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discretion in denying such motion. Jackson v. State, 249 Ga. 751, 755(3), 295 S.E.2d 53 (1982).’ Carter v. State, 252 Ga. 502, 504(2), 315 S.E.2d 646 (1984). Defendant’s arson conviction was not based entirely on State’s experts. “Thus, while the State's expert opinion evidence is crucial to the determination that the fire was a criminal enterprise and not accidental or providential, the State’s expert opinion evidence is not the sole evidence against defendant. Consequently, the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the case and appoint an expert investigator, in response to defendant’s tardy request. See Carter v. State, 252 Ga. at 504(2), 315 S.E.2d 646, supra.” Belton v. State, 270 Ga. 671, 512 S.E.2d 614 (February 22, 1999). Trial court did not err in denying defendant funds post-trial “to hire an expert to examine biological material recovered from the crime scene,” as part of defendant’s attempt to assert ineffective assistance of counsel. “The purported ineffectiveness was trial counsel’s failure to have the material tested before trial. Belton argued to the trial court that before he could show the deficient performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), he needed to determine whether testing would have produced exculpatory evidence. In support of the relevancy of such test results, Belton points to testimony by one of his defense counsel that the defense was surprised at trial by testimony from a medical examiner that the location of some of the blood stains was consistent with the stains having a source other than the victim. The problem with Belton’s argument is that it depends entirely on hindsight. ‘To show deficient performance, [a defendant] must demonstrate that ... counsel’s performance was not reasonable under the circumstances confronting ... counsel at the time, without resorting to hindsight. [Cit.]’ Turpin v. Mobley, 269 Ga. 635(3), 502 S.E.2d 458 (1998). Rather than focusing on what testing would have shown had it been sought, the proper emphasis is on whether counsel’s actions, under the circumstances then existing, were reasonable. Stansell v. State, 270 Ga. 147(2), 510 S.E.2d 292 (1998). One of Belton’s defense counsel testified at the hearing on Belton’s motion for funds that the defense chose not to have testing done because the State had not done so, and the defense could argue that the State’s failure to do so left a reasonable doubt that Belton was the perpetrator. The question to be answered by the trial court, then, was whether that strategic decision was reasonable under the circumstances defense counsel faced in preparing for trial, not whether post-trial testing would have actually revealed the presence of another person at the scene. ” BB. EXPUNGEMENT Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff’s Office, 307 Ga.App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (December 17, 2010). Trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s appeal of denial of his expungement request; contrary to superior court’s ruling, “Grimes … had the right to seek expungement of his records notwithstanding the fact that he was indicted before the charge against him was nolle prossed.” “Pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(3), an individual has a right to have his records expunged if ‘the prosecuting attorney determines’ that certain requirements are met, notably that the charge was dismissed without the prosecutor having sought an indictment or filing an accusation. See OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(1)(A), (B); (3)(A).” After indictment or accusation, expungement is not as a matter of right, but a defendant may petition for expungement under “OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(6), which is the right of appeal referenced in OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(9). OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(6) expressly provides that in an appeal thereunder, ‘[a] decision of the agency [declining to expunge] shall be upheld only if it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the individual did not meet the criteria set forth in paragraph (3) of this subsection or subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (7) of this subsection.’ (Emphasis supplied). Although this provision is somewhat convoluted, we conclude that unless the trial court determines that clear and convincing evidence of record shows that the individual was not entitled to expungement as of right under OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(3), or, following an indictment or accusation, the charges were nolle prossed, dead docketed, or dismissed for a reason set forth in OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(7)(A) through (G), the agency's refusal to expunge cannot be affirmed.” Review under (d)(6) is not de novo, however, but on the record. “Although OCGA § 35-3-37(c) contemplates such a [de novo] procedure, Grimes's appeal was taken under OCGA § 35-3-37(d)(6). By its express provisions, an appeal under OCGA § 35-3- 37(d)(6) is as provided in OCGA § 50-13-19. In such case, ‘[t]he review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.... The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.’ OCGA § 50-13-19(g).” CC. EXTRADITION Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 354, 667 S.E.2d 37 (September 22, 2008). Habeas court properly denied defendant’s petition challenging his extradition to Washington by attacking the Washington probable cause determination. “[A] court in an asylum state considering a petition for writ of habeas corpus, is limited to determining four readily verifiable facts: whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and whether the petitioner is a fugitive from justice. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d