☢ test - Í

Beck v. State, 285 Ga.App. 764, 647 S.E.2d 408 (June 8, 2007). “ Beck also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he called a character witness, thereby placing Beck’s character at issue. This contention is also without merit. After the State rested, Beck’s trial counsel called a police officer, who knew Beck personally, to testify as to Beck’s reputation for truthfulness in the community. Beck now contends that this needlessly opened the door for the State to introduce evidence of two prior felony convictions. However, in light of the entrapment defense, which involved Beck admitting to the crime, see Flores v. State, 277 Ga.App. 211, 213(4) (626 S.E.2d 181) (2006). (‘[a]s a general rule, in order to raise an entrapment defense the defendant must first admit that he committed the crime and then show that he did so because of unlawful inducement by a law enforcement officer’), Beck’s trial counsel explained that he ‘thought it was important to have someone vouch for [Beck].... [S]he’s a police officer and has a lot of friends in the community. I felt her vouching for ... Beck would be of great import.’ This testimony demonstrates trial counsel’s continued strategy of supporting Beck’s entrapment defense. In light of the State’s use of the character witness to introduce evidence of Beck’s prior convictions, ‘[w]ith the benefit of hindsight, it would appear that this strategy may have backfired. But that is not to say that it was ineffective. Informed strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective legal assistance.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Phillips v. State, 277 Ga. 161, 163-164(b) (587 S.E.2d 45) (2003).” Bharadia v. State, 282 Ga.App. 556, 639 S.E.2d 545 (November 27, 2006). “Bharadia contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he put Bharadia’s character in issue by introducing evidence that he was on parole and by failing to object to the state’s evidence of his prior convictions. Counsel testified that since Bharadia was on parole, he had to get permission to travel, and evidence of his parole travel permit showed that he did not leave Atlanta until the day after the crimes had occurred. As for Bharadia’s criminal record, counsel testified that he wanted the jury to understand that Bharadia does not break into houses; rather, his prior crimes all involved cars. ‘Trial counsel’s decisions with regard to the choice of defenses and theories to be advanced at trial, even if unwise, are deemed matters of tactic and strategy; as a matter of law, strategic decisions do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mobley v. State, 277 Ga.App. 267, 274(3)(b) (626 S.E.2d 248) (2006).” Redman v. State, 281 Ga.App. 605, 636 S.E.2d 680 (August 29, 2006). No ineffective assistance where defense counsel, in consultation with defendant, made a strategic decision to call a character witness, knowing it would open the door to allow the State to cross-examine the witness about a juvenile conviction of defendant for a similar offense. Witness disclaimed knowledge of the prior offense. “Moreover, the trial court gave a special limiting instruction to the jury to ensure that they would not consider any impeachment evidence in making their determination of Redman’s guilt or innocence with respect to the crimes for which he was being tried.” 17. CLOSING ARGUMENT Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 783 S.E.2d 913 (March 7, 2016). Following murder and related convictions, habeas court properly granted Norris relief, based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, on other grounds; however, appellate counsel couldn’t successfully “argue on appeal that the trial court erred by improperly limiting trial counsel’s closing argument to one hour.” Appellate counsel couldn’t successfully challenge the limitation given that trial counsel had acquiesced to it. Prior opinion, 782 S.E.2d 264, 2016 WL 366902 (February 1, 2016), vacated. White v. State, 297 Ga. 218, 773 S.E.2d 219 (June 1, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in “declining the trial court's invitation to reopen closing arguments to address mutual combat.” Trial court originally announced its intent not to charge on mutual combat, but changed that decision after closing arguments, and gave counsel the opportunity to make additional argument thereon. “The trial transcript and the motion for new trial transcript make it clear that White's counsel strategically chose not to reopen his closing argument. Trial counsel explained at the motion for new trial hearing that he felt that his closing argument had gone well and that the mutual combat charge was ‘beneficial icing.’ He further stated that he believed that talking to the jury about mutual combat and justification ‘would [have been] the wrong tactical decision to make’ since he would then be overlooking the ‘very good defense that had come up that was really rather a gift at trial, that someone else who didn't look like Mr. White was the shooter in the case and Mr. White wasn't the shooter.’ ‘Inasmuch as th[is] decision ... was not patently unreasonable, and because [White] provides no basis for concluding that the result of his trial would have been different if [his counsel] had [presented additional] closing argument, he has not shown that his trial counsel was ineffective in this regard.’ (Citation omitted.) McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 347(4)(b) (667 S.E.2d 43) (2008).” Babbage v. State, 296 Ga. 364, 768 S.E.2d 461 (January 20, 2015). Malice murder, armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in strategically referring to defendant “as a drug dealer. Trial counsel testified at