☢ test - Í

overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (June 28, 2004). 1. Franks argues that trial counsel in the guilt-innocence phase closing argument erroneously conceded his guilt on some of the charged offenses. He avers that this resulted in a complete breakdown of the adversarial process because he had pled not guilty and was entitled to have his lawyer refrain from effectively pleading him guilty without his permission in the argument to the jury. Citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-661 (104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.E.2d 657) (1984), he claims that a failure of trial counsel of this magnitude means that prejudice is presumed and a new trial is required.” Such error did not occur here, however; while counsel did say that defendant was “guilty” of certain charges in issue, thrust of argument was that he committed the act, but lacked the requisite intent. “When determining whether the Cronic presumption of prejudice applies because trial counsel’s argument constituted a breakdown in the adversarial process, ‘[t]he focus must be on whether, in light of the entire record, the attorney remained a legal advocate of the defendant who acted with “undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service” to the defendant.’ [Cit.] The record shows that trial counsel remained a vigorous advocate of Franks’s case throughout the guilt-innocence phase closing argument and that he argued that Franks lacked the requisite mental state to be convicted of the crimes against the children. Trial counsel’s argument in this case is distinguishable from the cases cited by Franks where counsel had clearly and unequivocally asserted to the jury that their client was guilty as charged by the government. [Cits.] Therefore, the Cronic presumption of prejudice does not apply.” 2. Counsel was not ineffective for calling defendant a “loser” in closing argument; thrust of argument was that defendant and victim had gotten mixed up with “some big-time, dangerous drug dealers” who had actually committed the murders in question. Argument was consistent with defense presented. Hudson v. State, 277 Ga. 581, 591 S.E.2d 807 (January 12, 2004). Counsel’s failure to request limiting instruction on use of defendant’s prior felony conviction, “[i]n the absence of contrary evidence, … [is] presumed to be part of trial strategy.” 20. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, FAILURE TO FILE MOTION TO REVEAL Sorrells v. State, 326 Ga.App. 888, 755 S.E.2d 586 (March 28, 2014). Physical precedent only. Conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed, but remanded to consider ineffective assistance. Counsel’s performance was deficient when he failed to move for disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, Thornton test was met here. “Because the confidential informant participated in the drug transaction, his testimony appears material to Sorrells's defense of misidentification; the testimony presented by the prosecution was in conflict with that presented by Sorrells; and the confidential informant was the only available witness to the transaction who could have amplified or contradicted the testimony of the state's witnesses concerning the seller's identity. See Little v. State, 230 Ga.App. 803, 808–810(3), 498 S.E.2d 284 (1998) (concluding that the threshold requirements for an in camera hearing were met, where the police officer's testimony was in conflict with the defense witness's testimony that the defendant was not at the drug scene and thus could not have participated in the drug transaction, and where the confidential informant was the only available witness to the drug transaction who could have amplified or contradicted their testimony; noting further that the defendant elected not to testify); Hampton v. State, 215 Ga.App. 57–58, 449 S.E.2d 654 (1994) (concluding that an in camera proceeding to determine whether the failure to obtain identity of confidential informant was harmful was required, where testimony of undercover police officer working with confidential informant conflicted with the testimony of defendant).” Counsel said he didn’t seek the informant’s identity because he didn’t want to add another witness against defendant, but “Sorrells's trial lawyer conceded that he had not discerned that the informant's testimony would have been damaging.” Remanded to determine whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Daniel v. State, 306 Ga.App. 48, 701 S.E.2d 499 (September 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for drug trafficking and possession affirmed; “Daniel contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to demand a hearing on Daniel's motion to reveal the identity of the CI, and further that the trial court erred in refusing to conduct an inquiry into the identity of the CI during the hearing on Daniel's motion for new trial. Both of Daniel's claims fail, however, because it is undisputed that prior to the time of trial, Daniel definitively knew the identity of the CI. “It is axiomatic that harm as well as error must be established by an appellant in order to secure a reversal of his conviction.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gilford v. State, 296 Ga.App. 651, 655(4), 673 S.E.2d 40 (2009). See also Smith v. State, 302 Ga.App. 222, 227-228(3)(a), 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010); Disharoon v. State, 288 Ga.App. 1, 7(2), 652 S.E.2d 902 (2007).”