made the request at the call of the case for trial, without asking for ex parte consideration. Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (June 12, 2000). Capital murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied funds for expert analysis of number of Hispanics in jury pool, in relation to challenge to array. “[T]he record shows that much of the evidence that Morrow claimed he needed with regard to the traverse jury pool was similar to the evidence he had used, and the trial court had found unconvincing, in support of his motion concerning the grand jury pool.” Davis v. State , 244 Ga.App. 345, 535 S.E.2d 528 (June 7, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s post-conviction request to retain a fingerprint expert to explain the significance of the lack of defendant’s fingerprints at the scene. “[D]efendant's conviction is not based upon expert opinion testimony or fingerprint evidence. To the extent that the complete absence of any defendant's fingerprints is exculpatory, [fn] that is obvious to the juror of ordinary intelligence and does not need the explication of an expert witness . Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the case or in refusing to appoint an expert witness in this instance.” Brown v. State, 242 Ga.App. 106, 528 S.E.2d 868 (January 28, 2000). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance “to allow the State Crime Lab to complete analysis of body fluids taken from Brown and [victim] Turner or to allow Brown to obtain an independent analysis of the fluids. … First, Brown had no right to seek, and the trial court had no authority to order, that the State Crime Lab analyze the samples for his benefit. Kendrix v. State, 206 Ga.App. 627, 628, 426 S.E.2d 251 (1992). It follows that Brown was not entitled to a continuance for this purpose. Second, even though an indigent defendant, upon timely motion, has a right to funds to hire an expert to examine critical evidence which is subject to varying expert opinion, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion for an expert in this case. Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 17, 282 S.E.2d 61 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994); Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 365 S.E.2d 115 (1988). An indigent criminal defendant's motion for funds to obtain an independent expert should inform the trial court with reasonable precision why the evidence sought to be examined is critical, what type of testimony is needed, what the expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for the expert services. Id. at 40-41, 365 S.E.2d 115; Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 310, 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997). Because Brown's motion failed to set forth these elements, denial of the motion was not error. It follows that the trial court did not err in denying Brown a continuance for this purpose.” Carter v. State, 237 Ga.App. 703, 516 S.E.2d 556 (April 21, 1999). Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to hire expert witness. “‘[T]he grant or denial of a motion for appointment of an expert witness lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and where the defendant’s conviction [does] not rest entirely on the [S]tate’s expert evidence, and the [S]tate’s expert [is] not shown to be incompetent or biased, ... the trial court [does] not abuse its