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521 (1978); Johnson v. Mitchell, 256 Ga. 339, 349 S.E.2d 186 (1986). Once a requisition has been made by the governor of the demanding state, ‘[i]t is not appropriate for the habeas court to look behind the probable cause finding of the demanding state.’ Rhodes v. North Carolina, 255 Ga. 391, 338 S.E.2d 676 (1986). Additionally, ‘[o]nce a habeas corpus court has found the extradition papers to be legally sufficient, a further inquiry into a petitioner's statutory and constitutional defenses violates the clear intention that an extradition proceeding be of a summary nature.’ Hutson v. Stoner, 244 Ga. 52, 53, 257 S.E.2d 539 (1979).” McLeod v. Barrett, 271 Ga. 569, 521 S.E.2d 219 (October 18, 1999). Habeas court properly denied relief pending extradition. 1. Extradition demand was in sufficient form. “OCGA § 17-13-23 sets forth the form of the demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state. The written demand must allege, except in cases arising under OCGA § 17-13-25, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled the state. It must be accompanied by a copy of an indictment found; or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime; or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon; or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of the state; and the copy of the indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction, or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. Id. The … Governor's Warrant clearly complied with the statute. It contained an Application for Requisition, executed by the Superintendent of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and stated that McLeod had been tried and convicted on indictments charging him with two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and two counts of grand larceny, and that McLeod had escaped the Mississippi State Penitentiary on January 11, 1972. The Requisition also included copies of the indictments that were the bases of the original convictions as well as the sentences imposed and sworn and notarized statements from the present and past superintendents of corrections that McLeod had escaped from custody before completion of his sentences. The application also contained certifications from the Mississippi Governor, Secretary of State, and Superintendent of the Department of Corrections.” 2. Mississippi’s failure to adopt Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) did not bar his extradition there. Defendant’s claim “overlooks the fact that the extradition process has its foundation in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which states: “A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.” See Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 43(1), 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995).” DD. FINDINGS OF FACT Van Auken v. State, 304 Ga.App. 802, 697 S.E.2d 895 (July 6, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for “move over” violation affirmed. Trial court denied motion to suppress despite finding that defendant didn’t commit move-over violation, because it also found “that the sergeant had articulable suspicion to make the stop because he had a good faith belief that an unlawful act had been committed. See, e.g., State v. Rheinlander, 286 Ga.App. 625, 626-627 (649 S.E.2d 828) (2007).” At jury trial, however, court denied motion for directed verdict on move-over charge. Held, trial court wasn’t bound to grant motion for directed verdict despite prior finding that defendant didn’t commit offense. “A motion to suppress and a motion for a direct verdict of acquittal involve different evidentiary frameworks. In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court sits as the trier of fact and thus is charged with resolving any conflicts in the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses. See Perkins v. State, 300 Ga.App. 464, 467(3) (685 S.E.2d 300) (2009); Reid v. State, 298 Ga.App. 889, 892(2) (681 S.E.2d 671) (2009). In contrast, in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the trial court does not assume the role of factfinder. Rather, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and the court can grant the motion only where there is no conflict in the evidence and no rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See OCGA § 17-9-1(a); Mealor v. State, 233 Ga.App. 193, 194(4) (504 S.E.2d 29) (1998); Moore v. State, 215 Ga.App. 626, 627(2) (451 S.E.2d 534) (1994). Given these different modes of analysis, the trial court's finding regarding the ‘move-over’ violation made in the context of the suppression orders cannot be treated as the equivalent of a finding that the evidence demanded a verdict of acquittal on that count as a matter of law. [fn] See Camacho v. State, 292 Ga.App. 120, 122-123(2) (663 S.E.2d 364) (2008).” Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284, 130 S.Ct. 2217, 176 L.Ed.2d 1032 (May 24, 2010). Remands, to Eleventh Circuit, defendant’s habeas petition from Georgia death sentence, to determine whether state court’s factual determinations should be presumed correct, or whether an exception to such a presumption applies under See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(8) (1994