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information about other charges was false. “However, in admitting such evidence, trial counsel also presented the jury with unquestionably bad-character evidence that trial counsel himself knew was false. Counsel failed to redact damaging portions of the letter that went out with the jury (or even to inform the jury that those references were false). Such statements clearly injected evidence of bad-character and were inherently prejudicial in a trial where the defendant was accused of trafficking. Indeed, we have held that the admission of bad character evidence is severely restricted and have reversed convictions where such evidence was improperly injected at trial.” Conviction reversed and remanded for re- trial, as evidence was not overwhelming. Accord, Whitaker v. State , 276 Ga.App. 226, 622 S.E.2d 916 (November 4, 2005) (Defendant received ineffective assistance when counsel introduced an exhibit showing the prosecution witness’s prior conviction for burglary – in which the defendant himself was also convicted. The prior offense was “identical” to the crime on trial. Defendant’s participation could have been redacted, but wasn’t.); Berry v. State , 318 Ga.App. 806, 734 S.E.2d 768 (November 27, 2012) (deficient performance to tender police report revealing defendant’s prior similar drug offenses). Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga.App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (August 12, 2003). Defendant received ineffective assistance from counsel who tendered damaging police report into evidence and could state no tactical reason for doing so other than to “show confidence” in his case. Report contains damaging “information that does not appear to have been otherwise admissible... we must conclude that no reasonable trial attorney would have introduced this report into evidence on behalf of Lovelace.” However, strong case against defendant makes this error harmless. Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 559, 532 S.E.2d 395 (July 5, 2000). Felony murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to admission of mugshots and testimony touching on defendant’s prior incarceration. “Officer Flournoy testified that he had displayed a photographic lineup, consisting of ‘jail photographs’ to a witness who later identified appellant as the assailant. We have previously held that admitting a defendant's mugshot into evidence is not reversible error since it does not introduce defendant's bad character. Stanley v. State, 250 Ga. 3(1), 295 S.E.2d 315 (1982). At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that no objection was made to Officer Flournoy's testimony because the officer never intimated that appellant's picture was in the group of photographs and he reasoned that an objection would have drawn unnecessary attention to the testimony. Under the circumstances we hold that trial counsel's performance was sufficient.” 16. CHARACTER EVIDENCE, OPENING DOOR See also subheading DAMAGING EVIDENCE, PRESENTING, below Korponai v. State, 314 Ga.App. 710, 725 S.E.2d 832 (March 9, 2012). DUI conviction affirmed; defense counsel was deficient in asking defendant on direct “do you ever drink and drive?” opening the door for introduction of his prior DUI conviction by the State. Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Dyer v. State, 295 Ga.App. 495, 672 S.E.2d 462 (January 12, 2009). At defendant’s child molestation trial, not ineffective assistance to open door to other molestation allegations where “strategy was to show ‘that it didn't happen and that the little girl was making that stuff up through her mother and in the same [vein] she could have made up her allegation against her father.’” “In retrospect, trial counsel's decision may appear unwise, but ‘[p]articularly in regard to matters of trial strategy and tactic, effectiveness is not judged by hindsight or result.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Slade [ v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 307(2) (509 S.E.2d 618) (1998)]. Instead, we hold that trial counsel's strategic decision at the time of trial to open the door to evidence that Dyer had abused his sisters fell within the “wide range of reasonable professional conduct.’ Terry [ v. State, 284 Ga. 119, 120(2) (663 S.E.2d 704) (2008)]; see also Buice v. State, 239 Ga.App. 52, 60(6)(b) (520 S.E.2d 258) (1999) (tactical decision to introduce prior allegations of molestation and then refute them did not constitute ineffective assistance).” Evans v State, 288 Ga.App. 103, 653 S.E.2d 520 (October 26, 2007). “Evans … contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by eliciting improper character evidence from [co-defendant] Lynch’s former boyfriend, a state’s witness. Specifically, the witness testified during cross-examination that Evans was not capable of being a good person and had threatened Lynch’s children. At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that his questioning of Lynch’s former boyfriend was consistent with his trial strategy. Evans’s defense was that he was being framed. Trial counsel sought to show through cross-examination that the boyfriend was jealous of Evans’s relationship with Lynch, that he wanted Evans removed from Lynch’s residence, and that he therefore had a motive for falsifying his testimony. Trial counsel’s cross-examination amounted to reasonable trial strategy, and therefore, did not amount to ineffective assistance. [Cit.]” Cited with approval, Al-Attawy v. State , 289 Ga.App. 570, 657 S.E.2d 552 (January 25, 2008) (“ Not objecting to testimony but instead subjecting it to cross-examination may be part of a reasonable trial strategy. ”).