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reasonable explanations for why defense counsel would decide not to make a two-hour-long closing argument in a case like this one, and Brown has shown nothing to suggest that Axam’s failure to object (to the court’s comment to the jury rather than a directive to counsel) was professionally deficient. As a result, the trial court properly rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this basis.” Smith v. State, 288 Ga. 348, 703 S.E.2d 629 (November 8, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel waived closing argument. “ In counsel's professional judgment, one, cohesive closing argument delivered by counsel for [co-defendant/husband] Joseph Smith would be more effective than presenting two closing arguments. ‘Inasmuch as th[is] decision ... was not patently unreasonable, and because [Sonya] provides no basis for concluding that the result of [her] trial would have been different if [her counsel] had [presented an additional] closing argument, [she] has not shown that [her] trial counsel was ineffective in this regard.’ (Citation omitted.) McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 347(4)(b) (667 S.E.2d 43) (2008).” Emmanuel v. State, 300 Ga.App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (October 7, 2009). No ineffective assistance where counsel strategically chose not to object to prosecutor’s future dangerousness arguments because “she believed that any interruption would cause the prosecutor to argue more vehemently and she wanted him to finish his argument and be seated. She also believed the jury was sophisticated enough to know it was closing argument and not base a two-week trial on something said during closing argument. Emmanuel's attorney ‘reasonably chose silence, and we will not use hindsight to second-guess that decision on appeal,’” quoting Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 886, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002). Accord, Humphrey v. Lewis , 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (June 18, 2012) (counsel reasonably chose silence rather than object and highlight prosecutor’s brief “golden rule” argument). Reynolds v. State, 300 Ga.App. 353, 685 S.E.2d 346 (October 7, 2009). Failure to object to prosecutor’s improper closing argument, in absence of strategic reason or overwhelming evidence of guilt, was ineffective assistance: “I want you to consider that Mr. Reynolds had the opportunity to stay ... that night and call the police or wait for police to respond to give his version of the facts.” Horne v. State, 298 Ga.App. 601, 680 S.E.2d 616 (June 29, 2009). Counsel’s decision to use just 45 minutes of allotted two hours for closing argument was strategic and not unreasonable, as counsel “thought arguing for more than 45 minutes was not effective.” Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 675 S.E.2d 1 (February 9, 2009). “While it was not reasonable trial strategy to permit the assistant district attorney to argue to the jury that [defendant's] prior convictions for robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon established [defendant] had a propensity to commit crime, in light of the evidence of [defendant's] guilt-his co-indictee's testimony, the letters he wrote to his co-indictee, and his fingerprint on the window of the victim's vehicle-counsel's deficient performance created little actual prejudice to be considered in our assessment … of the collective prejudice of counsel's errors. Schofield v. Holsey , [281 Ga. 809, 811, n. 1, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007)].” Davenport v. State, 283 Ga. 171, 656 S.E.2d 844 (January 28, 2008). “[D]efense counsel ‘is given wide latitude in making closing arguments. (Cit.) This Court will not, with benefit of hindsight, second-guess defense trial strategies in closing arguments. Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions were not reasonable, we will presume that these strategies were not deficient. (Cit.)’ [Cit.] Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. 760, 763(4)(c) (642 S.E.2d 817) (2007). See also Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62(4) (428 S.E.2d 73) (1993). It cannot be said that trial counsel was ineffective simply because another attorney might have used different language or placed a different emphasis on the evidence. See Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 308(6) (647 S.E.2d 576) (2007).” 18. CLOSING ARGUMENT, FAILURE TO OBJECT, See subheading EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT, FAILURE TO OBJECT, below 19. CONCEDING GUILT/ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL HISTORY Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.App. 395, 696 S.E.2d 686 (June 11, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel conceded defendant’s guilt as to aggravated assault, as to which there were numerous witnesses, while contesting the charge of armed robbery, as to which there was only one witness (and which carried potential life sentence). Citing “ Paul v. State, 257 Ga.App. 86 (570 S.E.2d 399) (2002) (given overwhelming evidence of theft, trial counsel's strategy of showing state could prove robbery but not armed robbery was reasonable); see also Mallon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 394, 396(2) (597 S.E.2d 497) (2004) (bench trial strategy of showing that evidence established lesser charged offense but not greater charged offense was reasonable).” Accord, Favors v. State , 296 Ga. 842,