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770 S.E.2d 855 (March 27, 2015) (given the unequivocal and undisputed testimony, “it was not objectively unreasonable to concede guilt on [charge of aggravated assault on a police officer] in an effort to avoid a conviction on the more serious murder charges.”). Biggins v. State, 299 Ga.App. 554, 683 S.E.2d 96 (August 5, 2009). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel, in closing argument at defendant’s trial for aggravated battery against his girlfriend, “stated that Biggins was not a ‘nice guy,’ that he hoped that [victim] C.H. would not get involved in a relationship with someone like Biggins in the future, and that Biggins acted wrongly in striking C.H. Nevertheless, Biggins's trial counsel further argued that C. H.'s testimony lacked credibility and that Biggins's actions did not constitute the serious offenses with which he was charged. At the hearing on Biggins's motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that his comments during closing argument were part of his strategy, in light of the overwhelming evidence that C.H. had been struck, to convince the jury to convict Biggins only on the lesser-included charges.” Claritt v. State, 280 Ga.App. 384, 634 S.E.2d 81 (June 16, 2006). “ Claritt maintains that counsel was ineffective for acknowledging during his opening statement that Claritt was a marijuana dealer. Counsel testified that he felt the information would explain ‘the type of witnesses that would appear’ and address credibility issues. The attorney further stated that, given Henderson’s testimony that he participated in the robbery to repay a marijuana debt, the evidence of Claritt’s marijuana dealing would be tendered in any event. Under these circumstances, the decision to address Claritt’s marijuana-dealing during opening statements was tactical. [Cit.]” Lawson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 334, 620 S.E.2d 600 (September 1, 2005). Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient where counsel admitted in opening that defendant had drugs in his pocket at time of arrest. “Lawson’s attorney revealed that his overall strategy was to admit to the lesser charges to get acquittals on the more serious ones and explained that he therefore used the marijuana possession as an explanation for why Lawson had run from the police.” Admission was also consistent with defendant’s statement to police. Moore v. State, 274 Ga.App. 432, 618 S.E.2d 122 (July 14, 2005). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel stipulated to the fact that defendant was a convicted felon to keep out of evidence fact that she had more than one prior felony conviction and was in prison when she gave a statement to police in this case. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (December 13, 2004). Florida Supreme Court erred in holding that counsel was per se ineffective in a capital trial for conceding guilt and focusing instead on the sentencing phase, without defendant’s express consent. Here, counsel had several discussions with defendant pre-trial, but defendant was non-responsive when counsel proposed his trial strategy. Counsel testified that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and that contesting guilt would damage the credibility of counsel and defendant in the sentencing phase. A unanimous Supreme Court agrees, noting “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for attempting to impress the jury with his candor and his unwillingness to engage in ‘a useless charade.’” “[I]n a capital case, counsel must consider in conjunction both the guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed. When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant’s best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel’s strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant’s explicit consent. Instead, if counsel’s strategy, given the evidence bearing on the defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, that is the end of the matter; no tenable claim of ineffective assistance would remain.” Walker v. State, 268 Ga.App. 669, 602 S.E.2d 351 (July 22, 2004). Trial counsel was not ineffective for agreeing to allow prosecutor to cross-examine defense witness about his criminal history without certified copies of his convictions, where witness was not listed on witness list and could have been properly excluded from testifying at all. Allowing witness to testify in return for allowing impeachment based on GCIC print-out without certified copies was “a compromise both parties accepted.” Dixon v. State, 268 Ga.App. 215, 601 S.E.2d 748 (June 30, 2004). 1. Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel apprised jury venire of defendant’s prior guilty plea to the offenses on trial. Decision was strategic – counsel wanted to discover which jurors in small community were already aware of the prior plea – but not a reasonable decision in light of other means of discovering same information. State could not have presented evidence of prior plea under OCGA § 17-7-93(b). Error not reversible, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. 2. Similarly, Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel “introduced evidence of his prior criminal history,” mistakenly believing his character was already in issue. Error not reversible, however, in light of