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the new trial hearing that his strategy was to present to the jury a credible alternative explanation for what [co-defendant] Hall was doing at the time of the murder and also to preempt or blunt the effect of the evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the search of Hall's home. Because the phone records showed that Hall was in the vicinity of the crime scene around the time of the crimes, counsel chose to argue that Hall was simply at his home—which was in close proximity to the crime scene—doing what he normally did. Though this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful, we do not find that it was patently unreasonable given the nature of the State's evidence against Hall and the apparent absence of any alternative strategies.” Gordon v. State, 318 Ga.App. 767, 734 S.E.2d 777 (November 27, 2012). Aggravated battery and other convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance from allegedly burden-shifting closing argument. “As to whether defense counsel's closing argument concerning the difficulty that he had as to persuading the jury that reasonable doubt existed as to Gordon's guilt improperly shifted the burden of proof on that issue, the record shows that both counsel and the trial court emphasized that it was the trial court's responsibility to explain the law. The record also shows that the trial court correctly charged the jury that the State was required to prove ‘each element of the crimes that are charged ... beyond a reasonable doubt’; that ‘there is no burden upon [Gordon] whatsoever’; and that ‘reasonable doubt’ could arise from conditions including ‘a lack of evidence,’ ‘a conflict in the evidence,’ or ‘any combination of those factors.’” Thus, no reasonable probability of different outcome but for the allegedly burden-shifting argument. Sanders v. State, 289 Ga. 655, 715 S.E.2d 124 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder convictions affirmed for parents who “were vegans who fed their baby only soy milk and apple juice.” Child died of “extreme malnourishment or starvation.” No ineffective assistance where counsel admitted in closing argument that defendants had made mistakes and could be found guilty of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. “[T]he admissions by Ms. Sanders' attorney of mistakes on her part were consistent with Appellants' joint theory of defense that their parenting mistakes constituted involuntary manslaughter but not murder. This theory was reasonable given the strong evidence that the victim was malnourished for days to weeks, during which he was unable to respond normally to stimuli, and that he needed medical attention. After hearing that evidence presented and observing the effect of the medical witnesses, some of whom wept during their testimony, Ms. Sanders' lawyer made the partially successful strategic decision to mitigate the damage to the defense by showing the jury that it could convict her of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. Defense counsel is not deficient in adjusting his strategy to meet developments at trial. See Taylor v. State, 190 Ga.App. 681, 682(1), 379 S.E.2d 814 (1989).” Daniels v. State, 310 Ga.App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (July 6, 2011). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel. Closing argument where counsel suggested to the jury that defendant might be guilty of other offenses, but not those charged in the indictment, was reasonable trial strategy. Damerow v. State, 310 Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance “[t]o the extent that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to object to the closing argument” of prosecutor, allegedly expressing improper personal opinions about the evidence and credibility. Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 708 S.E.2d 294 (March 25, 2011). Convictions for felony murder, kidnapping and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to trial court’s announcement to jury that “the law gives each side an hour for closing arguments,” instead of the two hours allowed in capitol cases. “The trial court never interrupted [attorney] Axam’s argument or indicated to him that he had limited time. We conclude that such weak evidence of an actual improper limit on closing argument is insufficient to demonstrate a violation of OCGA § 17- 8-73. In any event, the existence of the statutory right to make a two-hour closing argument in a murder case does not mean that an attorney acts incompetently whenever he decides to use less than the whole two hours. Brown claims that Axam must have shortened his argument to less than an hour because of the trial court’s comment to the jury and that Axam did not object because he was unaware of OCGA § 17-8-73. But that is pure speculation. When asked whether he was aware of the time allowed for closing when he defended Brown, Axam testified that he could not recall what he knew on that issue eight years earlier. Absent a persuasive demonstration to the contrary, we must presume that Axam knew the law and that his decision not to object resulted from strategy and tactics rather than incompetence. See [ Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 109 (131 S.Ct. 770, 790, 178 L.Ed.2d 624) (2011)]. For example, even assuming Axam felt bound by the court’s comment directed to the jury, he may have understood that the court’s statement was erroneous but decided not to object because he was not planning to argue for more than an hour in any event; because he thought the court had simply made a slip of the tongue; or because he wanted to wait and see how the arguments were going and to object, if at all, when the trial court tried to cut him off to enforce the one-hour limit. There are many